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Abstract 
The rating quality of credit rating agencies (CRAs) attracted substantial attention from 
researchers after the global financial crisis. In particular, the potential conflicts of 
interest of CRAs have been widely criticised. Investors expect CRAs to provide 
accurate and timely ratings as an evaluation benchmark. However, CRAs collect most 
of their revenue from bond issuers; thus, they have an incentive to cater to issuers, 
resulting in inflated and non-informative ratings.  
This study examines how incumbent issuer-pay CRAs in China changed their ratings 
strategy in response to a reform in the credit rating industry. This reform introduces a 
new independent rating agency, China Credit Rating (CCR), which utilised a 
combination of public utility and investor-pay business models. CCR receives great 
support from the government which prevent it from the pressure given by issuers and 
investors. Meanwhile, CCR collects part of its revenue from subscribers, reducing the 
possibility of government budget shortage. As a result, CCR tends to play a role in 
disciplining incumbent issuer-pay CRAs’ rating behaviour and further improving 
ratings’ information quality. By investigating how incumbent issuer-pay CRAs in China 
respond to the entry of CCR, this thesis finds that the rating inflation for firms that are 
also covered by CCR are significantly lower than those not covered by CCR. Moreover, 
market reaction to rating changes by CRAs on firms covered by CCR is more 
pronounced after CCR’s rating coverage initiation. These results indicate that ratings 
information quality from CRAs has been improved in the sense that rating inflation is 
attenuated and ratings are associated with larger market reaction when CCR is present. 
This result adds empirical evidence to the literature documenting the influence of the 
introduction of a new rating agency with an alternative business model to issuer-pay 
rating agencies. This research further shows that the scope of information quality 
improvement is associated with different information scenarios and the reputation of the 
rating assigners. Specifically, the information quality improvements are more 
pronounced for firms facing better investor protection environment (e.g. advanced 
marketization or better legal rights protection) and for ratings from more reputable 
CRAs. These results suggest that both internal (i.e. CRAs’ reputation) and external 
forces (i.e. investor protection environment) are crucial to attain higher informativeness 
for CRAs’ ratings with the presence of CCR. In addition, this study provides primary 
evidence that certification via reputable CRAs is beneficial to issuers in the bond market 
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in China, with regard to save financing cost. After considering the issuer-reputable CRA 
match, this thesis finds bonds rated by the most reputable CRAs to be associated with a 
lower yield spread (higher bond price), revealing the investors’ recognition of the rating 
quality of reputable CRAs. This result is consistent with the traditional certification 
hypothesis and underlying reputational mechanism. This research further finds such 
benefits are larger for firms with worse investor protection environment or with higher 
risks. On the other hand, yield premium is significantly lower in the post-CCR period 
and for firms not covered by CCR. These results illustrate that reputable CRAs play a 
role of certifying the quality of firms’ debt securities, and this certification effect is 
reinforced by the entry of CCR. 
Overall, this study contributes to a growing body of literature that examines how 
different business models of CRA affect credit ratings by studying the efficiency of an 
innovative trial in China, making a supplement to the relevant theoretical models, 
empirical studies and government proposals. It also complements the study on 
reputational mechanism of credit rating agencies, calls for investors’ attention on the 
different reactions of different issuer-pay CRAs, and emphasizes the importance of 
investor protection environment construction. This study also supplements the research 
on certification role of credit rating agencies, and provides a sight for bond issuers and 
investors when evaluating bonds rated by CRAs with different reputation. 
Keywords: Certification effect, Credit ratings, Informativeness, Investor-pay rating 
agency, Public rating agency, Rating inflation, Reputation 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I will introduce the background of this thesis, including an overview of 
prevailing business models used in U.S. and the institutions of China’s credit rating 
industry, and a summary of the main findings and contributions of this research. Section 
1.1 briefly introduces and compares various business models adopted by credit rating 
agencies. Section 1.2 briefly introduce the international experience of credit rating 
industry. Issuer-pay credit ratings agencies (CRAs) and an independent CRA based on a 
synthesized model is discussed in Section 1.3 and Section 1.4 respectively. Section 1.5 
summarizes the main findings and contributions of this study 
1.1 Background 
Since the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007–2009, criticisms of CRAs, such as Moody’s, 
S&P and Fitch, have regularly made the headlines. In particular, IMF (2009) estimated 
that the loss on structured financial products was approximately US$4 trillion. A lot of 
arguments and reform proposals focus on the business models adopted by CRAs. In the 
following, I briefly introduce the involution of these models. 
1.1.1 From Investor-Pay to Issuer-Pay 
Initially, to avoid the adverse selection problem between investors and issuers, private 
CRAs emerged as a solution to the information asymmetry in the 1900s (White 2010) 
when investors paid CRAs for their rating reports. However, in the early 1970s, this 
charging model changed to the ‘issuer-pay’ model under which CRAs charged issuers 
according to the size and type of the issue. There were two main reasons for this change. 
The first reason was the widespread use of photocopy machines that led to the problem 
of ‘free-riding’, which infringed on CRAs’ revenue. In worst cases, CRAs could not 
make enough revenue to meet their operation expenses (White 2002). The second 
reason was the surging demand of issuers for credit ratings to assure doubtful investors. 
A key cause of this was Penn Central’s failure to pay back its US$82 million 
commercial paper (CP) in 1970. This, together with the 1970 recession, caused 
investors to doubt the solvency of many companies’ CPs, which had been booming in 
the 1960s. When faced by the liquidity crisis caused by investors’ refusal to roll over 
their CPs, issuers wanted to reassure panicked investors by actively seeking credit 
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ratings (White 2002). A regular market pattern was established in which new debt issues 
had to have at least one credit rating when they came to the market. This increased 
rating demand allowed CRAs to impose charges on issuers. These two reasons pushed 
CRAs to change their business model. Moody’s and Fitch changed their charging 
models in 1970, and S&P followed in 1974. Today, a majority of CRAs accept the 
issuer-pay model and collect most of their income from the companies they rate. Among 
the current 10 nationally recognised statistical rating organisations (NRSROs), only one, 
Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR), still applies the investor-pay model. 
Many researchers and policy-makers argue that the current charging model may 
encourage CRAs to give favourable ratings to issuers. Specifically, CRAs prefer 
customers who have larger issues (Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012; He, Qian & Strahan 
2011) or who are repeat issuers (Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012), resulting in inflated 
and inaccurate ratings for these issuers. Therefore, the information quality of ratings is 
reduced. Critics point out that issuer-pay CRAs fear losing clients before their next issue. 
Thus, the delays in adjusting ratings (weekly information content of ratings) to reflect 
the changing financial situation of the issuers and the bias towards large companies are 
widely criticised. Sean Egan of the Egan-Jones investor-pay CRA viewed the issuer-pay 
model as irredeemable, citing evidence from past failures such as Enron and Parmalat 
and certain structured products in the subprime crisis (Nielsen 2013). 
1.1.2 Comparison of Issuer-Pay and Investor-Pay 
Many studies aim to compare different business models of CRAs and the question of 
who pays the credit rating seems to be a matter of importance. First, ratings are usually 
more favourable and less accurate/informative under issuer-pay model. For example, 
theoretically, in Skreta and Veldkamp’s (2009) model, issuers are inclined to release the 
most favourable rating through rating shopping among different issuer-pay CRAs with a 
naïve investors’ assumption. They suggested that this situation can be alleviated by 
changing to the investor-pay model. Pagano and Volpin’s (2010) model advocates that 
the adoption of the investor-pay model can improve the accuracy of ratings. They 
further suggest a more modest method that keeps the issuer-pay CRAs but requires 
issuers to pay an upfront fee that is irrelevant to the rating results to discourage rating 
shopping. Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2016) developed a model that analysed optimal 
compensation schemes for CRAs, and the results differed according to which party paid 
for the ratings: the social planner, issuers or investors. Larger errors in ratings were 
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found when issuers ordered the ratings compared to investors. From an empirical 
perspective, Beaver, Shakespeare and Soliman (2006) compared the ratings of Moody’s 
and EJR, and found that EJR’s ratings provided more accurate and timely information to 
investors. Jiang, Harris and Xie (2012) tested S&P’s ratings before and after it adopted 
an issuer-pay model, using Moody’s as a benchmark. They found that the ratings of 
S&P were higher afterwards, which suggests that the issuer-pay model leads to rating 
inflation. They also undertook cross-sectional analysis to identify whether ratings 
increased more for bonds with higher potential of generating conflicts of interest, and 
found that an increase in ratings correlated with inherent conflicts of interest. Cornaggia 
and Cornaggia (2013) carried out research on Rapid Ratings, another investor-pay CRA, 
and concluded that this agency provided more reasonable, timely and accurate ratings 
for investors compared to Moody’s, who was more inclined to satisfy the issuers. 
Second, different models may attain the same level of social welfare provided that there 
is high degree of regulatory intervention. For instance, Bongaerts (2013) sets a model 
with the rational agents’ assumption and showed that the investor-pay model, issuer-
produced ratings and mandatory co-investments model could all improve social welfare, 
and that the very high degrees of regulatory intervention were essential in making the 
above alternative models take hold 
Third, many reasons are proposed to explain why the issuer-pay model causes rating 
inflation and inaccuracy. Rating shopping, through which issuers can take advantage of 
the issuer-pay business model to increase the ratings for both corporate bonds (CBs) and 
structured products, is thought to be a significant reason. Issuers may choose the highest 
rating from the preliminary rating process, and it is assumed that issuers will always 
pursue higher ratings. This rating shopping may pressure a CRA to increase the rating, 
causing rating inflation according to the model developed by Skreta and Veldkamp 
(2009). Fennell and Medvedev (2011) also found evidence of rating shopping from their 
interviews. Bongaerts’s (2014) model found that rating shopping still exists with 
rational investors. In principle, rating shopping can be exacerbated by competition and 
competition itself is argued to be responsible for rating inflation and inaccuracy. Bolton, 
Freixas and Shapiro’s (2012) model shows that lower reputation cost, fierce competition 
and more naive investors provide CRAs with incentives to inflate ratings and that a 
monopoly should be efficient in solving the rating shopping problem. Bongaerts, 
Cremers and Goetzmann (2012) identified the tie-breaker role that Fitch plays when 
Moody’s and S&P disagree with each other; this role creates an incentive for issuers to 
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seek a favourable rating from Fitch. Moreover, Becker and Milbourn (2011) suggested 
that the entry of Fitch coincided with reduced quality of the ratings from incumbent 
issuer-pay CRAs such as Moody’s and S&P; the rating levels increased, the correlation 
between ratings and market-implied yields fell and the ability of ratings to predict 
default deteriorated. Their empirical study accepts that competition weakens the 
reputational mechanism and leads to higher rating inflation; however, it rejects rating 
shopping as the mechanism. 
The above studies mainly advocate that investor-pay CRAs are more reliable than 
issuer-pay CRAs, with rating shopping and competition put forward as two reasons for 
this. 
1.1.3 Other Proposed Business Models and Debates 
1.1.3.1 Other Alternative Models 
When comparing issuer-pay models with investor-pay models, the latter receives a high 
level of support. The investor-produced model, public utility model and platform model 
have also been proposed by scholars as alternative ways to improve rating quality. For 
example, Bongaerts (2014) introduced the investor-produced model in which rating 
agencies are also the end users of the ratings. Diomande, Heintz and Pollin (2009) and 
Lynch (2010) suggested that the United States (US) launch a public CRA, arguing that 
the conflict of interest could be managed by modelling the CRA on other successful 
public independent bodies such as the Federal Reserve or the Supreme Court. Mathis, 
McAndrews and Rochet (2009) and Richardson and White (2009) proposed the 
introduction of a platform that would act as an intermediary between issuers and CRAs 
to prevent issuers from influencing ratings. It would be this platform’s responsibility to 
assign the rating request to a CRA, either randomly or based on the CRA’s rating 
quality. 
Many regulatory proposals also support changing the issuer-pay model. For instance, in 
the US, the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) 
brought in a wide range of regulatory reforms aimed at reducing the conflicts of interest 
and increasing rating transparency. The issue of issuer-pay versus investor-pay demands 
an assessment of the conflicts of interest by the Office of the Controller General. 
Another proposal relevant to this study is the Franken Amendment, which suggested 
that the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should introduce a platform to 
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bring all NRSROs and issuers together through an independent organisation for 
structured products—the exact platform model that Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet 
(2009) and Richardson and White (2009) proposed. However, after a two-and-a-half-
year study by the SEC, the Franken Amendment was not implemented.1 In Europe, the 
Group of Twenty (G20), Financial Services Authority (FSA), Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have all 
presented proposals for credit rating industry reform. The proposals relevant to this 
study are those that advocate business model change. For example, the European 
Commission Consultative Paper (European Commission 2010) advocated a public 
utility model when it proposed to ‘examine the possibility of creating a public European 
CRA to compete with the private sector’, and ‘to explore ways to mitigate conflicts of 
interest in the issuer-pay business model, especially considering a turn back to investor 
or subscriber pays, a mixture of these two and alternative approaches involving a third 
party paying or hiring the services’. 
1.1.3.2 Debates on Alternative Models 
Despite criticism of the issuer-pay model and proposals of alternative models, there are 
still debates regarding which model should be used. Some people do not believe the 
issuer-pay model is at fault. For example, big CRAs such as Moody’s, S&P and Fitch 
argue that the conflict of interest is completely manageable (Becker & Opp 2013; 
Coface 2010; Pagano & Volpin 2010), and CRAs may believe that the long-term 
revenue balances the rating fee collected from the issuers who ask for high ratings with 
the reputation cost (House 1995). This means the reputational mechanism of CRAs is 
elevated to achieve self-regulation. 
Moreover, there are some arguments that suggest that other business models also cause 
rating inflation and inaccuracy due to investors’ and regulators’ over-reliance on credit 
ratings. A kind of ‘certification’ role is allocated to ratings, whereby ratings act as a 
credit-quality threshold or gatekeeper in financial contracts. Deb et al.’s (2011) study 
listed the four typical certification roles of CRAs in the use of contracts and market 
practice, and participants in the market have different expectations of CRAs according 
to their certification role. Aside from their use in contracts, ratings are also widely used 
within regulatory frameworks such as supervisory policies (SEC 2002) and in 
determining net or regulatory capital requirements for banks, securities firms and 
                                                          
1 See Becker and Opp (2013), SEC (2012) and SEC (2014). 
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insurance companies (Gonzalez, Sotelino & Savoia 2011). This over-reliance on ratings 
means that both issuers and investors prefer higher ratings to satisfy the benefit target 
and regulatory requirements. Therefore, this reliance also dissuades investor-pay CRAs 
from reducing the rating inflation. The model built by Opp, Opp and Harris (2013) 
incorporates the regulatory purposes of ratings, and finds that after considering rating-
contingent regulation, CRAs provide higher ratings regardless of whether the higher 
ratings reveal more or less information. This is consistent with Cornaggia and 
Cornaggia’s (2013) findings that Moody’s is willing to give relatively higher ratings for 
bonds at marginal investment grade in order to make them more convenient for 
regulated investors to buy. Cole and Cooley (2014) suggested that regulatory reliance is 
a more likely cause of rating inflation and inaccuracy than the business model. 
Further, debates also focus on the disadvantages of alternative business models. For the 
investor-pay model, the free-rider problem is the main challenge (Richardson & White 
2009). As mentioned previously, the free-rider problem is one of the reasons why CRAs 
changed from the investor-pay to issuer-pay model in the 1970s. Although a lower 
subscription fee can alleviate this problem, investor-pay CRAs will still find it difficult 
to take advantage of economies of scale and may compromise their rating quality or 
leave the industry (Fennell & Medvedev 2011). Other challenges of the investor-pay 
model include pressure from investors to require high ratings (Pagano & Volpin 2010), 
regulatory use of ratings (Goodhart 2008) and using ratings for structured products 
(Fennell & Medvedev 2011). Kashyap and Kovrijnykh’s (2016) recent model shows 
that even though the investor-pay model provides more accurate ratings, investors ask 
for ratings too often, thus dampening their social efficiency. 
In regard to the investor-produced model, investors themselves may become the party 
that benefits most from rating inflation in terms of lower capital charge (Gonzalez, 
Sotelino & Savoia 2011; Sy 2009). The model developed by Becker and Opp (2013) 
shows that investor-produced ratings are slightly more inflated when running under the 
existence of issuer-pay CRAs. This result is in line with Behn, Haselmann and Vig’s 
(2014) suggestion that banks’ internal ratings are inaccurate and over-optimistic. 
Bongaerts’s (2014) model also shows that even though investor-produced CRAs can 
induce more accurate ratings, the traditional issuer-pay CRAs cater better to issuers, 
thus leaving rare market for investor-produced CRAs. 
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The public utility model does not eliminate conflicts of interest because the government 
is also an issuer (European Commission 2010). It is likely that public CRAs would be 
biased towards sovereign or municipal bonds, or large government-owned companies 
(Cinquegrana 2009). Other concerns regarding the public utility model include whether 
rating quality may decline due to insufficient budget funds, how ratings of public CRAs 
will be perceived by the market and how to maintain high-quality ratings given the 
absence of competitive market pressure (Fennell & Medvedev 2011). 
The platform model has also been questioned. Along with the difficulty in deciding 
which criteria is used to choose a CRA for a rating request, the platform model also has 
the potential to decrease incentives for CRAs to provide high-quality ratings as they 
may be chosen randomly regardless of the quality of their ratings. Additionally, if a 
platform has a monopoly it would have a role as a systemic regulator alongside its 
commercial role, thus creating the potential for a new conflict of interest to arise 
(Fennell & Medvedev 2011). Moreover, Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) pointed out 
that the Cuomo plan (issuers pay upfront for ratings) proposed by Pagano and Volpin 
(2010) alleviates the conflict of interest but cannot solve rating shopping. Bongaerts 
(2014) suggested that the main reason for rating inflation is the private benefit for 
issuers and investors. His model suggested that the investor-pay model, investor-
produced ratings and Franken Amendment may all have very limited potential in 
improving social welfare—the issuer-pay CRAs would need to be banned to make any 
of them effective. 
As discussed, the proposed alternative models all have their own drawbacks and cannot 
perfectly eliminate the conflict of interest between CRAs, investors, issuers and 
government, thus providing no conclusive solution. In practice, the launch of CRAs 
with alternative models has been very limited. For example, the French credit insurer 
Coface wanted to sell its investor-produced ratings to other investors, but this never 
eventuated (Coface 2010). Another example is Markus Krall, a senior managing partner 
at Roland Berger, who tried to set up a European not-for-profit investor-pay CRA. This 
plan was finally abandoned due to a lack of interest from investors (Nielsen 2013; 
Spiegel 2012). Moreover, the SEC did not pass the Franken Amendment, thus keeping 
the present issuer-pay CRAs prevalent in the market. Black Rock and PIMCO are two 
examples of companies who offer investor-produced ratings. However, while their 
ratings are adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in the US 
to determine capital requirements, the companies only focus on commercial mortgage-
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backed securities in the case of Black Rock and residential mortgage-backed securities 
in the case of PIMCO; thus, investor-produced ratings are not widely applied in the 
industry. 
Apart from the drawbacks of the alternative business models, the nature of the credit 
rating industry, large economies of scale, extensive time required to establish 
reputations, network externalities and high fixed costs also create significant barriers to 
entry into the market (Fennell & Medvedev 2011) and are further reasons why there are 
so few examples of the alternative models in practice. This lack of widespread practical 
cases of introducing other business models into the credit rating industry creates a 
barrier to empirical analysis of the effectiveness of these alternative ratings models. 
For the aforementioned reasons, issuer-pay CRAs have historically dominated the 
ratings industry around the world and, even after many regulatory proposals, no 
individual country or area—except China—has widely applied other alternative models. 
China launched an independent CRA (CCR) in 2010 that combined the public utility 
and investor-pay models. This unique undertaking provides us with an experiment 
through which to analyse whether this specific CRA with its new business model 
affected the rating information quality of the incumbent issuer-pay CRAs in China.  
1.1.4 Certification Effect of Reputable CRAs 
After the subprime crisis and sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the failure of CRAs has 
been widely discussed by the public and academia. The discussion was directed at their 
capital: their reputation. There are several branches of studies on the reputation of CRAs 
and financial intermediaries in general. Nevertheless, this thesis will focus on the 
relationship between intermediary reputation and security price. 
Theoretically, there are still inconsistencies between the certification hypothesis and 
market power hypothesis in relation to the role of a financial intermediary’s reputation. 
In terms of the certification effect via reputation of the CRAs, some commentators 
believe that the reputational mechanism can alleviate any conflict of interest to some 
extent. When issuer-pay CRAs consider the long-term reputation cost, they tend to 
provide more informative ratings to avoid investors’ or regulators’ derecognition of 
their rating inflation (Bar-Isaac & Shapiro 2013; Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012). 
Further, Goel and Thakor (2010) found that CRAs’ concern over their reputation can 
induce them to invest more, and that reputation tends to dominate any conflicts of 
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interest in the industry (Covitz & Harrison 2003). Fischer’s (2015) model uses a 
dynamic setting to capture the effects of CRAs’ reputations, and the author found that 
low-quality bond issuers generally tend to match low-quality CRAs. However, the same 
debate between certification and market power also exists in the credit rating industry. 
For example, model built by Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009) suggested that 
agencies increase their ratings using their cumulative reputation. The truth-telling 
incentives are weaker when CRAs have more business from rating complex products. 
Empirically, there has been limited research on the influence of the reputation of 
China’s CRAs on bond-issuing prices. For a long time, the reputation of issuer-pay 
CRAs in China was criticised (Kennedy 2008; Lee 2006).  
Generally speaking, the empirical studies on the relationship between bond yield and 
CRA’s certification role are still sparse and inconclusive, while the inconclusive 
evidence mainly stems from the differences in the sample and time period selection. 
China provides a unique setting in which many issuer-pay CRAs are competing; thus, I 
have sufficient criteria to split them into reputable and non-reputable groups. The entry 
of CCR gives us an exogenous shock to further test the certification hypothesis. This 
thesis complements the literature that supports the certification effect of reputable CRAs 
in the bond market. 
1.2 International experience from the US 
The United States has the largest bond market in the world, whose outstanding amount 
is about USD 35.78 trillion at the end of 2014. And three credit rating agencies, 
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch nowadays dominate the international 
credit rating industry. They hold 97%-98% of U.S. bond market2, and hold a collective 
global market share roughly 95%, with Moody’s and S&P having around 40%, and 
Fitch 15% (Caouette et al. 2008). Therefore, the U.S. bond market is a typical example 
of the mature markets internationally, and then the institutional background of 
international credit rating industry is mainly about the U.S. situation.  
1.2.1 The history of CRAs 
The emerging of credit rating industry started from 1909, when John Moody publicly 
rated the American railroad bonds (White 2010), and it extended its business to utility 
                                                          
2 Status quo for rating agencies (chart of percentage of outstanding credit ratings reported to the SEC 2007 and 2011; 
and Moody's revenue and income 1996, 2000, 2010, 2012)| mcclatchydc.com 
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and industrial bonds in 19103. Poor’s Publishing Co. and Standard Statistics4 followed 
in 1916 and 1922 respectively. Then in 1924, the Fitch Publishing CO. 5  began its 
business. Internationally, the transmission of capital flow from banking system to 
financial market leaded the need for CRAs not only in the developed but also the 
developing countries (Dale & Thomas 1991). Together with U.S. four largest CRAs, 
one other U.S., one British, two Canadian and three Japanese firms are listed among the 
world's "most influential" rating agencies by the Financial Times in its publication 
Credit Ratings (Cantor & Packer 1995). As the development of the international 
financial markets, credit rating agencies expanded their business overseas.  
All the ratings given by CRAs are to indicate the possibility of securities default. The 
symbols are created by CRAs themselves to rank the risk of default, and generally the 
higher the ranking the lower the risk. Gradually, CRAs wanted to add accuracy to the 
ratings6, so they introduced plus and minus symbols. Other modifications including the 
“watchlist” have also become standard. 
The development of CRAs from one part comes from the booming of capital market, 
from another part it is because of the regulation. The power of influence of CRAs is 
given and enforced by the regulation to some extent. In U.S., bank regulators started to 
require that banks needed to heed ratings when they invested in bonds from 1930s, and 
banks were prohibited from buying speculative bonds in 1936 (Richardson & White 
2009). This rule is still in place today, enacting by Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC). In the next few decades, insurance regulators related the minimum 
capital requirement for insurance companies to the bond ratings held in their investment 
portfolios. The same method began to be used by the federal pension in 1970s.  
Then an important organization was founded in 1975 by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Similar to the requirements of other financial regulators, SEC 
wanted broker-dealers to keep sufficient capital levels, and it should be related to the 
bonds’ ratings in their investment. However, SEC found that the qualities of CRAs were 
uneven, and there was no clear statement on which CRA the financial institutions 
                                                          
3  Moody’s company was acquired by Dun & Bradstreet in 1962; Moody’s was spun off as a 
freestanding company in 2000. 
4 The two companies merged, to become Standard & Poor’s, in 1941; in 1966 that company was 
absorbed into McGraw-Hill, where it remains today. 
5 Fitch merged with a British rating firm, IBCA, in 1997 and is now a subsidiary of FIMILAC, a 
French business services conglomerate. 
6 Fitch in 1973, S&P in 1974 and Moody’s in 1982. 
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should heed, leaving the possibility that ratings of bogus CRAs could be used for 
regulatory purpose. SEC believed this would cause the bad CRA drive good ones, 
leading potential risks from regulatory perspective. Thus SEC established nationally 
recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO), a fully new regulatory category. 
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch were immediately recognized by NRSRO, and then other 
financial regulators quickly accepted this category and applied it to their requirements.  
The influence of CRAs was reinforced by regulation again. And the monopoly situation 
of credit rating industry was also intensified because of the barrier created by SEC and 
the widespread recognition of NRSRO designation by bond market investors.  
In the next 25 years, there were four more CRAs entered the NRSRO, but the total 
number at the end of 2000 came back to the original three as Fitch merged the new 
entrants. The bankruptcy of Enron in November 2011 drove the attention of media, 
scholars and congress to the failure of the three NRSORs, because they still kept 
investment grade on Enron’s debt five days before its collapse. After the congressional 
hearings and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, SEC did some simple reports on credit rating 
industry, yielding a more widespread recognition of the NRSOR process while not 
mentioning the barriers to enter the category. After that wave, SEC designated the 
fourth and fifth NRSRO in 2003 and 20057, but the process was still sluggish. To 
prompt SEC and clear the designation opacity, Congress passed the Credit Rating 
Agency Reform Act (CRARA). The Act was signed into law in September 2006, 
specifying criteria for designating NRSROs and requiring the transparency of NRSRO 
process. After the passage of the Act, SEC has added six NRSROs, but in 2011 one 
Japanese CRA withdrew its NRSRO registration, thus the total number of NRSROs till 
now is 10. 
In total, the need of credit rating started from the development of financial market, and 
from 1930s, the power of CRAs has been gradually enforced by the financial regulators. 
The regulators play a very important role on setting the barrier of market entry, creating 
a monopoly market and ensuring the dominance of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. 
                                                          
7 Dominion Bond Rating Services, a Canadian firm was designated in 2003. A.M. Best, a specialist 
on insurance companies’ obligations was designated in 2005. 
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1.2.2 The charging models of CRAs 
Credit rating agencies originally charged fee from the investors by selling their reports 
or publications. But from the early 1970s, this charging model began to change to the 
“issuer-pay”, which means the CRAs charged the issuers according to the size and type 
of the issue. There are two main reasons for this change. Firstly, the widespread use of 
photocopy machines leaded to the problem of “free rider”, which decreased the CRAs’ 
revenue. The CRAs even did not have enough money to support their operation (White 
2002). The second reason is the urgent demand of issuers for credit ratings from 1970. 
In 1970, Penn Central failed to pay back its $82 million commercial paper. And together 
with the 1970 recession, investors started to doubt the solvency of a lot of companies’ 
CPs, which was booming from the 1960s. Faced with the liquidity crisis caused by 
investors’ refusal to roll over their CPs, issuers wanted to reassure those panic investors 
by actively seeking credit ratings. And then a regular market pattern was established 
that new debt issues must had at least one credit rating when they came to the market. 
This increasing rating demand let CRAs found they can impose charges on issuers. 
Moody’s and Fitch changed their charging models in 1970, and S&P followed in 1974. 
A majority of CRAs accept issuer-pay model and collect most of their incomes from the 
companies they rate. Among the current 10 NRSROs, there is only one exception, Egan-
Jones Rating Company (EJR), still applies the investor-pay model.  
The fees charged by CRAs are related to the issues size and category, and CRAs have 
the right to change the charging standard. According to Cantor and Packer (1995), a 
typical fee on a long-term corporate bond issue ranges from 2 to 3 basis points of the 
principle for each year when the rating maintains. And normally, the fee for each issue 
has both a minimum and a maximum, which can be negotiated for frequent borrowers. 
The charging fees have a tendency to increase in recent years. For instance, the U.S. 
ratings fees of S&P for corporate bonds have been increased to up to 6.15 basis points 
with minimum fee $92,250; the fee for structured issues is also raised to up to 12 basis 
points (Standard & Poor's Rating Services U.S. Ratings Fees Disclosure 2015). 
Moody’s and Fitch are charging more as well. It seems that the 2008-09 financial crisis 
did not change the dominant position and pricing power of the three big CRAs, and they 
also argue the competition of this industry is focused on rating quality rather than price 
(Faux 2011).  
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This change of the charging model causes the discussion about the rise of conflict of 
interest (White 2002). Many researchers believe the current charging model may 
encourage CRAs to give favourable ratings to issuers, which will lead to the rating 
inflation and descending rating accuracy (Skreta & Veldkamp 2009). Especially for the 
structured financial products such as CDS, because CRAs directly engaged in the 
designing process, this conflict of interest is even worse (Richardson & White 2009). 
The conflict also comes from CRAs’ fear to lose the clients for their next issues. Then 
the delays in adjusting ratings to reflect the changing financial situation of the issuers 
and the bias to the large companies are criticized (Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012). 
Faced with these accuses, CRAs themselves argue they keep the rating quality by 
reputation mechanism and they focus on the economic cycle thus do not change the 
ratings frequently.  
1.2.3 The process of getting rated 
Although there are differences in the details of rating process for various CRAs, they all 
generally follow the basic routine. The new issuer will request a preliminary meeting 
with credit analysts. Sometimes, raters will lease a preliminary rating based on public 
information without a meeting. Then it is the time for issuers to decide whether or not to 
proceed the borrowing and rating. When the issuer proceeds, the rating agencies will 
assign a team of analysts to analyse the firm. Generally, firms will provide the raters 
with five years’ financial statements, future financial plans and operation forecasts. The 
analysts will also meet with the senior officers of the issuers, including the CEO, CFO 
typically, and they will discuss the operation of the company in depth. After this 
investigation, the team will attend a rating committee, presenting their qualitative and 
quantitative analysis and their recommended rating. This rating committee is always 
composed by the team leader, other analysts familiar with the industry and some senior 
officers of the agency. And the final rating result is decided by the voting result of this 
committee. After publication of the rating, CRAs will keep on monitor the ratings on an 
ongoing basis. Jewell and Livingston (1999) also briefly introduce the rating process of 
agencies. 
All of the above are for solicited ratings, which means CRAs can get paid through this 
process. But for unsolicited ratings which are not requested by the issuers, CRAs have 
various policies. Moody’s and S&P rate all SEC-registers, US corporate securities, no 
matter they are paid or not (Langohr & Langohr 2008). Fitch began unsolicited rating in 
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2001, targeting high-profile issues with discrepancy. The unsolicited ratings of S&P are 
based on public information while Moody’s and Fitch include a certain amount of inside 
information (Behr & Güttler 2008). Ratings without request are always lower than 
soliciting ratings, and are criticized for its insufficient information. Recently, some 
rating agencies started to withdraw its unsolicited ratings. This is very different from the 
situation of China, which we will discuss later.  
During the rating process, new issues always receive more than two ratings from 
different CRAs. The dual ratings are very common in international bond market. In 
developed countries, the long-time development of financial market leads to the feature 
of dual rating. At the meantime, the regulations put the dual rating in action as well, 
especially for the emerging market. Most dual rating system is applied to particular 
categories of securities, such as the structured financial instruments. Dual rating system 
causes the split ratings, when CRAs have different opinions on one same issue. From 
1983 to September 2008, 14,005 U.S. new issuing corporate bonds have dual ratings 
from Moody’s and S&P, and 6,867 (49.03%) issues among them have split ratings 
(Livingston & Zhou 2009). This is also not the situation of China’s market. 
1.3 Issuer-Pay CRAs in China 
1.3.1 The History of China’s Credit Rating Agencies 
China’s CRAs developed in conjunction with the growth of China’s financial market, 
particularly the bond market. In the mid-1980s, China launched a CB market and CRAs 
emerged to rate stocks, insurance companies, banks and bonds in the domestic market. 
During that decade, China’s CB market experienced a boom and, in 1987, the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC) issued ‘temporary regulations on the management of corporate 
bonds’. The PBOC also encouraged its branches to create credit rating departments in 
their own provinces and, from 1989, some of these departments became independent 
CRAs. The number of CRAs surged to over 90 during this period. However, during this 
time, the PBOC set the coupon rate according to the prevailing one-year bank deposit 
rate (an additional 40%). This meant that ratings had no influence on the bond-issuing 
yield. Further, ratings were not disclosed to the public and were used by government 
authorities to approve issue applications (Chen 2003). 
This boom era led to a disastrous bond default in the mid-1990s, with massive 
borrowers refusing to pay the interest or principal. In the Liaoning and Jilin provinces, 
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more than half of the bonds went to default. Thus, the local government and PBOC had 
to pay out, with the total cost estimated to be between RMB 3 and 8 billion 
(Kennedy 2008). The collapse of Guangdong International Trust and Investment 
Corporation and the Asian financial crisis compounded the situation. In 1999, the 
Chinese government moved the right of CB approval to the State Planning Commission 
(SPC; renamed the National Development and Reform Commission [NDRC] in 2003). 
Shortly thereafter, the SPC applied a quota system and only large state-owned 
enterprises with 100% bank guarantee could issue CBs. The coupon rate was set at 
around 150–250 basis points (bps) above the one-year bank deposit rate (Fleisher 2008). 
At the same time, in December 1997, the PBOC designated nine of the existing 50 
CRAs as agencies who could rate the publicly issued CBs. They were China Chengxin 
Rating Co., Ltd (CCXR); Dagong Global Credit Rating Co., Ltd (Dagong); Shenzhen 
Credit Rating (the predecessor of Pengyuan); Yunnan Credit Rating; Changcheng Credit 
Rating; Shanghai Far East Credit Rating (SFE); Shanghai Brilliance Credit Rating & 
Investors Service Co., Ltd (SBCR); Liaoning Credit Rating; and Fujian Credit Rating 
Committee (the predecessor of Lianhe). Subsequently, China’s bond market and credit 
rating industry experienced low development in the following years. In 2003, NDRC 
claimed that all CBs had to be rated by CRAs who had rating experience from 2000 
onwards, and the number of qualified CRAs decreased from nine to five (CCXR, 
Dagong, SFE, SBRC and Lianhe). During this period, CRAs played a very small role in 
the bond-issuing process, as the approval of CBs was decided by the NDRC and the 
price of bonds was set by the Interest Rate Section of the PBOC’s Monetary Policy 
Division. Moreover, all CBs were guaranteed by a state-owned bank or enterprise. 
In the following years, several of China’s bond market milestones were reached. First, 
in 2005, the PBOC created the short-term CP. The maturity of a CP is one year or less, 
and all firms can apply to issue it without the requirement of guarantee (the price is 
decided by the market). The PBOC also authorised the aforementioned five CRAs to 
give credit ratings to the CPs. Second, in 2008, the PBOC created a new type of bond—
the medium-term note (MTN)—with the same features as a CP, but a longer maturity. 
Both the CP and MTN are traded on the interbank market regulated by the PBOC. The 
volume of CPs and MTNs saw a rapid increase (see Figure 1.1) and the business of 
CRAs surged. More importantly, credit ratings began to have some influence on both 
the issuing coupon rate and the bond price on the secondary market (Tu 2006). This 
proved that the effectiveness of China’s CRAs was strongly related to the level of 
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maturity of the domestic financial market. This is also why I chose data from 2006. The 
third breakthrough came in 2007, when the authorising power for CBs was split 
between the NDRC and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). From 
this point onwards, the CSRC was mainly in charge of the bonds issued by listed 
companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange markets, known as enterprise bonds 
(EBs). Meanwhile, the NDRC started to focus on bonds issued with the main purpose of 
infrastructure construction. Subsequently, EBs were issued and traded on the exchange 
market while CBs were issued and traded on both the exchange and interbank markets. 
After this separation, the CSRC issued provisional administrative measures on the credit 
rating business in the Chinese securities market to regulate the CRAs for EBs. This 
authorisation split added one more supervisor to the credit rating industry. 
Figure 1.1: Volume and Number of Issues on China’s Bond Market 
 
Note: Bonds including non-financial institutions’ CPs, MTNs, CBs and EBs. 
Source: China Bond, Wind. 
Till now, China has the third largest outstanding bond volume around the world, just 
following the US and Japan (Figure 1.2). And China’s government is gradually opening 
its bond market to foreign investors8, which makes this study more significant to help 
investors to better understand China’s bond market.  
Figure 1.2 China’s debt securities in the world bond market 
                                                          
8 http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_23_72846_0_7.html 中国人民银行公告〔2016〕第 3号; 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/3330621/index.html 内地与香港债券市场互
联互通合作管理暂行办法》 
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Generally speaking, the role of China’s CRAs is appointed by financial regulators, 
similar to in the US. The first regulation of CRAs was the revised version of CB 
regulation issued by the PBOC in 1992. It stated that issuers ‘could’ seek ratings from 
CRAs during their application process. Subsequently, in 1997, the PBOC changed this 
regulation to ‘issuance of corporate bond must have ratings’, which reinforced the 
position of the nine recognised CRAs. In 2003, the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC) approved insurance companies to invest in CBs and only 
recognised the ratings from China Chengxin International Credit Rating Company 
Limited (CCXI),9 Dagong, Lianhe and SFE. In the same year, the NDRC also gave five 
CRAs—CCXI, Dagong, Lianhe, SFE and SBCR—the qualification to rate CBs. Further, 
from October 2003 onward, the CSRC required listed companies to hire CRAs when 
they launched bonds. Over the next few years, this requirement was applied to different 
categories of bonds, such as the subordinated debt of banks and insurance companies, 
                                                          
9 A joint venture of China Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCR) and Moody’s. 
 20 
 
Asset Based Securities (ABS), CPs and MTNs. Today, all publicly issued bonds are 
required to be rated by qualified CRAs. 
1.3.2 The Existing Credit Rating Agencies in China 
Currently, there are a total of nine issuer-pay CRAs in China who can issue ratings on 
the bond market. The ‘big four’ CRAs in China are CCXI, Lianhe, Dagong and SBCR. 
From 2006 to 2015, more than 90% of the market’s non-financial institutions’ CPs and 
MTNs were shared by the big four. For CBs, about 70% of issuers were clients of the 
big four. 
CCXI was the first joint venture credit rating company in China. It was founded in 
August 1999 by China Chengxin Securities Credit Rating Company Limited (now 
China Chengxin Credit Management Co., Ltd [CCCM]) and Fitch (1998). CCCM is a 
private CRA that was one of the first CRAs in China (established in 1992). CCXI then 
had permission to rate CBs. In July 2004, Fitch announced its divestment from CCXI 
due to a desire to focus on the domestic market (Fitch 2004). In 2005, further reform of 
China’s bond market attracted another investor: Moody’s. In September 2006, Moody’s 
bought up to the regulatory cap of a 49% share of CCXI and started to provide 
management and technical support on rating methodologies and training of 
analysts (PeopleDaily 2006). Since CCXI acquired the rating qualification early and has 
expertise adopted from two internationally famous CRAs, it has a generally higher 
market share in China’s bond market (see Appendix 2.1) and a better reputation. At the 
end of 2015, CCXI had more than 200 employees and rated issuers throughout China. 
Until the end of 2015, CCXI had qualifications and licences from PBOC in 1997, 
NDRC in 2003 and CIRC in 2003 and 201310. 
In 1995, the Fujian Credit Rating Committee was formed and, in July 2000, Lianhe was 
established after reorganization and a name change. From its inception, Lianhe had the 
permission to rate CBs. In August 2007, Fitch returned to China’s market and bought a 
49% share of Lianhe from its original shareholder, Lianhe Credit Information Service 
Co., Ltd (LCIS). Lianhe thus became the second joint venture CRA in China. At the end 
of 2015, Lianhe had about 200 staff and its business was conducted throughout China. It 
had the same qualifications as CCXI. Since CCXI and Lianhe are both joint venture 
firms, they do not have approval from the CSRC to rate bonds on the Shanghai and 
                                                          
10 CIRC 2013: The recognition of seven credit rating agencies. 
http://www.circ.gov.cn/web/site0/tab5214/info3887803.htm 
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Shenzhen exchange markets. 11  However, their brother companies (with the same 
domestic shareholders) have this qualification.  
Dagong, founded in March 1994, is one of the earliest CRAs in China. In 2010, the SEC 
rejected Dagong’s application to enter the NRSRO because the SEC did not consider it 
to have the capability to analyse a transnational corporation. Dagong does not have the 
issue of foreign capital. It has full licences12 to rate all categories of bonds on different 
markets and was also recognised by the CIRC from 2003. Dagong can rate borrowers 
throughout China and employed more than 300 workers at the end of 2015. 
The other issuer-pay CRAs in China—SBRC; CCXR; United Ratings (UR); Pengyuan 
Credit Rating Co., Ltd (Pengyuan); Golden Credit Rating International Co., Ltd (Golden) 
and SFE—are all national rating agencies. 
1.3.3 The Charging Models of Credit Rating Agencies 
China’s credit rating industry did not experience the change from an investor-pay to 
issuer-pay model. Initially, China’s CRAs collected most of their revenue from 
borrowers. One agency, Xinhua Far East, successfully sold their reports on the qualities 
of approximately 100 listed companies on China’s stock market. This business model 
started from early 2002, but it was not applied to the whole bond market. It disappeared 
with the fall of SFE. Till the end of 2015, the only investor-pay rating agency in China 
is CCR, and only subscribers can read their reports in detail. Investors without a 
subscription can only review the ratings and brief introduction of specific firms. This 
situation is very similar to that of the US; however, China’s CRAs did not accumulate a 
reputation from the investor-pay model compared to the international big three who had 
around 60 years of investor-pay history. 
A fierce price fight among CRAs over the charging fee led to malignant competition 
(Chen 2010). From October 2007, urged by the PBOC, China’s five major interbank 
CRAs (CCXI, Lianhe, Dagong, SBRC and SFE) started to implement the Rating Charge 
Self-Discipline for CRAs on the Interbank Bond Market. Under this agreement, these 
five CRAs agreed to abide by the guiding opinions of the PBOC in relation to the 
management of credit rating and the People’s Republic of China’s financial industry 
                                                          
11 CSRC 2007 Decree No. 50: Provisional Administrative Measures on the Credit Rating Business in 
Chinese Securities Market. 
12 Dagong receive the recognition from PBOC in 1997, NDRC in 2003, CIRC in 2003 and 2013, 
CSRC in 2007. 
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standard specification for credit rating in the credit and interbank bond markets. This 
established a common minimum charging rate in order to prevent a conflict of interest 
when rating bonds. For non-financial institutions’ CPs, the minimum price for rating the 
issuers and bonds was 100,000 RMB and 150,000 RMB respectively. For long-term 
bonds, the minimum charging rate for CBs, convertible bonds and MTNs was 250,000 
RMB, while the price for financial institutions’ bonds was more than 350,000 RMB. 
The fee of the follow-up rating for long-term bonds was charged by the number of years 
at 20% of the initial rating fee. Moreover, the minimum charging rate was 600,000 
RMB for ABS and 1,000,000 RMB for mortgage backed securities (MBS). This self-
discipline agreement was also applied to other CRAs and treated as a normal standard 
for the bonds on the exchange market. Further, in 2008, the PBOC released the Notice 
of the People’s Bank of China on Strengthening the Management of the Credit Rating 
Practices in Interbank Bond Market that required CRAs to report their potential clients 
and business to the PBOC before starting the rating process. The minimum time for 
finishing the rating report required by this regulation is 45 days. This also prohibits 
price competition and assures the report quality to some extent. 
Therefore, contrary to the US, the minimum charging rate of China’s credit rating 
industry is decided by the government. In practice, due to their fear of losing clients, 
CRAs in China generally charge the minimum rate. From this perspective, it is obvious 
that the international big three CRAs have more power in the market as they can 
increase the rating price. In other words, China’s credit rating industry has more intense 
competition. 
1.3.4 The Process of Getting Rated 
The process of China’s bond rating is similar to that of the US. There is also a 
preliminary rating process. During this period, companies who want to issue bonds will 
be led by underwriters in seeking appropriate CRAs. Generally, CRAs will give an 
initial rating based on public information and materials supplied by borrowers and 
underwriters. Issuers will compare the ratings under the consultation of underwriters. 
During this process, they consider both the ratings and reputation of different CRAs, or 
stipulate the value of the ratings and how much the ratings can save them in costs. After 
deciding on the agency, the issuer and CRA sign a contract and report this to the CRA’s 
supervisors. Subsequently, a team made up of at least two rating analysts will go to the 
issuer’s office to commence an investigation. The rating processes and documents need 
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to follow the relevant standards issued by the PBOC and the CSRC. After a vote by the 
rating committee, the final credit rating result is released to the public. If the issuers 
disagree with the final rating, the CRA will not release the result. The CRA then 
monitors any issues on an ongoing basis. 
Unlike the US, unsolicited rating is not prevalent in China. Another key difference is in 
the area of double rating. Most of China’s bonds are rated by only one agency. Except 
for asset-based securities 13  and super commercial papers (SCPs), 14  there are no 
requirements for double rating. Further, China’s issuers are rarely willing to seek more 
than one CRA to rate their bonds. 
1.4 China Credit Rating’s Institutional Background 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, the new CRA that combines the public utility and 
investor-pay models is CCR. It was founded in August 2010 by the National 
Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors (NAFMII) with 50 million RMB 
in registered capital. NAFMII is a self-regulated organisation whose purpose is to 
propel the development of China’s over-the-counter financial market under the direction 
of the PBOC. The registered capital comes from the membership fee collected by 
NAFMII. Although CCR announced its total independence from the PBOC,15 the PBOC 
is in charge of its shareholder NAFMII16 and both CCR’s chairmen of the board and its 
chairman of the supervisory board have working experience at the PBOC.17 Thus, due 
to its support from the government, CCR has the feature of a public utility model. 
However, CCR implements the investor-pay model. CCR releases its ratings through 
ChinaBond, Wind and its own website. All investors in the market can see its rating 
announcements and rating notches. However, only subscribers receive full access to 
CCR’s current and historical rating reports and customised services from CCR, such as 
reports for specific companies or industries.18 CCR commenced business in 2012. From 
2012 to 2015, CCR covered 870 companies who had already issued bonds on the 
market. Additionally, CCR regularly releases relevant industrial credit analysis reports 
                                                          
13 PBOC, CBRC, CSRC 2012: Notice on further expansion of the securitisation of credit assets. (关
于进一步扩大信贷资产证券化试点有关事项的通知). 
14 SCPs must have double ratings; one of from an investor-pay agency. Issuers who launch SCPs 
must have both ratings above AA+. http://news.cnstock.com/news/sns_jr/201310/2780021.htm 
15 http://www.nafmii.org.cn/ztbd/zzzxpgyxzr/201202/t20120227_4048.html 
16 http://www.nafmii.org.cn/fzlm/GYWM/201202/t20120227_4278.html 
17 http://www.chinaratings.com.cn/AboutUs/Governance/ 
18 CCR provides a range of service packages to investors with different levels of subscription fees. 
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and credit risk perdition models to its customers, as well as organising credit risk–
related training. 
Being a combination of the investor-pay and public models, CCR has some unique 
features. First, it has a connection with the government (the PBOC) and declares its 
purpose as not-for-benefit. Therefore, to some extent, it has immunity from pressure 
from both investors and issuers who require higher ratings as mentioned in Section 1.1. 
Second, CCR applies a sufficient approach to prevent the excessive free-riding problem, 
which is the main issue for investor-pay CRAs. The investors (e.g., banks, securities 
firms and insurance companies) subscribe directly to CCR for each rated asset class in 
which they conduct business. CCR allocates a unique subscriber number to each 
investor per asset class. Each time a subscriber wants to download the full-version 
rating report or rating database, they enter the relevant user number and validated 
subscriber number. The advantages of this approach are described in Deb et al.’s (2011) 
study. Third, as a combined model, the subscription fee solves the problem of lacking 
incentives to provide high-quality ratings and the shortage of government funds that are 
the main concerns of the public utility model. Last, CCR’s ratings are not considered in 
the bond valuation system of ChinaBond; thus, CCR does not have a powerful influence 
on the bonds’ price. In addition, ratings from CCR are not widely included in the 
regulatory framework. Therefore, for the investors’ benefit and from the perspective of 
regulatory purpose, CCR has less pressure to inflate ratings than incumbent issuer-pay 
CRAs. CCR thus combines the advantages of the investor-pay and public utility models, 
while at the same time limiting and controlling their drawbacks. 
Panel A of Table 1.1 shows the comparison of ratings by CCR and issuer-pay CRAs 
after 2012. It compares every firm–year–CRA rating given by issuer-pay CRAs with the 
corresponding rating given by CCR. The ratings by CCR are similar to the benchmarks 
for all issuer-pay CRAs and no one rating given by CCR is higher than that of the 
issuer-pay CRAs. Panel B of Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for issuer-pay CRAs’ 
and CCR’s ratings between 2012 and 2015 and the t-test results of mean differences 
between groups. CCR’s ratings are significantly lower than those by issuer-pay CRAs at 
a 1% level of significance. 
According to CCR’s internal policy, it selects some issuers to rate randomly or at the 
request of its subscribers. The entry of CCR does not squeeze the market share of the 
existing issuer-pay CRAs because CCR cannot rate CPs, MTNs, CBs or EBs. However, 
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the opinions and trust of bond investors are likely to be affected by the relatively lower 
ratings given by CCR that may reveal the low quality of ratings by incumbent CRAs. 
By reviewing significant rating differences, supervisors are also expected to apply 
stricter scrutiny or punishment on issuer-pay CRAs. The basic hypothesis of this study 
is that incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, based on these two concerns, were forced to adjust 
their rating behaviour to provide more conservative, timely and accurate ratings 
following the entry of CCR, resulting in a general improvement in rating quality. 
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Table 1.1: Statistics of Comparison between Ratings Given by CCR and Issuer-
Pay Credit Rating Agencies 
Table 1.1 presents a comparison between ratings of issuer-pay CRAs and CCR between 2012 
and 2015. The sampled firms have been rated both before and after 2012. Panel A compares 
every firm–year–CRA rating given by issuer-pay CRAs with the rating given to that firm in the 
same year by CCR. Panel B presents the mean differences of ratings given by CCR and issuer-
pay CRAs between 2012 and 2015. Rating is a numerical value based on a notch basis from 1 to 
5. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Comparison of ratings between CCR and issuer-pay CRAs 
Issuer-pay ratings >CCR =CCR <CCR 
N 3066 1106 0 
Proportion  73.49% 26.51% Nil 
    
Panel B: Mean difference between ratings of CCR and issuer-pay CRAs 
 Issuer-pay CRAs CCR (Issuer-pay—CCR) 
Mean rating 4.070 3.042 1.028*** 
N 11,419 1972  
1.5 Findings and Contributions of This Study 
This study discusses three problems with regard to CRAs in Chapter 2, 3 and 4, and 
they are closely related to each other. Chapter 2 examines whether the incumbent CRAs 
in the treatment group have significantly reduced their ratings in comparison to the 
control group, as a response to the coverage by CCR, using a DID identification 
approach which helps control for confounding effect (i.e. other macro-economic shocks). 
The analysis documents that the incumbent CRAs have significantly reduced their 
ratings in the treatment group compared to the control group, subsequent to the entry of 
CCR.  
To further understand the results, I test how this discipline effect has changed the 
information content of rating change announcements made by incumbent CRAs in 
Chapter 2. Using an event study approach, I find that CCR’s coverage has triggered a 
larger market reaction to incumbents’ rating downgrade announcements. In Chapter 2 
and 3, I also find the reputation concerns of the incumbent CRAs is one of the 
mechanisms through which the CCR’s coverage reduces information asymmetry and 
enhances the rating quality of the incumbent CRAs. I find that only reputable CRAs 
react and lower their ratings as a response to CCR’s coverage, compared with non-
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reputable CRAs. Moreover, the effect of CCR’s coverage on the information content of 
incumbents’ downgrade announcements is significantly larger for reputable CRAs.  
Following the results of Chapter 2 and 3, then in Chapter 4, I further check the role of 
reputable CRAs in reducing the financing cost of bond issuers. It is found that hiring 
reputable CRAs can save bond issuing spread for issuers and this certification effect is 
reinforced by the entry of CCR, further reflecting its role to discipline the rating 
behaviour of incumbent CRAs.   
1.5.1 Main Findings 
1.4.1.1 The Entry of China Credit Rating Improved Information Quality of Ratings on 
the Bond Market 
There were only issuer-pay CRAs’ ratings on the market before 2012. Issuers paid for 
the rating agencies, investors acquired the credit information of bonds mainly through 
issuer-pay CRAs and the government indirectly supervised the CRAs. Therefore, issuer-
pay CRAs had the information advantage of their clients over other participants in the 
market. Based on the studies discussed in Section 1.1.2, issuer-pay CRAs had an 
incentive to hide unfavourable issuer information (i.e., rating inflation and reluctance to 
downgrade ratings), potentially creating information asymmetry between issuers, 
investors and the government. This study proposes that the entry of CCR revealed more 
information to the market through its ratings that reduced the information asymmetry to 
some extent. As information became more transparent, incumbent issuer-pay CRAs had 
to adjust their rating strategy, thus indirectly improving their rating information quality. 
Specifically, this study uses two measurements to represent the rating quality change: 
rating change level (Chapter 2) and information content of ratings (Chapter 3). 
Chapter 2 compares the difference in rating change of CCR-covered firms and 
uncovered firms. If CCR does reveal more accurate information, it should be observed 
that the rating inflation level is relatively lower for the CCR-covered sample than the 
uncovered sample. The DID approach is applied to explore this further. A significantly 
negative difference is found between the treatment group (covered by CCR) and the 
control group (not covered by CCR) in terms of the changes in their ratings by 
incumbent issuer-pay CRAs. This implies that CCR plays a certification role in the 
credit rating industry; incumbent issuer-pay CRAs adjusted their ratings to the 
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‘benchmark’ ratings provided by CCR, reducing the severity of the rating inflation and 
reflecting their improvement of rating’s information quality. Additionally, the sample 
selection bias is taken into consideration. The propensity score matching (PSM) method 
and Heckman two-stage approach are applied to control the problem of endogeneity. 
Chapter 3 uses ratings information content change to show the rating quality change. If 
CCR can release more information and affect the behaviour of incumbent issuer-pay 
CRAs, these CRAs should improve their rating quality and timeliness. This in turn 
increases the information content of their rating change announcements. If so, investors 
should have a greater response to the rating change announcements of incumbent issuer-
pay CRAs after CCR’s coverage initiation. To evaluate this hypothesis, an event study 
is applied to compare the rating information content of the issuer-pay CRAs in China 
before and after CCR’s coverage initiation of each given firm. A significant 
improvement is found in incumbent issuer-pay CRAs’ ratings information content 
following CCR’s coverage. Rating changes of issuer-pay CRAs incorporate more 
information and trigger more sensitive market reactions compared to before CCR’s 
coverage. This study’s empirical method relies on CCR’s coverage initiation as the 
inception of CCR’s influence on the rating strategies of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, 
and the PSM method and instrumental variable (IV) approach are employed to solve the 
endogeneity problem. 
From the analysis of the above two measurements, it is found that CCR’s entry reduced 
rating inflation and increased the information content of ratings, both of which reflect a 
reduction in information asymmetry and an improvement of rating quality. 
1.4.1.2 Mechanisms through which CCR’s Entry Improved Rating Quality 
After evaluating CCR’s role in improving information quality, this study seeks to find 
the mechanisms through which CCR’s entry influences incumbent issuer-pay CRAs’ 
behaviour. In Chapters 2 and 3, two channels are found to play important roles: CRAs’ 
reputation concerns and the investor protection environment. 
First, it is found that more reputable incumbent issuer-pay CRAs are more inclined to 
change their rating strategy after CCR’s coverage than less reputable ones, releasing 
more accurate and timely information. Therefore, reputable incumbent issuer-pay CRAs 
experience lower rating inflation after CCR’s entry and the market is more responsive to 
rating changes made by reputable incumbent CRAs. 
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Second, it is found that the incumbent CRAs and market react more to issuers who have 
a better investor protection environment. In other words, for firms that are more 
exposed to investors, incumbent issuer-pay CRAs are more likely to be concerned with 
their quality provision following CCR’s coverage. 
1.4.1.3 Certification Role of Reputable Credit Rating Agencies in China 
As the reputational mechanism can be elevated by the entry of CCR and the ratings 
given by reputable CRAs experience relatively lower inflation, this study further 
analyses how the reputation of issuer-pay CRAs certifies the bonds and whether this 
certification effect is influenced by CCR’s entry. 
Chapter 4 first analyses the certification hypothesis from the issuer’s point of view by 
asking whether certification from reputable CRAs benefits issuers in China’s bond 
market. In this chapter, issuance data from 2006 to 2015 is employed. After controlling 
the issuer-CRA selection bias, it is found that reputable CRAs obtain lower bond yields 
for their clients. In addition, the investor protection environment and issuer’s risk are 
two mechanisms through which the certification effect has influence. Second, the study 
analyses whether CCR’s entry affects the reputation concerns of existing reputable 
issuer-pay CRAs. It is found that bonds rated by reputable CRAs obtain lower bond 
yields after CCR’s entry and that the certification effect in reducing debt costs by 
reputable CRAs is stronger for uncovered issuers than CCR-covered issuers. 
The findings in Chapter 4 suggest that CRAs’ rating decisions reflect reputation 
concerns and are thus informative of issue quality. Investors take reputable CRAs’ 
ratings as a positive signal and assign a lower yield for issuers. This effect is reinforced 
by the entry of an independent CRA, verifying the reputational mechanism from another 
perspective. 
1.5.2 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to a growing body of literature that examines how different 
business models of CRA affect credit ratings. The global financial crisis has boosted a 
surge of research interest in CRAs, particularly in relation to making regulatory reforms 
in the industry, alleviating the conflicts of interest and relieving the problem of severe 
rating inflation. While it is not realistic to remove the current issuer-pay business model, 
many researchers and policy-makers, such as SEC and European financial authorities, 
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have presented proposals to modify the business model. This thesis analyses the 
influence of launching an independent CRA with a new business model in China and 
supplements the existing theoretical models, empirical studies and government 
proposals. 
The findings also complement the study on the reputational mechanism by Becker and 
Milbourn (2011). They identified that the entry of Fitch, another issuer-pay CRA, 
weakened the incentive of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs to improve rating quality 
because Fitch induced competition. CCR, which collects money from investors and is 
supported by the government, does not constitute direct competition. Instead, CCR 
generates more informative ratings that reveal the low quality of the ratings by 
incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, subsequently triggering reputation concerns. Xia’s (2013) 
findings suggested that the entry of an investor-pay CRA could elevate the reputational 
mechanism of S&P and increase the rating quality of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs. This 
study’s findings complement Xia’s findings and further show that reputable incumbent 
CRAs care more about their reputation than do non-reputable ones; thus, the 
reputational mechanism that increases rating quality works for reputable issuer-pay 
CRAs. This study’s findings also call for investors’ attention to the different reactions of 
different issuer-pay CRAs and emphasise the importance of investor protection 
environment construction. 
This study also supplements the research on the certification effect of CRAs and 
provides an insight for bond issuers and investors when evaluating bonds rated by 
CRAs with different reputations. 
Xia’s (2013) study is the closest to this study in that it focuses on how the rating 
initiation of an investor-pay CRA—EJR—affects the rating quality of S&P. The author 
concluded that S&P is more responsive to credit risk and its rating changes contain 
greater information content after EJR’s coverage. In general, S&P improves its rating 
quality when facing competition from an investor-pay CRA, with this change due to the 
reputation concerns elevated by EJR’s coverage. Xia’s (2013) study differs from this 
study in several important ways. First, EJR is a pure investor-pay CRA and thus 
different from the independent CRA (CCR) in China, which combine the investor-pay 
and public utility models. Second, this study not only focuses on the reaction of one 
specific CRA, but also summarises the general reaction of all incumbent issuer-pay 
CRAs in China. 
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The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 estimates the comparison of 
rating changes between CCR-covered and uncovered groups using the DID approach. 
Chapter 3 analyses the market reaction to rating change announcements before and after 
CCR’s coverage initiation using an event study. Chapter 4 estimates the certification 
effect through the reputation of CRAs and how CCR’s entry changed this effect. 
Chapter 5 provides a conclusion to the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Reaction on credit ratings as a response to the Entry of CCR 
This chapter analyses the role of CCR’s entry from the perspective of discipline rating 
inflation that increases ratings’ information quality. Section 2.1 provides a review of 
this chapter and the related literatures. Section 2.2 includes a description of the data and 
methodology. Baseline empirical results are presented in Section 2.3 and mechanisms 
are discussed in Section 2.4. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 are the robustness check analysis and 
conclusion respectively. 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter supplements a growing body of literature that examines how different 
business models of CRA affect credit ratings. This chapter proposes that the entry of 
this independent CRA reveals more information to the market through its ratings and 
reduces the information asymmetry to some extent. As information becomes more 
transparent, incumbent issuer-pay CRAs have to adjust their rating strategy and become 
more conservative. 
Specifically, I use rating change levels to represent the rating strategy change. I find that 
the ratings of issuer-pay CRAs have increased during the last 10 years in China and that 
ratings given by CCR are all lower than issuer-pay CRAs’ ratings. Comparatively, the 
ratings of issuer-pay CRAs are inflated. If CCR does reveal more accurate information, 
it should be observed that the rating inflation level is lower for the CCR-covered sample 
then the uncovered sample. I apply the DID approach to estimate if the rating inflation 
is relatively controlled for the companies covered by the independent CRA, compared 
with their counterparts that are not rated by this independent CRA. I find a significantly 
negative difference between the treatment group (covered by CCR) and the control 
group (not covered by CCR) in terms of the rating changes given by incumbent issuer-
pay CRAs. This implies that the independent CRA plays a certification role in the credit 
rating industry; incumbent issuer-pay CRAs adjust their ratings to the ‘benchmark’ 
ratings provided by CCR, increasing their rating quality and reducing the severity of the 
rating inflation. Additionally, the PSM method and Heckman two-stage approach are 
applied to solve the problem of endogeneity. 
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Further, I identify through which mechanisms CCR’s entry influences incumbent issuer-
pay CRAs’ behaviour. Two channels are found to play important roles: CRAs’ 
reputation concerns and the investor protection environment. First, this research finds 
that more reputable incumbent CRAs are more inclined to change their rating strategy 
after CCR’s coverage than less reputable ones, releasing more accurate and timely 
information. Therefore, reputable incumbent CRAs experience lower rating inflation for 
covered firms after CCR’s entry. This finding complements the study on the 
reputational mechanism by Becker and Milbourn (2011). Xia’s (2013) findings also 
suggested that the entry of an investor-pay CRA can elevate the reputational mechanism 
of S&P and increase the rating quality of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs. The findings 
complement this and further show that reputable incumbent CRAs care more about their 
reputation than non-reputable ones; thus, the reputational mechanism that can increase 
rating quality works for reputable issuer-pay CRAs. The findings also shed light on 
investors’ attention to the different reactions of issuer-pay CRAs. Second, I find that 
incumbent CRAs react more to issuers who have a better investor protection 
environment. In other words, for firms that are more exposed to investors, incumbent 
issuer-pay CRAs are more likely to be concerned with their quality provision following 
CCR’s coverage. This finding sheds light on the importance of market building to 
which regulatory institutions pay considerable attention. 
2.1.1 Related literatures 
Under the prevailing issuer-pay model, the principal revenue stream of CRAs is 
collected from the clients who aim to issue bonds. As a result, CRAs have the incentives 
to allocate more favourable ratings to customers who have larger issues (Bolton et al., 
2012; He et al., 2011) or who are repeated issuers (Bolton et al., 2012). If issuers and 
issuer-pay CRAs create an information barrier between them and other participants in 
the bond market, they can take advantages of other counterparties. In turn, if this 
information asymmetry problem is severe, it would trigger overoptimistic credit ratings 
and lower the information content of rating change announcements. Due to this concern, 
the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 required an assessment of the conflict of interest of issuer-
pay CRAs by the Office of the Controller General. 
As a response to the information asymmetry problem driven by the issuer-pay CRAs, 
regulators and researchers have proposed several alternative business models aiming to 
improve the credit rating qualities. First, an investor-pay business model is 
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recommended since it provides more accurate and timely information, compared to the 
issuer-pay model (Beaver et al., 2006; Cornaggia and Cornaggia, 2013; Kashyap and 
Kovrijnykh, 2016; Pagano and Volpin, 2010). Another is an investor-produced model in 
which the rating agencies are also the end-users of ratings (Becker and Opp, 2013; 
Bongaerts, 2014). In another dimension of the public utility model, Diomande et al. 
(2009) and Lynch (2010) advocate for a non-profit public rating agency in the US, 
arguing that the conflict of interest can be managed by modelling on other successful 
public independent bodies, such as the Federal Reserve or the Supreme Court. The 
European Commission Consultative Paper also proposes to create a public European 
CRA. Finally, there is a platform model proposed by Mathis et al. (2009) and 
Richardson and White (2009) to prevent the issuer from influencing ratings by setting a 
platform as an intermediary between issuers and CRAs. The platform is responsible to 
assign the rating request to a CRA, either randomly or based on CRA’s rating quality. 
The ‘Franken Amendment’ in the US suggests that for structured products, SEC should 
introduce a platform to bring all Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROS) and issuers together through an independent organization.  
Although the above models have been proposed, there are rare experiments on these 
models in practice. Furthermore, the weaknesses of other alternative business models 
aforementioned have been warned. For instance, it has been warned that the free-rider 
problem would be the main challenge for the investor-pay model (Fennell and 
Medvedev, 2011; Richardson and White, 2009) and there is still pressure from investors 
to require inflated ratings (Pagano and Volpin, 2010). In contrast, the investor-produced 
model is accused of that investors themselves may become the party benefiting most 
from rating inflation, in terms of lower capital charge (Gonzalez et al., 2011; Sy, 2009). 
The model developed by Becker and Opp (2013) shows that if running under the 
existence of issuer-pay CRAs, the investor-produced ratings would be slightly more 
inflated. At the same time, it is also argued that the public utility model cannot 
completely wipe off the conflict of interest because the government is also an issuer by 
its own. It is worried that the public CRA would be biased to the sovereign or municipal 
bonds, or large companies owned by the government (Cinquegrana, 2009). Another 
concern for the public utility model is whether the rating quality will decline due to 
insufficient budgets. The platform model is questioned as well, as it is hard to decide 
which criteria to use to choose one CRA over another for a rating request.  
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Different from the above failed experiments, as an attempt to discipline the existing 
incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, China introduced an independent CRA which is called 
CCR. An important feature of CCR is that it combines an investor-pay and a public 
utility model. This unique feature of CCR potentially prevents it from being influenced 
by both issuers and investors, and at the same time, overcomes the drawbacks of the 
public utility model as well. The introduction of CCR in China offers a unique setting to 
test the efficiency and effectiveness of the combination of investor-pay and public 
utility model. 
This study provides fresh insight into the recent debate on the credit rating business 
models. Jiang et al. (2012) found that the ratings of S&P were higher after it adopted an 
issuer-pay model, suggesting that the issuer-pay model leads to rating inflation. Xia 
(2013) documents that the entry of an investor-pay CRA can elevate the reputation 
mechanism of S&P, then increasing rating quality of incumbents. Our findings suggest 
that a combined investor-pay and public utility model enhances the information quality 
of the incumbent issuer-pay CRAs. Our study also adds to prior credit rating business 
model literature in two dimensions. First, Jiang et al. (2012) and Xia (2013) simply 
compares between an issuer-pay and an investor-pay models. The new CBR combines 
an investor-pay model and a public utility model, of which can simultaneously reduce 
both the conflict of interest problem in the issuer-pay model and the free-rider problem 
in the investor-pay model. Second, Jiang et al. (2012) and Xia (2013) both use only one 
incumbent CRA for comparison purpose. This leads to a potential identification concern, 
that is, the reaction of this particular incumbent CRA may be unrelated to the entry of a 
new business model, but is due to the reactions to structure change of other incumbent 
CRAs (e.g., more competition). In contrast, we cover all the incumbent CRAs in the 
Chinese market in this paper, alleviating this concern substantially.  
2.2 Sample and Methodology 
Data was collected from Wind, ChinaBond and CCR. Each observation in my sample is 
an issuer credit rating corresponding to a certain rating action from incumbent issuer-
pay CRAs, including a new rating assignment, affirmation, upgrade and downgrade. 
The sample consists of 17,516 firm–year–CRA observations from 1,534 firms who have 
rating records for both pre-2012 and post-2012 periods. There are 645 firms covered by 
CCR for this sample. I included all the long-term issuer credit ratings of Chinese firms 
assigned by all issuer-pay CRAs. The ratings include both initial ratings and follow-up 
 36 
 
ratings on an ongoing basis. The study period is from 2006 to 2015 and the data sample 
excludes ratings for financial institutions, treasury bonds and enterprise set bonds and 
other non-rated or small volume bond categories. Following the literature, a numerical 
value is assigned to the ratings as follows: AAA, AAA– = 5; AA+, AA = 4; AA– = 3; 
A+ = 2; others = 1. There are both practical and theoretical reasons for why I classify 
the ratings in this way (see Appendix 2.1). 
To identify the effect of CCR’s entry on the rating inflation of incumbent issuer-pay 
CRAs I conceived the entry of CCR as an exogenous reform. I am interested in whether 
the new entrant makes incumbent CRAs more conservative when giving ratings. The 
default treatment group thus consists of firms covered by CCR. I consider the beginning 
of 2012 as the start of the treatment as incumbent CRAs reacted to CCR’s entry only 
after CCR officially initiated a number of ratings on the market. 
It is observed that there are significant differences in the main financial characteristics 
between the treatment and control groups (see Table 2.1). There is a possibility that 
larger firms are more exposed to the market and, consequently, their information is 
more accessible. Thus, the CCR coverage is inclined to choose those big firms, although 
its own policy is random choice. Therefore, the assignment into treatment and control 
groups is not totally random as a true experiment would require. However, for a quasi-
experiment, it is sufficient that CCR’s entry (a reform dominated by government) can be 
thought of as if it was randomly assigned into treatment and control groups. 
I applied the DID approach to estimate the influence of CCR’s entry on rating inflation. 
An industry-fixed-effect ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model following 
Becker and Milbourn (2011), Jiang, Harris and Xie (2012), Xia (2013) and Baghai, 
Servaes and Tamayo (2013) is applied: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖        (2.1) 
In Eq. 2.1, Rating denotes the numerical values of ratings given by incumbent issuer-
pay CRAs; CCRcover is a dummy variable that equals one if the rated firm is also 
covered by CCR, otherwise it is zero; Post is also a dummy variable that equals one if 
the firm–year–CRA observation is from the period after 2012 (when CCR officially 
started its business), otherwise it is zero; and X is a set of firm characteristic controls. X 
includes sales, which is the natural logarithm of sales; leverage, which is the ratio of 
total liability from the balance sheet to total assets; ROA, which is the return on assets 
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that represents profitability; tangibility, which is the ratio of property, plant and 
equipment to total assets; growth, which is the year-to-year increase of operating 
income; cash equivalent, which is the ratio of cash, tradable assets and receivable over 
current assets to represent the liquidity; and industry and year fixed effects, which 
correspond to industry and year dummies. In this equation, if CCR’s entry alleviates the 
problem of rating inflation, I would expect to see a negative coefficient on the 
interaction term β1. 
Apart from the OLS model, I also used the ordinal regression model (ORM) to estimate 
the rating change. In OLS regression, the difference between the nearby rating 
categories is assumed to be the same. I applied the ORM to avoid this assumption. 
ORM is commonly presented as a latent-variable model. Defining y* as a latent variable 
ranging from –∞ 𝑡𝑜 ∞, the structural model is: 
𝑦∗ = 𝒙𝒊𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖 
I divided y* into J ordinal categories: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑚 𝑖𝑓 𝜏𝑚−1 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ < 𝜏𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝐽 
where the cutpoints 𝜏1through 𝜏𝐽−1are estimated. Thus, when the latent y* crosses a 
cutpoint, the observed category changes. Puhani (2012) stated that the treatment effect 
has the same sign as the coefficient of the interaction term in a DID analysis when using 
the ORM. The result in Table 2.2 shows that ORM estimation is consistent with 
estimations using OLS, meaning that the probability of a higher rating for CCR-covered 
firms decreased after CCR’s entry compared to uncovered firms. To better interpret the 
meaning of the results and analyse the mechanism behind the results, I will mainly 
focus on the OLS model. 
2.2.1 Endogeneity Concerns 
Although CCR announced that its coverage is randomly selected, we still observe some 
shared features among covered firms from Table 2.1. On average, covered firms are 
significantly different from uncovered firms. This may cause endogeneity problems in 
econometric analyses investigations, as the role of CCR’s entry leads to lower rating 
inflation in the form of omitted variable bias due to self-selection. If firms’ financial 
characteristics alone are sufficient to cause incumbent issuer-pay CRAs to adjust their 
ratings regardless of CCR’s coverage, the effect of CCR will be overestimated. 
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To correct this problem, this research addressed the well-recognised issue of 
endogenous matching in the Heckman (1980) two-stage ‘treatment effects’ approach in 
the manner of Ross (2010), Andres, Betzer and Limbach (2014) and Schenone (2004). 
This approach uses a first-stage equation to determine the probability that the potential 
endogenous dummy variable equals one and adjusts the sample moments of second-
stage multivariate regression to produce unbiased estimates. This thesis estimated the 
selection equations for firms’ characteristics which lead to CCR’s coverage in the first 
stage of Heckman approach. And in the first-stage regression, at least some of the 
independent variables should be valid instruments in the sense that they are not only 
meaningful predictors of the likelihood that CCRcover equals one, but also independent 
of the issuer’s credit rating and thus properly excludable from the second-stage 
regression. I argue that issuer’s ownership and whether the issuer is a listed firm can 
serve as the basis for constructing such instruments. Ownership equals one if the firm is 
owned by the government, otherwise it equals zero; listed equals one if the firm is listed 
on the Shanghai or Shenzhen exchange market. According to Livingston et.al (2017), 
Chinese state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) have easier access to bank loans and receive 
favorable loan terms. Given the perceived government backing of SOEs, particularly 
those of the central government, I expect the type of issuer ownership would 
significantly affect the bond ratings. As SOEs have more exposure to the bond market, 
the ownership of issuers might be significantly related to the coverage decision of CCR 
as they have more accessible information on the market. The listing status also has 
influence on the CCR’s coverage decision as issuers with publicly traded equity are 
likely have more public information, and it will indirectly affect the ratings (Chen and 
Guo 2010). However, on the contrary, it is impossible that credit ratings lead to the 
change of issuers’ ownership or listed status (Pagano et al 1998.  Column 4 of Table 
2.2 presents the underlying CCRcover-issuer matching equation for the rating data. 
Ownership and listed are highly statistically significant, confirming the existence of 
selection bias. From this regression, I then constructed an inverse Mills ratio that is 
added as a control variable in the second-stage regression. This procedure, suggested by 
Heckman (1980), corrects the omitted variable (or self-selection) bias caused by 
endogenous matching. I applied the DID analysis using Eq. 2.2, which adds the inverse 
Mills ratio to Eq. 2.1, to see if, after controlling the sample selection bias, the entry of 
CCR alleviates rating inflation. 
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𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         (2.2) 
Second, I applied the PSM approach (Xia 2013). I matched CCR-covered firms in the 
sample (treated group) to those not rated by CCR as of the end of 2015 (control group) 
based on various dimensions that are likely to predict CCR’s coverage decision. The 
aim is that putting together firms (firm–year–CRA) that are similar in these dimensions 
will allow us to obtain matched firm–year–CRA observations that designate when CCR 
would have begun to rate the firm had it decided to cover the firm. The thesis matched 
the sample firms based on a set of pre-treated (i.e., one year prior to CCR coverage) 
characteristics and used one-to-one matching method to match each year. The 
propensity score matching (PSM) approach pairs treatment and control firms based on 
similar observable characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). In particular, I match 
CCR covered (or rated) firms in the sample (the treated group) to those not rated by 
CCR (the control group) based on a set of firm characteristics of CRAs, including size, 
leverage, ROA, operating income growth rate, tangibility, and cash ratio. The idea is 
that, by putting together firm-year-CRAs that are similar in these dimensions, we obtain 
matched firm-year-CRAs that designates when CBR would have begun to rate the firm 
had it decided to cover the firm. Following the suggestion of Roberts and Whited (2012), 
we use PSM with replacements which allows a given untreated observation to be 
included in more than one matched set. This procedure ensures a proper identification as 
it allows for better matches and less bias, and alleviates the sensitivity of the estimated 
effect towards the order in which the treatment observations are matched. These 
matched firms are the most similar ones to the covered sample. From the control group, 
I found 389 matching firms in the treatment group. Through the regression results using 
the PSM sample, we can observe a much clearer effect of CCR’s entry, supposing that 
the treatment and control groups are similar in terms of the chosen dimensions. 
2.3 Empirical Results 
2.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents the characteristics of all firms who received ratings by the nine 
incumbent issuer-pay CRAs between 2006 and 2015. Of the total 17,516 ratings 
assigned to these firms by the issuer-pay CRAs, the mean rating is 3.991, meaning that 
the long-term rating is, on average, AA to AA+. 
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Next, I compared the characteristics of treatment and control groups. Panel B of Table 
2.1 presents summary statistics for the control group and treatment group respectively. 
We can observe that the mean rating and median rating of the treatment group are both 
significantly higher than the control group. Further, their financial characteristics are 
significantly different from each other. For example, the mean rating perceived by firms 
who are covered by CCR is (0.518 notches) higher, and the leverage of firms in the 
treatment group is significantly (7.361%) higher than the control group. According to 
CCR’s internal policy, it chooses the covered firm on a random basis.19 However, from 
Panel B of Table 2.1 it can be seen that, on average, firms from the covered group 
(treatment group) have a larger size, higher leverage level, higher proportion of tangible 
assets and lower growth rate. 
2.3.2 Baseline Empirical Results 
Table 2.2 presents the regression results for Eq. 2.1 and Eq. 2.2. In Columns 1 to 3 of 
Table 2.2 we test the raw sample that includes 17,516 firm–year–CRA observations, 
with and without industry and year fixed effects respectively. The negative correlation 
between incumbent issuer-pay CRAs’ ratings and the interaction term suggests that, 
overall, ratings for treated firms are relatively lower than controlled firms after the entry 
of CCR, which is significant at a 1% significance level. In other words, CCR’s entry has 
had a significant influence on alleviating the rating inflation problem of the issuer-pay 
CRAs in China, reflecting the improvement of rating quality. For example, in Column 3 
the coefficient of 𝛽1 is –0.097, significant at 1% significance level. This means that, 
compared with CCR-uncovered firms, the rating inflation for CCR-covered firms is 
0.097 notches lower. 
Other control variables also show expected signs. For example, ratings are higher for 
the post-period, which is in line with previous studies on rating inflation in China’s 
bond market (Kennedy 2003, 2008; Lee 2006; Song 2013). Overall, covered firms have 
higher ratings than uncovered firms, which is consistent with the data description in 
Table 2.1. This research also finds larger sales, more tangibility and a higher growth 
rate are all associated with a more favourable rating, while a higher leverage ratio leads 
to a lower rating. 
                                                          
19 Interview with the insiders of CCR. 
 41 
 
Column 4 of Table 2.2 is the probit regression result of the Heckman first-stage sample 
selection bias method. Whether CCR covers a specific firm or not is highly related to 
the financial characteristics of that firm. For example, firms with larger size and state 
ownership are more likely to be covered by CCR. Columns 5 to 7 report the second-
stage regression results of the Heckman test with industry or year fixed effects and the 
results of Eq. 2.2. I still observe a negative value of 𝛽1 , which means that after 
correcting the sample selection bias, the entry of CCR still significantly alleviates the 
rating inflation for the covered group. Columns 8 to 10 present the results of Eq. 2.1 
when applying the PSM sample—the results still hold. The results from the ORM is 
represented in Column 11, and we also find a negative value for the coefficient of the 
interaction term. 
This implies that the rating given by CCR has a benchmark effect for other incumbent 
issuer-pay CRAs, elevating some mechanisms which lead incumbent CRAs to give 
more conservative ratings. This demonstrates that ratings of CCR add private 
information to the market, thereby alleviating the information asymmetric problem and 
improving the rating quality to some extent. 
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Table 2.1: Rating Sample Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the rating sample from 2006 to 2015. The firms in the sample have been rated both before and after the 
official entry of CCR. Panel A presents the statistics of the full sample. Rating is a numerical value given by the issuer-pay CRAs, based on a notch 
basis as follows: AAA, AAA– =5; AA+, AA = 5; AA– = 3; A+ = 2; others = 1; post is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm–year–CRA 
observation is from the period after 2012, and zero otherwise; CCRcover is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm was rated by CCR at any time, 
and zero otherwise; sales are the natural log of total sales; leverage is the ratio of total liability from the balance sheet to total assets; ROA is the return 
on assets that represents the profitability; tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets; growth is the year-to-year increase of 
operating income; cash equivalent which is the ratio of cash, tradable asset and receivable over current asset; all above variables are measured at the 
time t-1. Panel B presents the statistics of the controlled group and treatment group and the mean differences between these two groups. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of full sample 
  Rating Post CCRcover Sales Leverage ROA Tangibility Growth Cash equivalent 
Whole sample N 17,516 17,516 17,516 17,457 17,470 17,466 17,460 17,406 17,467 
Mean 3.991 0.652 0.571 4.432 60.097 0.521 0.259 0.653 0.470 
Std.dev. 0.790 0.476 0.495 1.864 15.083 1.214 0.202 12.365 1.013 
Min. 1 0 0 –4.605 0.300 –6.578 0 –0.989 0 
Max. 5 1 1 10.268 162.200 86.112 0.969 645.822 100.018 
Panel B: Summary statistics of the controlled group and treatment group  
Firms not 
covered by 
CCR 
N 7522   7473 7487 7483 7479 7436 7486 
Mean 3.696   3.454 55.891 0.446 0.203 1.221 0.540 
Std.dev. 0.793   1.661 15.812 0.494 0.181 18.889 1.470 
Min. 1   –4.605 0.300 –6.578 0 –0.989 0.009 
Max. 5   8.437 162.200 6.300 0.961 645.822 100.018 
Firms covered 
by CCR 
N 9994   9984 9983 9983 9981 9970 9981 
Mean 4.214   5.164 63.252 0.578 0.301 0.229 0.417 
Std.dev. 0.711   1.659 13.690 1.545 0.207 0.662 0.411 
Min. 1   –2.303 6.840 –4.072 0 –0.833 0 
Max. 5   10.268 139.850 86.112 0.969 23.685 13.884 
Mean difference 0.518***   1.711*** 7.361*** 0.132*** 0.098*** –0.992*** –0.123*** 
Median difference 0***   1.688*** 8.150*** 1.121*** 0.107*** 0.008* –0.048*** 
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Table 2.2: Difference-In-Differences Analysis of Ratings 
Table 2.2 presents the DID analysis results for the raw sample, Heckman sample and PSM matched sample from 2006 to 2015. The raw sample and 
Heckman sample consist of 17,389 firm–year–CRA observations of 1534 firms from 2006 to 2015. Columns 1, 2 and 3 represent the regression results 
of Eq. 2.1. The left-hand-side variable is the cardinal value of credit ratings. All the variables are the same as in Table 2.1. Firm fixed effects are 
indicator variables for firms; year fixed effects are indicator variables for fiscal years. Columns 4 to 7 present the DID result using the Heckman test to 
correct the sample selection bias. Column 4 presents results of the probit regression of CCR’s coverage choice on firm-specific characteristics for the 
sample of ratings given by issuer-pay CRAs between 2006 and 2015. The left-hand-side variable is CCRcover. Ownership equals one if the firm is 
owned by the government, otherwise zero. Columns 5 to7 present the regression results of Eq. 2.2. Columns 8 to 10 present the DID results using PSM 
sample. Column 11 presents the result applying ORM. The firms in these samples all have ratings both before and after the entry of CCR. Industry fixed 
effects are indicator variables for firms; year dummies are indicator variables for fiscal years. Standard errors are in the parentheses. R-squared is 
reported. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Raw sample  Heckman sample  PSM matched sample   ORM 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) First stage (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10)   (11) 
CCRcover*Post –0.150*** –0.110*** –0.097***   –0.122*** –0.112*** –0.096***  –0.074*** –0.074*** –0.059***   –0.229*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.019)   (0.022) (0.021) (0.019)  (0.025) (0.024) (0.022)   (0.068) 
CCRcover 0.624*** 0.273*** 0.259***   0.316*** 0.275*** 0.255***  0.236*** 0.235*** 0.194***   0.748*** 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.016)   (0.019) (0.018) (0.016)  (0.020) (0.019) (0.018)   (0.059) 
Post 0.331*** 0.280***    0.298*** 0.282***   0.248***     0.720*** 
 (0.018) (0.016)    (0.017) (0.016)   (0.021)     (0.052) 
Sales   0.227*** 0.264***  0.335***  0.231*** 0.244***  0.255*** 0.254*** 0.283***   0.870*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.008)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)   (0.014) 
Leverage  –0.010*** –0.010***  0.005***  –0.010*** –0.010***  –0.010*** –0.010*** –0.010***   –0.038*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) 
ROA  –0.008* 0.003  0.269***  –0.007* 0.000  –0.004 –0.002 0.002   –0.301*** 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.026)  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.041) 
Tangibility  0.091*** 0.011  1.030***  0.102*** -0.054  0.277*** 0.321*** 0.051*   0.641*** 
  (0.025) (0.028)  (0.055)  (0.035) (0.036)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.029)   (0.084) 
Growth  0.001*** 0.001**  -0.030***  0.004** 0.005***  0.008** 0.009*** 0.003   0.004*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)   (0.001) 
Cash equivalent   0.037*** 0.032***  0.008  0.037*** 0.031***  0.079*** 0.073*** 0.068***   0.192*** 
  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)   (0.028) 
Ownership     0.156***           
     (0.028)           
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Listed     –0.145***           
     (0.025)           
Inverse Mill ratio      –0.638*** 0.017 –0.112***        
      (0.013) (0.043) (0.039)        
Constant 3.474*** 3.256*** 2.800***  -2.045*** 4.132*** 3.220*** 3.011***  3.045*** 2.457*** 2.781***    
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.063)  (0.061) (0.019) (0.085) (0.097)  (0.033) (0.068) (0.064)    
Observations 17,516 17,388 17,388  17,388 17,381 17,381 17,381  13,511 13,511 13,511   17,388 
Prob (Chi-squared)     0.000          0.000 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.129 0.322 0.452  0.196 0.233 0.322 0.452  0.337 0.366 0.471   0.206 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes  No No No Yes  No No Yes   No 
Year dummies No No Yes  No No No Yes  No Yes Yes   No 
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2.4 Analyses Conditional on Reputational Differences and the Investor Protection 
Environment 
As aforementioned, this research proposes that there are two mechanisms through which 
the CCR’s entry can alleviate rating inflation and discipline the behaviour of incumbent 
issuer-pay CRAs. The mechanisms are reputation concerns and the investor protection 
environment. 
2.4.1 The Effect of China Credit Rating’s Coverage Initiation Conditional on 
Reputational Differences among Issuer-Pay Credit Rating Agencies 
The alleviation of rating inflation might reflect a reputational mechanism at work. That 
is, CCR’s independent and more conservative ratings have elevated the reputation 
concerns of the more reputable issuer-pay CRAs, who subsequently strengthen their 
incentives to lower the rating inflation (the ‘incentive/reputation’ channel). Specifically, 
when CCR covers a firm, its lower ratings reveal the low quality of the ratings from 
issuer-pay CRAs as discussed in Chapter 1. This eventually either lowers investors’ 
confidence in incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, making them less valuable to issuers, or 
leads to closer scrutiny and intervention from regulators. The fear of reputation cost 
provides a mechanism through which CCR’s entry can discipline issuer-pay CRAs into 
providing a lower rating inflation (Bar-Isaac & Shapiro 2013; Bolton, Freixas & 
Shapiro 2012; Mathis, McAndrews & Rochet 2009; Opp, Opp & Harris 2013; Skreta & 
Veldkamp 2009). 
However, in China, the reputation of issuer-pay CRAs is criticised (Kennedy 2008; Lee 
2006). Specifically, Bottelier (2003) found that most listed CBs in China have AAA 
ratings. According to the qualitative research of Xu and Han (2013), the credit rating 
industry in China is thought to be immature, the reputation of China’s CRAs is low, 
rating results lack fairness and severe competition dominates the market. Others contend 
that from the beginning, China’s CRAs have earned money from issues rather than 
investors, while their US counterparts collected revenue from investors for about 70 
years, during which time they built up their reputation, before changing to an issuer-pay 
model. Thus, it is argued that China’s CRAs need a longer time to mature (Poon & 
Chan 2008). Zhang and Zhang (2010) and Zhang (2013) all built models to prove the 
effects of the reputational mechanism under certain contexts in China and offered policy 
suggestions such as decreasing competition. It is believed that there are quality 
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differences among issuer-pay CRAs in China. Therefore, this research aims to find out 
whether the influence of CCR’s entry stems from the difference in reputation concerns 
between reputable issuer-pay CRAs and non-reputable CRAs. 
In order to test the above assumption, I divided all issuer-pay CRAs into two groups: 
reputable and non-reputable. The reputable group consisted of CCXI and Lianhe, while 
the non-reputable group comprised of the others. The CRAs were sorted into the two 
groups based on three criteria. First, according to previous studies on the reputation of 
other financial intermediaries, such as underwriters and banks, market share is a widely 
used criterion (Andres, Betzer & Limbach 2014; Megginson & Weiss 1991; Schenone 
2004). Appendix 2.1 shows the market share of each issuer-pay CRA based on the issue 
volume and number of bonds they rated between 2006 and 2015. CCXI and Lianhe 
accounted for over 70% of the market and are the top two issuer-pay CRAs in China in 
terms of market share. 
Second, as shown in previous studies, international CRAs have a better reputation than 
national CRAs. Thus, the second criterion is whether the issuer-pay CRA has foreign 
ownership—namely the big three: Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. The big three are long-
established global rating agencies (GRAs) and are generally have a greater advantage 
when competing with national rating agencies (NRAs). GRAs enjoy superior market 
power mainly due to their reputation capital (Hill 2004; Partnoy 1999). As NRAs lack a 
well-established reputation, investors are more likely to trust the ratings issued by 
GRAs whose reputation is at stake. Additionally, GRAs are thought to hold a higher 
level of independence. Empirical studies comparing GRAs and NRAs mainly focus on 
the Japanese market—the world’s second largest bond market with the most well known 
NRAs. Some of these studies provide evidence in support of the superiority of GRAs. 
For example, Beattie and Searle (1992) suggested that CRAs are inclined to be more 
lenient when judging issuers from their own countries, raising doubts about their 
integrity and credibility. Cantor and Packer (1997) suggested that Moody’s and S&P 
assign lower ratings than smaller CRAs. From a sample of Japanese non-financial 
companies, Packer (2002) found evidence that, on average, NRAs’ ratings are 
systematically 3.5 notches higher than GRAs’ ratings. Shin and Moore (2003) showed 
the inflated natures of NRAs in Japan, while Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000) 
suggested that NRAs are slower in downgrading compared with GRAs. Additionally, 
Carow (1999) and Li, Shin and Moore (2006) advocated the superiority of GRAs by 
showing that GRAs have more influence on the Japanese capital market than NRAs. As 
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mentioned in Chapter 1, there are two joint venture CRAs in China: CCXI (in which 
Moody’s has a 49% stake) and Lianhe (in which Fitch has a 49% stake). Moody’s and 
Fitch not only provide advanced rating techniques for their affiliates, but also assign 
representatives to participate in the rating decision process. Therefore, according to the 
second criterion, CCXI and Lianhe should be more independent with higher reputation 
capital and concern about their long-term reputation. 
Third, CRAs in China need to acquire recognition from different supervisors, the most 
difficult being the qualification from the PBOC and the CIRC. As the PBOC is in 
charge of the interbank market, the largest trading market in China, recognition from the 
PBOC means the bonds issued by these CRAs can be traded by almost all market 
participants. In addition, the CIRC is the regulatory organisation for insurance 
companies and have the most conservative investment strategy among all financial 
institutions. Therefore, recognition from the PBOC and the CIRC are essential to CRAs. 
Both CCXI and Lianhe have this qualification, satisfying the third criterion. 
In relation to the three criteria, only CCXI and Lianhe are recognised as reputable 
issuer-pay CRAs in China. Column 1 of Table 2.3 shows the comparison between the 
reputable and non-reputable groups. We can observe a significantly negative coefficient 
for the interaction term at a 1% significance level for the reputable group, which is not 
found for the non-reputable group. This means that CCR’s entry disciplines the rating 
inflation behaviour for reputable incumbent CRAs; however, it does not have a 
significant influence on non-reputable issuer-pay CRAs. This is consistent with the 
literature in that the reputational mechanism can be elevated through competition from a 
more credible CRA, especially for those who care more about reputation. Moreover, the 
difference between the coefficients of these two groups is statistically significant. This 
is also in line with the aforementioned literature that suggests that GRAs are more 
concerned about their rating quality and long-term reputation than NRAs. In other 
words, after controlling for the issuer’s financial characteristics, when CCR initiates 
ratings for an issuer that is also covered by a reputable issuer-pay CRA, that CRA will 
give lower ratings to this issuer in the post-period compared with firms not covered by 
CCR. This behaviour is significantly different from that of non-reputable CRAs, who 
are not sensitive to CCR’s entry. 
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2.4.2 The Effect of China Credit Rating’s Coverage Initiation Conditional on Issuers’ 
Investor Protection Environment 
This study proposes that issuers with a better investor protection environment are likely 
to be more exposed to the public and attract more attention from investors. These 
issuers are under stricter scrutiny and supervision from investors and regulators. This, in 
turn, puts pressure on incumbent issuer-pay CRAs to improve their rating quality 
following CCR’s coverage, because CCR’s more informative ratings reveal the low 
quality of incumbent CRAs’ ratings. Therefore, I expect that in the context of issuer-pay 
CRAs in China, issuers with a better investor protection environment experience lower 
rating inflation after CCR’s coverage. 
To test this hypothesis, I performed an analysis conditional on the issuer’s investor 
protection environment. I used two variables to capture the investor protection 
environment: investor protection index (IPI) and rating frequency. 
2.4.2.1 Investor Protection Index 
It is commonly accepted that better investor protection is associated with better financial 
markets (Dahya, Dimitrov & McConnell 2008; La Porta et al. 1997). In China, there are 
more than 30 provinces with unequal levels of economic development and investor 
protection. Some highly-developed provinces, such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, Beijing 
and Shanghai, have a more mature legal system, better investor protection mechanisms 
and friendlier investment environment. Conversely, other provinces, such as Gansu and 
Xinjiang, have a relatively incomplete market and legal environment. It is expected that 
firms from provinces with better investor protection are more exposed to the market and 
have a better investor protection environment. 
The index developed by Porta et al. (1998) is commonly used and includes indicators 
such as accounting standards, rule of law, anti-director rights and a dummy variable for 
common-law countries. However, these indicators cannot be directly used in China. The 
index used in this study was developed by Fan, Wang and Zhu (2011). It is consistent 
with the work of Porta et al. (1998) and widely applied in the existing literature on 
China’s market (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 2010; Cull & Xu 2005; Fan, 
Wong & Zhang 2007). The specific index I chose as the proxy of investor protection 
environment is the index measuring the development of market intermediaries, 
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protection of the legal rights of producers, protection of copyright and protection of 
consumers. 
Therefore, an issuer is classified as having a better investor protection environment if it 
comes from a province that is above the sample median. The high IPI group consists of 
firms who come from provinces with an IPI above the median level (otherwise, the 
company belongs to the low IPI group). Subsequently, I regressed Eq. 2.1 and Eq. 2.2 
by using samples from both high and low IPI groups and compared the difference of 
their coefficients on the interaction term. If a significantly negative value of the 
difference is observed, it means covered firms with a higher IPI (better investor 
protection environment) experience lower rating inflation after CCR’s entry. 
From Column 2 of Table 2.3, I find significant evidence that incumbent issuer-pay 
CRAs decrease their rating inflation in the treatment group after CCR’s entry for the 
high IPI group, but no clear evidence for the low IP group. The difference between the 
high and low IPI samples is significant in terms of the coefficient of the interaction term 
for all three models. This result indicates that in areas with an advanced legal system 
and better investor protection environment, issuer-pay CRAs are more conservative in 
their ratings. The reason for this may be that the issuers in these provinces are more 
sophisticated than other provinces, and have more public information to be accessed on 
the market. Thus, CRAs need to care more about the loss of reputation capital and the 
regulatory cost of inflating the ratings for them. 
2.4.2.2 Rating Frequency 
The rating frequency indicates how often firms are rated by issuer-pay CRAs. It is 
assumed that the more times a CRA has rated a firm, the closer their relationship with 
the issuer. As mentioned previously, in the long run, CRAs need to consider their 
reputation to secure their long-term revenue. Thus, the market has more access to the 
issuer’s information when the issuer is rated frequently. Therefore, I used rating 
frequency as another proxy for the investor protection environment. 
This research hypothesises that for the high-frequency group, issuer-pay CRAs decrease 
their rating inflation for CCR-covered companies compared with uncovered ones, while 
there is no such relationship for the low-frequency group. I defined an issuer as having a 
better investor protection environment if the frequency of ratings it received between 
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2006 and 2015 is above the sample median of rating frequency20. The high-frequency 
group has a better investor protection environment than did the low-frequency group. 
From Column 3 of Table 2.3, we observe significant differences (0.115) between the 
coefficients of interaction terms of the two groups at a 1% confidence level for all 
models. 
In summary, through the analysis of the investor protection environment, this thesis 
found that issuers with a better investor protection environment experience significant 
rating inflation reduction after the entry of CCR, while we cannot observe this from 
firms with worse investor protection environment. This implies that the rating 
information quality improvement is more pounced for firms having better investor 
protection environment following the introduction of an independent CRA. This also 
emphasises the importance of investor protection environment construction in the 
financial market. 
In general, reputable CRAs and firms with a better investor protection environment 
experience lower rating inflation following CCR’s entry, reflecting a reduction in 
information asymmetry and improvement of rating quality. 
  
                                                          
20 The reason of choosing the rating times between 2006 and 2015 rather than between 2006 and 
2012 is that the rating behaviour and strategy changes of incumbent CRAs are gradually happened.  
Along the time, CRAs will keep updating their knowledge on issuers’ level of exposure to 
information. If we only use the data before 2012, we would ignore the dynamic process of rating 
strategy change of CRAs. 
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Table 2.3:21 Difference-In-Differences Analysis of Ratings Categorised by the 
Reputation of Issuer-Pay Credit Rating Agencies 
Table 2.3 presents the DID analysis results categorised by reputation and investor protection 
environment. The reputable group consists of two CRAs: CCXI and Lianhe. The non-reputable 
group consists of the other seven issuer-pay CRAs. The high IPI group consists of firms from 
provinces with a higher-than-median IPI. The high-frequency group consists of firms whose 
number of ratings between 2006 and 2015 are above the median rating times; otherwise the 
company belongs to the low-rated frequency group. The Diff. of. Coefficient equals the 
coefficient of CCRcover*Post for reputable group minus that for non-reputable group for 
column 1; the coefficient of CCRcover*Post for high-IPI group minus that for low-IPI group for 
column 2; the coefficient of CCRcover*Post for high-frequency group minus that for low-
frequency group for column 3, respectively. Industry fixed effects are indicator variables for 
industry; year dummies are indicator variables for fiscal years. Standard errors are in the 
parentheses. R-squared is reported. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
  
                                                          
21 From this table on, we will focus on the model with industry and year fixed effects. 
  (1) Reputation   (2) Investor protection 
index 
  (3) Rating frequency 
 Non-
reputable 
Reputable  Low IPI High IPI  Low 
frequency 
High frequency 
CCRcover*Post –0.011 –0.171***  –0.032 –0.154***  –0.017 –0.132*** 
 (0.030) (0.030)  (0.029) (0.030)  (0.031) (0.034) 
 
Diff. of coefficient 
 
 
–0.160*** 
 
chi2 = 13.91 
  
–0.122*** 
 
chi2 = 8.52 
  
–0.115** 
 
chi2 = 6.26 
CCRcover 0.191*** 0.317***  0.226*** 0.289***  0.154*** 0.158*** 
 (0.029) (0.026)  (0.026) (0.027)  (0.029) (0.029) 
Sales  0.242*** 0.280***  0.238*** 0.266***  0.283*** 0.230*** 
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.005) 
Leverage –0.008*** –0.011***  –0.010*** –0.008***  –0.013*** –0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.008 0.004*  0.029 0.003  0.007 0.004*** 
 (0.026) (0.002)  (0.024) (0.002)  (0.022) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.091** –0.050  0.043 0.071  –0.040 0.056 
 (0.045) (0.039)  (0.038) (0.047)  (0.043) (0.039) 
Growth 0.000 0.001***  0.001* 0.001***  0.001** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash equivalent  0.050*** 0.027*  0.023** 0.118***  0.027** 0.157*** 
 (0.016) (0.015)  (0.011) (0.033)  (0.012) (0.021) 
Constant 2.260*** 2.952***  2.594*** 2.800***  2.781*** 2.765*** 
 (0.205) (0.098)  (0.151) (0.123)  (0.176) (0.116) 
Observations 8268 9120  8626 8762  9302 8086 
R-squared  0.395 0.493  0.379 0.490  0.356 0.456 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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2.5 Robustness Check 
2.5.1 Marginal Effects from the Ordinal Regression Model 
The rating variable can be treated as both continuous and discrete variables, for the 
convenience of explaining the underlying mechanisms of rating quality change, this 
thesis threats it as continuous variable. Here, as a robustness check, I treat it as ordinal 
variable and analyse it using ORM model. I applied the ORM regression using different 
ways to classify the ratings and analysed the marginal effect for each classification. For 
all scenarios, we found that the coefficients of the interaction term are significantly 
negative and the probability of being assigned a higher rating is reduced, while the 
probability of being assigned a lower rating is increased for the treatment group in the 
post-period compared with the control group (see Appendix 2.3). The results from ORM 
are in line with the preliminary results. 
2.5.2 Alternative Ratings Classifications 
Based on the discussion of classification and regression tree (CART) analysis in 
Appendix 2.2, I applied the DID regression on four alternative types of rating 
classifications. I explore whether the results are sensitive to the rating classification (i.e. 
the dummy variable with 5 grades). To address this concern, I develop four alternative 
dummy variables measures. The first and second measures are similar to the existing 
one, where AAA, AAA-=5, AA+=4, AA=3, AA-=2, others=1 and AAA, AAA-=4, 
AA+, AA=3, AA-=2, others=1, respectively. In the third measure, a numerical value is 
assigned to the ratings as follows: AAA, AAA-=9, AA+=8, AA=7, AA-=6, A+=5, A=4, 
A-=3, BBB+=2 and others=1. For the fourth measure, AAA, AAA-=6, AA+=5, AA=4, 
AA-=3, A+=2, and others=1.The results still hold (see Appendix 2.4). 
2.5.3 Alternative Sample Period 
This thesis considered the possibility that the influence of CCR’s entry may be delayed. 
Therefore, I deleted the observations in 2012 and assumed that the market needed one 
year to react to CCR’s coverage. The result does not change qualitatively. In addition, it 
is assumed the experiment was implemented from 2011 and made the post-dummy 
equal one if the observation was after 2011. We do not observe any significant results in 
the PSM sample (see Appendix 2.5). 
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2.5.4 Additional Check on Mechanisms Using the Propensity Score Matching Sample 
To future correct the potential endogeneity problem, I used the PSM sample to test the 
reputational mechanism and investor protection environment mechanism found in the 
DID regression. The results still hold (see Appendix 2.6). 
2.5.5 Additional Check on Mechanisms Using the Heckman Sample 
Although DID method itself to some extent can cure the potential endogeneity issue, but 
to further address that the rating quality change of reputable CRAs results from CCR’s 
entrant rather than reputable CRAs’ own client’s selection bias, Heckman method is 
employed. It is concerned that CCR’s coverage decision may result from its preference 
to larger and more solvent firms and this selection bias cause the empirical results. 
Heckman two stage method is thought to good cure to alleviate the above selection bias. 
I used the Heckman sample to test the reputational mechanism and investor protection 
environment mechanism found in the DID regression. The results still hold (see 
Appendix 2.7). 
2.5.6 Additional Check on Conditional Regression 
As discussed, the reputable issuer-pay CRAs pay more attention to their credibility; thus, 
they should be more cautious when dealing with ratings for firms that have a better 
investor protection environment following CCR’s coverage. Therefore, for issuers with 
a better investor protection environment, this thesis assumes that reputable issuer-pay 
CRAs should experience a greater improvement in their rating information content. The 
empirical result confirms the prediction (see Appendix 2.8). 
2.5.7 Additional Proxy to Measure Investor Protection Environment 
I used the Marketization Index (MI) in 2009 (Fan, Wang & Zhu 2011) as a proxy for the 
investor protection environment. I divided the sample into two groups. The high MI 
group consists of firms from provinces with a higher MI than the median level; the low 
MI group comprises firms from provinces with a lower MI than the median level. The 
empirical result confirms the investor protection environment mechanism (see 
Appendix 2.9). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined how the entry of CCR, a new independent CRA that utilises a 
combination of the public utility and investor-pay models, affects the behaviour of 
incumbent issuer-pay CRAs in China. To be best of this researcher’s knowledge, this 
combined business model is unique in China. I found a decline in rating inflation for 
those firms covered by CCR compared to those not covered by CCR. This indicates that 
CCR acts in a certification role to discipline incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, creating a 
benchmark for them. This also reflects the rating quality of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs 
has been improved. 
In particular, this discipline effect is more significant among the more reputable issuer-
pay CRAs and firms with a better investor protection environment. Thus, I further find 
that reputation and public supervision are two mechanisms through which CCR’s entry 
influences incumbent CRAs’ rating behaviour. 
The findings in this chapter complement the existing literature that documents a 
negative link between the entry of a new issuer-pay CRA and incumbent issuer-pay 
CRAs’ rating inflation. These findings also shed light on the debate concerning whether 
CRAs with alternative business models can alleviate the rating inflation problem. They 
also generate policy implications regarding the distinct effects of different types of 
CRAs on existing providers’ rating strategies and emphasise the importance of investor 
protection environment construction.  
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Chapter 3 
Does the Market Care about Rating Change Announcements  
Following the Entry of a New Player? 
This chapter analyses the relationship between CCR’s entry and information quality of 
the incumbent issuer-pay CRAs from the perspective of how investors reacted to 
incumbent CRAs’ rating change announcements following CCR’s coverage initiation. 
Section 3.1 provides a general introduction to the chapter and related literatures. Section 
3.2 describes the data collection and descriptive statistics. Methodology and baseline 
empirical results are shown in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the IV and PSM 
methods to remedy the endogeneity problem. Section 3.5 estimates the mechanisms. 
Sections 3.6 and 3.7 are the robustness test and conclusion respectively. 
3.1 Introduction 
By investigating the market reaction to the rating change announcements issued by 
incumbent issuer-pay CRAs before and after CCR’s coverage initiation, I find that the 
rating changes incorporate significantly higher information content after CCR’s 
coverage. This result adds empirical evidence to the literature documenting the 
influence of introducing a new rating agency with an alternative business model on 
issuer-pay rating agencies. 
I study this implication by comparing the information content of the ratings by issuer-
pay CRAs in China before and after CCR’s coverage initiation of each given firm. If 
CCR releases more information that affects the behaviour of incumbent issuer-pay 
CRAs, then the issuer-pay CRAs should improve their rating quality and timeliness, 
incorporating more information in their ratings. This, in turn, increases the information 
content of their rating change announcements. If so, investors should have a greater 
response to the rating change announcements of incumbent CRAs after CCR’s coverage 
initiation. To investigate this hypothesis, I apply an event study to compare the ratings 
information content of the issuer-pay CRAs in China before and after CCR’s coverage 
initiation of each given firm. I find a significant improvement in incumbent CRAs’ 
ratings information content following CCR’s coverage. Rating changes of issuer-pay 
CRAs incorporate more information and trigger more sensitive market reactions 
compared to that before CCR’s coverage. 
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The empirical method relies on CCR’s coverage initiation as the inception of CCR’s 
influence on the rating strategies of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs. In practice, CCR 
announced that its coverage is random. However, from the descriptive statistics results, 
this thesis finds CCR is more likely to cover firms larger in size, and with greater sales 
and higher tangibility. As a result, CCR’s coverage might not be exogenously 
determined; CCR might cover a firm because it was concerned that the firm had an 
inflated rating given by issuer-pay CRAs, or investors were not satisfied with the 
unresponsiveness of the present ratings. If these concerns simultaneously led incumbent 
CRAs to adjust their rating quality regardless of CCR’s coverage, then the influence of 
CCR’s entry on information content might be overestimated. 
To remedy this issue, I employ two approaches. First, I apply an IV analysis to build a 
causal role of CCR’s coverage initiation. The instrument for the timing of CCR’s 
coverage of each firm is the firm’s one year prior industry average total asset. This 
instrument can predict CCR’s coverage decisions because CCR is inclined to cover 
firms with a larger size. However, the industry-level total asset is unlikely to be directly 
correlated with the rating informativeness of issuer-pay CRAs for a particular firm. 
Using the IV procedure, the effect of CCR’s coverage on rating information content is 
at the same magnitude of that estimated in the OLS. This confirms the causal role of 
CCR’s coverage. 
Second, I apply a PSM method and find that the improvement in incumbent CRAs’ 
rating information content is unique to firms that are actually covered by CCR and is 
not present for firms with similar characteristics that do not have CCR coverage. 
Finally, this chapter also highlights the importance of CRAs’ reputations and investor 
protection environment on the effect of CCR’s coverage on information content of 
rating changes by issuer-pay CRAs. This research finds that the market reacts more to 
rating changes made by reputable incumbent CRAs. Further, I find that the market 
reacts more to rating changes of issuers who have a better investor protection 
environment. In other words, incumbent issuer-pay CRAs are more likely to be 
concerned with their quality provision after CCR’s coverage initiation for firms that are 
more exposed to investors. 
3.1.1 Related literatures 
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Researchers have used single or multi regression models or event study to test the 
reaction of stock and bond prices to credit ratings. If the change in price is significantly 
related to credit ratings regardless of the initial rating or change in rating, the credit 
ratings are informative and valuable (Barron, Clare & Thomas 1997; Goh & Ederington 
1993; Holthausen & Leftwich 1986; Kliger & Sarig 2000; Nayar & Rozeff 1994). It has 
evidences that both an upgrade and a downgrade in ratings can add information to the 
bond market, and that the stock market reacts more strongly to a downgrade (May 2010), 
and May (2010) used OTC market data. This is consistent with the findings of Nayar 
and Rozeff (1994) and Cantor (2004). Behr and Guttler (2008) confirm this opinion by 
estimating the influence of unsolicited ratings of S&P on stock price from 1996 to 2005 
and conclude that unsolicited ratings also convey new information. Goh and Ederington 
(1993) further distinguished among different types of downgrade, and they argued that 
the anticipated ratings changes and downgrades due to wealth transfer from bondholders 
to stockholders should not cause a significant negative stock response. Galil and Soffer 
(2011), on the other hand, argue that positive announcements from agencies add more 
information to the CDS market, controlling the presence of concurrent public and 
private information. Based on an analysis if the rating data of Moody’s from 1982 to 
2004, Bannier and Hirsch (2010) have also identified the economic function underlying 
the watch lists of rating agencies. They give positive assure on CRAs for their active 
monitoring function. Xia (2013) finds S&P’s rating downgrade announcements cause 
more market reaction following the coverage of the investor-pay EJR.  
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This study enhances our understanding of the nascent credit rating industry in China. 
Dhawan and Yu (2015) and Livingston et al. (2017) find that Chinese bond ratings are 
informative towards corporate bond yield. Korkeamäki et al. (2014) reach a similar 
conclusion in the syndicated loans market. Poon et al. (2013) show the role of credit 
rating in reducing the underpricing of seasonal offerings. While these studies mainly 
focus on the informational role of the incumbent issuer-pay CRAs in China, there is 
limited evidence on the CRAs’ reactions to the entry of a new credit rating agency, CCR. 
To our best knowledge, we are the first to provide such evidence. Our findings improve 
our understanding of the implication of the entry of CCR (a new combined investor-pay 
and public utility model) by documenting its effect on the information asymmetry and 
the rating quality of the incumbent CRAs. 
3.2 Sample and Methodology 
3.2.1 Data 
I collected data from Wind, ChinaBond and CCR. 
I manually constructed the sample by merging two rating databases from CCR and all 
other issuer-pay CRAs. CCR’s rating database consists of issuer credit ratings between 
2012 and the end of 2015. Each observation is an issuer credit rating corresponding to a 
certain rating action including a new rating assignment, affirmation, upgrade and 
downgrade. Throughout the thesis, I use the rating action of ‘new rating assignment’ 
from CCR to identify the date when CCR initiated coverage of each firm. I deleted 
firms that only obtained an initial rating but that have not been followed by CCR since, 
leaving 2,440 observations for corporate ratings representing 870 firms in CCR’s 
original database. I obtained credit ratings for nine other issuer-pay CRAs between 2006 
and the end of 2015 from Wind Info, leaving 26,069 firm–year–CRA observations for 
3,663 firms. The data sample excludes ratings for financial institutions, treasury bonds 
and enterprise set bonds and other non-rated or small volume bond categories. 
Therefore, I have two unbalanced cross-sectional data. I merged these two datasets by 
manually matching the company names and yearly information. I successfully merged 
869 out of 870 firms from CCR’s rating dataset. 
For each firm, I identified the day when CCR initiated coverage of the firm as the first 
coverage date. I then defined the period after the first coverage date as the post-
coverage period and the period before the first coverage date as the pre-coverage period. 
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After this, I merged the rating sample with the Wind Info to obtain firms’ financial 
information. The final sample contains 11,520 firm–year–CRA observations, 
representing 869 firms that incumbent issuer-pay CRAs originally rated and CCR later 
initiated coverage of between 2006 and 2015. 
3.2.2 Sample Description 
Panel A of Table 3.1 compares the descriptive statistics for firms rated by incumbent 
issuer-pay CRAs that are later covered by CCR with firms not covered by CCR between 
2006 and 2015. On average, firms rated by both types of CRAs are larger, as measured 
by sales. This implies that CCR does not randomly choose firms to cover. For example, 
the mean sales (log) of firms covered by CCR is 5.048, while the mean sales of firms 
not covered by CCR is only 3.211. This difference is significantly different from zero at 
a 1% confidence level. Firms rated by both types of CRAs have a relatively larger size, 
higher leverage, ROA and tangibility and lower growth rate. 
Table 3.1: Rating Sample Summary Statistics 
Table 3.1 compares the statistics of firms rated by both CCR and issuer-pay CRAs to firms only 
rated by issuer-pay CRAs between 2006 and 2015. Rating is a numerical value based on a notch 
basis as follows: AAA, AAA– = 5; AA+, AA = 4; AA– = 3; A+ = 2; others = 1; sales is the 
natural logarithm of sale; leverage is the ratio of total liability from the balance sheet to total 
assets; ROA is the return on assets that represents the profitability; tangibility is the ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to total assets; growth is the year-to-year increase of operating 
income; cash equivalent is the ratio of cash, tradable asset and receivable over current asset; all 
above variables are measured at the time t – 1. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Summary statistics of the controlled group and treatment group 
  Rating Sales Leverage ROA Tangibility Growth Cash 
equivalent 
Firms not covered by 
CCR 
Mean 3.898 3.211 53.829 0.449 0.180 0.853 0.567 
Std.dev 0.008 1.599 17.108 0.456 0.182 16.170 1.681 
Min. 1 –4.605 0.080 -6.578 0.000 –0.999 0.000 
Max. 6 8.437 162.200 6.300 0.961 1029 100.018 
N 14,549 14,485 14,501 14,480 14,432 14,437 14,485 
Firms covered by CCR Mean 4.769 5.048 63.023 0.577 0.295 0.233 0.419 
Std.dev 0.010 1.645 13.933 1.456 0.208 0.671 0.402 
Min. 1 –2.303 6.840 –4.072 0.000 –0.987 0.000 
Max. 6 10.268 139.85 86.112 0.969 23.680 13.884 
N 11,520 11,505 11,501 11,504 11,499 11,489 11,499 
Mean difference 0.871*** 1.837*** 9.194*** 0.128*** 0.115*** –0.620*** –0.148*** 
Median difference 1*** 1.843*** 9.530*** 0.125*** 0.134*** 0.018*** –0.027*** 
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3.3 Methodology and Baseline Empirical Results 
In this section, I present the methodology and baseline empirical results that show the 
effects of CCR rating initiation on the informativeness of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs’ 
rating changes. According to Xia (2013), information content of credit rating changes of 
issuer-pay CRAs is used to measure the rating quality improvement. The specific 
method I employ is to analyse the bond return reactions to rating change announcements 
of issuer-pay CRAs before and after CCR’s coverage initiation by setting up an event 
study in which the price changes for CPs, MTNs, CBs and EBs in China are considered. 
This approach has been widely used by previous studies (Ederington & Goh 1998; Hand, 
Holthausen & Leftwich 1992; Holthausen & Leftwich 1986; Hull, Predescu & White 
2004; Jorion, Liu & Shi 2005; Katz 1974; Weinstein 1977). This study combines an 
event study with CCR’s coverage initiation to estimate the influence of CCR’s coverage. 
A greater market reaction indicates that rating changes of issuer-pay CRAs have more 
information and suggests the ratings’ higher information quality. If incumbent issuer-
pay CRAs become more informative after CCR’s rating initiation, the bond market has 
a greater reaction to the rating change announcements. 
3.3.1 Event Study Set-Up 
I collected the information of 12,784 relevant bonds issued in China between 2006 and 
2015. The rating change is defined as any rating differences made by the issuer-pay 
CRAs compared to the prior rating assigned by any issuer-pay CRA for each issuer. By 
following the announcements of issuer-pay CRAs, I obtained 1,820 rating changes on 
these bonds’ issuers. Among them, there are 1,395 upgrades and 425 downgrades. The 
event date is the day in which the rating change is announced; thus, I have multiple 
event dates, one for each rating change of every issuer. Subsequently, I merged the 
firms who received rating changes with bonds issued by this firm. Thus, the rating 
change for one firm might have an influence on several bonds’ prices. I calculated the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each bond. To be sure, the consideration of 
possible co-movements of stock and bond markets is nothing new in the literature, 
dating back to Pinches and Singleton (1978) that analyze the adjustment of stock prices 
to bond rating changes. 
Following the study of Ferri et al (2013),  I used the CARs (expressed in percentage) 
over the 21-trading-day event window (from t – 10 to t + 10) to measure the magnitude 
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of market reactions to rating changes; t is the event date. As the bond market is less 
liquid than stock market, I choose 21 days as the event window. In robustness check, I 
altered the event window to 11 days, the results are still hold. The estimation window is 
90 trading days (from t – 120 to t – 30). Daily abnormal returns (AR) are calculated 
based on the market model (Fama & French 1993). Specifically, I ran the following 
OLS model for each bond: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖         (3.1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 define a bond’s daily returns and daily return of a market portfolio 
over a 90-trading-day period ending 30 trading days before the event day. The daily 
return of a market portfolio is defined as the daily change of the China Bond Index 
(CBA).22 For each period, individual bond returns and market return are calculated as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  ln (
𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
)          (3.2) 
𝑅𝑀,𝑡 =  ln (
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
)          (3.3) 
Next, for each bond, I use the estimated 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖, namely ?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖, to calculate the 
daily expected returns (the normal returns) during the 21-day event window, from 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡−10 to ?̂?𝑖,𝑡+10, as 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡` =  ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑀,𝑡` , where t` ∈ [−10, 10]       (3.4) 
Then, I calculate the daily AR, which is defined as the difference between the actual 
return and the estimated return in each of the 21 days: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡` =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡` − ?̂?𝑖,𝑡` , where t` ∈ [−10, 10]       (3.5) 
The CAR is the sum of the daily AR during the 21 days:23 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡` =  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡`−1 + 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡` , where t` ∈ [−10, 10]     (3.6) 
                                                          
22 Since 5 February 2006, China Bond Index has been developed and issued every trading day by 
China Central Depository & Clearing Co., LTD. 
23 I also employed another way to calculate CAR as the total AR during the 21-trading-day event 
window as a robustness check; the results still hold. 
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After merging with CCR’s coverage database and the available market trading database, 
finally I obtained 832 upgrades and 264 downgrades for 766 bonds issued by 361 firms 
who are covered by both CCR and incumbent issuer-pay CRAs. 
3.3.2 Baseline Empirical Results 
Table 3.2 presents the multivariate results from the regression by applying the following 
model: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜕𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (3.7) 
where 𝑋𝑖 and 𝜕𝑖 represent the control variables (leverage, tangibility, sales, growth and 
ROA) and industry dummy respectively. 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the event date is in the post-coverage period, otherwise zero. The results for 
downgrade and upgrade samples show that the market reaction is significantly negative 
towards downgrade announcements and not significantly responsive to upgrades. 
Specifically, in Column 1, switching from the pre-coverage to post-coverage period 
increases the magnitude of the 21-day CAR decreases by over 2.735% for downgrades, 
which is economically sizeable for the bond market. When considering the control 
variables and industry fixed effect in Columns 2 and 3 respectively, the same conclusion 
was obtained. These results are consistent with the literature that suggests that the 
market has a greater reaction to rating downgrades than upgrades (Dichev & Piotroski 
2001; Ederington & Goh 1998; Galil & Soffer 2011). A reason for these asymmetric 
reactions to upgrades and downgrades is that firms usually voluntarily release good 
news to the market well before rating changes, thus reducing the market reaction 
(Ederington & Goh 1998). Another possible reason is the regulatory use of credit ratings 
(Ferri, Lacitignola & Lee 2013) that make investors care more about downgrades as an 
investment restriction on ratings. 
This unbalanced results between downgrades and upgrades also point to a reputational 
mechanism. As failure to reveal negative information has a higher reputation cost than 
failure to reveal positive information for CRAs (Ellul, Jotikasthira & Lundblad 2011; 
Kisgen 2007), incumbent issuer-pay CRAs are likely to pay more attention on 
downgrades (which reveal negative news) in the face of CCR’s lower and more 
informative ratings to avoid the higher reputation cost (Bar-Isaac & Shapiro 2013; 
Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012). This improves the information content of issuer-pay 
CRAs’ rating downgrades. I will further discuss the reputation concerns for different 
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issuer-pay CRAs in Section 3.5.1. For other analyses, the focus will be on the effects of 
downgrade announcements. 
3.4 Endogeneity Tests 
One potential problem of the analyses thus far is that CCR’s coverage initiation is not 
exogenously determined. Although CCR states that its coverage is random, I still 
observe significant differences of financial characteristics between covered and 
uncovered firms. Therefore, CCR’s coverage may come from the requests of their 
clients or from the government regarding the quality of the existing rating. If this 
concern independently stimulates incumbent issuer-pay CRAs to adjust their ratings 
regardless of CCR’s actions, the effect of CCR’s entry and the reputational mechanism 
will be overestimated. In Section 3.4, I used two approaches to remedy this issue: an IV 
analysis and PSM. From here on, I will focus on the market reaction to downgrades. 
Table 3.2: Information Content of Rating Changes of Issuer-Pay Rating Agencies 
Table 3.2 presents the 21-trading-day CARs (in percentage) for bonds surrounding the rating 
change announcements of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs. The sample consists of issuer-pay CRAs’ 
rating change announcements for 361 firms that CCR initiated coverage of between 2012 and 
the end of 2015. Rating changes are between 2006 and 2015. There is a total of 832 upgrades 
and 264 downgrades for 766 bonds. CCRfirstcover is a dummy variable equal to one if the event 
date of rating change is during the post-coverage date, otherwise zero. The left-hand-side 
variable is the 21-day CARs surrounding rating change announcements. Sales is the natural 
logarithm of sales; leverage is the ratio of total liability from the balance sheet to total assets; 
ROA is the return on assets that represents the profitability; tangibility is the ratio of property, 
plant and equipment to total assets; growth is the year-to-year increase of operating income; 
cash equivalent is the ratio of cash, tradable asset and receivable over current asset; all above 
variables are measured at the time t-1. Industry fixed effects are indicator variables for firms’ 
industry. Standard errors are in parentheses. R-squared is reported. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Downgrades Upgrades 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
CCRfirstcover  –2.735** –2.737** –3.862*** –0.071 –0.120 –0.154 
 (1.306) (1.348) (1.455) (0.136) (0.140) (0.144) 
Sales  –0.701 –0.247  0.111* 0.114* 
  (0.624) (0.709)  (0.061) (0.067) 
Leverage  0.229*** 0.256***  –0.010 –0.009 
  (0.078) (0.080)  (0.008) (0.008) 
ROA  0.153 0.147  –0.024 –0.027 
  (0.204) (0.209)  (0.020) (0.020) 
Tangibility  –3.681 –6.153  0.151 –0.015 
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  (3.255) (3.760)  (0.358) (0.419) 
Growth  0.466 0.079  -0.022 0.024 
  (0.900) (0.915)  (0.082) (0.082) 
Cash equivalent  7.269*** 8.612***  0.062 0.029 
  (2.315) (2.383)  (0.227) (0.230) 
Constant 0.254 –13.953** –14.316** –0.127 0.059 0.092 
 (1.030) (5.407) (5.796) (0.091) (0.540) (0.579) 
Observations 264 262 262 832 831 831 
R-squared (Adjusted) 0.017 0.083 0.150 0.000 0.006 0.032 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
3.4.1 Instrumental Variables Analysis 
I employed an IV analysis to establish the casual role of CCR’s coverage initiation on 
issuer-pay CRAs’ rating adjustment. From the discussion on descriptive statistics in 
Section 3.2, I find that CCR’s coverage follows the rule of ‘a large firm’. Based on this 
law, I used the previous year’s average asset of each issuer’s industry as an instrument 
for the timing of CCR’s coverage for the firm. Industry categories are classified by 
codes defined by CSRC and widely used in China. For each year, I calculated the 
issuer’s industry average total asset based on the financial data in prior years using firms 
who were not covered by CCR as of 2015. I also used covered firms’ data to construct 
the instrument as a robustness check, obtaining similar results (see Section 3.6.4). The 
idea here is that if the issuer’s industry has an overall large total asset, then the relevant 
issuer is also likely to be a larger firm and thus more likely to be covered by CCR. The 
IVs should not be related to the quality or informativeness of issuer-pay CRAs’ ratings 
for that particular firm, which means the industry average total asset should be 
independent to rating information content. I confirm this hypothesis in this section. 
Based on the methods used by Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2012) and Xia (2013), I 
employed a logit model in the first-stage regression to regress CCR’s coverage initiation 
(i.e., CCRfirstcover dummy) on the industry average total asset (i.e., Ind–Mean–Asset) 
and other same control variables in the second-stage regression under a bond-fixed-
effect setting. From the first-stage regression, I obtained the predicted probability that 
CCR would initiate coverage in any given year for a given firm. Then, for each firm, I 
designated the first day of the year with the highest predicted probability as the 
instrumented date for CCR’s coverage initiation (i.e., the instrumented coverage date). 
Then, I defined the instrumented CCRfirstcover dummy as equal to one for observations 
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whose rating change announcements happened after the instrumented coverage date 
(otherwise zero). This instrumented CCRfirstcover is used in the second-stage 
regression. The regression results are presented in Table 3.3. 
Column 1 of Table 3.3 presents the result of first-stage regression, from which the 
instrument is significantly positively related to the time of CCR’s coverage initiation. 
Therefore, this result is consistent with the assumption that CCR is more likely to rate 
large firms. The LR chi-squared statistics is significant at a 1% confidence level, which 
indicates that the Ind–Mean–Asset is not a weak instrument. Column 2 presents the 
results of second-stage regression under different models, and the previous findings in 
Table 3.2 are preserved. Specifically, the market reaction to the downgrades of issuer-
pay CRAs (shown by the change of CARs) is more stronger and significantly different 
from zero in the post-coverage period than the pre-coverage period (i.e., –3.156% and 
significant at 5%). Therefore, this confirms the casual effect of CCR’s coverage on 
ratings informativeness of incumbent CRAs. 
Further, we need to confirm that the instrument we chose (Ind–Mean–Asset) does not 
directly affect the rating quality of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs for each given issuer. To 
ensure this, I examined the significance of the correlation between the instrument (i.e., 
Ind–Mean–Asset) and incumbent CRAs’ rating information content in the sample of 
non-CCR-covered firms. This sample can mute the indirect channel of CCR’s coverage, 
thus allowing us to purely focus on the direct channel. If the instrument is independent 
from the rating informativeness, we should not observe a significant correlation between 
them. Similarly, I used information content of issuer-pay CRAs’ rating changes to 
measure the rating quality. First, we tested the significance of Pearson correlation 
between them. There is only a correlation of 0.006, with a P value of 0.845, which 
indicates that the correlation is very small and not statistically significant. This result 
shows that the instrument is not likely to be directly related to rating quality of issuer-
pay CRAs. Second, we utilised a multivariate model, shown in Eq. 3.8, to further test 
the correlation between the above two variables. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜕𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (3.8) 
Based on the prediction above, the multivariate regression should show a statistically 
significant result for 𝛽1if the instrument directly causes the rating quality change of 
issuer-pay CRAs. The regression result is presented in Column 3 of Table 3.3, and I 
 66 
 
applied the same control variables to that in Column 2 for the second-stage regression. 
In line with the univariate correlation test, we do not observe a significant relationship 
between the industry average total asset and CARs, the measurement of rating quality of 
issuer-pay CRAs. 
Through the IV approach, we confirm the role of CCR’s coverage initiation on rating 
informativeness of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, assuming the coverage initiation is 
casual. The instrument I employed is not likely to be correlated with the dependent 
variable.  
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Table 3.3: Instrumental Variable Regression for Downgrades 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the IV regressions. The first stage is logit regression of the 
CCRfirstcover dummy on Ind–Mean–Asset. CCRfirstcover is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the event date of rating change is during the post-coverage date, zero otherwise. Ind–Mean–
Asset is the industry average total asset (measured as the logarithm of total asset) of each firm’s 
industry in the prior year, calculated using only issuer-pay CRA-rated firms not covered by 
CCR as of 2015. Also included in the first stage are the same control variables as those in the 
corresponding second stage and for the exclusion restriction test. Industries are classified by 
codes defined by CSRC. The first day of the issuer-year with the highest predicted probability 
of CCR’s coverage initiation for each issuer is assigned as the instrumented date for CCR’s 
coverage initiation. The instrumented CCRfirstcover equals one if the event date of rating 
changes is after the instrumented date for CCR’s coverage initiation, zero otherwise. In the 
second-stage regression in Column 2 and the exclusion restriction test in Column 3, the left-
hand-side variable is the 21-day CARs (in percentage change) surrounding rating change 
announcements. Standard errors are in parentheses. R-squared is reported. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 First stage  Second stage  Exclusion restriction 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
CCRfirstcover (instrumented)   –3.156**   
   (1.358)   
Ind–Mean–Asset 7.537***    –2.069 
 (1.230)    (1.707) 
Sales 0.354*  –0.620  0.385 
 (0.204)  (0.701)  (0.244) 
Leverage 0.023  0.270***  –0.027 
 (0.022)  (0.080)  (0.024) 
ROA –0.015  0.204  –0.094 
 (0.056)  (0.208)  (0.052) 
Tangibility 1.720  –7.676**  –2.815** 
 (1.049)  (3.790)  (0.969) 
Growth –0.543  0.494  0.057 
 (0.544)  (0.901)  (0.073) 
Cash equivalent 1.001  8.631***  –0.005 
 (0.667)  (2.393)  (0.257) 
Constant –43.126***  –14.854**  13.378 
 (7.157)  (5.800)  (9.897) 
Observations 257  262  385 
LR Chi-squared 122.29     
Prob (Chi-squared) 0.000     
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.359  0.144  0.043 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes 
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3.4.2 Propensity Score Matching Method 
The second method applied to remedy the endogeneity problem is the PSM approach. I 
matched CCR-rated firms in the sample (treated group) to those not rated by CCR 
(control group) from 2012 to 2015, based on various dimensions that are likely to 
predict CCR’s coverage decision. The idea is that by putting together firms (firm–year–
CRA) that are similar in these dimensions, we would obtain matched firm–year–CRA 
that designated when CCR would have begun to rate the firm had it decided to cover the 
firm. I used the first day of the matched year as the hypothetical date of CCR’s coverage 
initiation and examined whether the information content of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs 
improved in the matched sample after the hypothetical CCR’s coverage initiation. 
I matched the sample firms based on a set of pre-treated (i.e., one year prior to CCR 
coverage) characteristics, and I used 1-to-1, 1-to-3 and 1-to-5 nearest-neighbour 
matching methods respectively. Column 1 of Table 3.4 simply repeats Column 3 of 
Table 3.2 for downgrades for comparison purposes. PSM regressions on the 
hypothetical CCR’s coverage initiation are shown in Columns 2 to 4, from which I 
cannot observe any statistically significant relationship between CCR’s coverage and 
market reaction.24 The results indicate that previous findings on the influence of CCR’s 
coverage are unique for issuers who are actually covered by CCR (treatment group), 
while for the matched sample the information content of issuer-pay CRAs is not 
significantly related to CCR’s actions. This further shows that CCR’s coverage reveals 
more information on the bond market, which enriches the rating informativeness of 
incumbent issuer-pay CRAs and, in turn, causes a greater market reaction. This 
reinforces the argument that CCR’s entry improves the information quality of ratings in 
the bond market in China. 
  
                                                          
24 For the subgroup regression in Section 3.4, we also applied the PSM method. Consistent with the 
result in Table 3.4, we did not obtain significant results to show the relationship between 
hypothetical CCR’s coverage and ratings quality. 
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Table 3.4: Propensity Score Matching for Downgrades 
Table 3.4 presents the results of the nearest-neighbour PSM where each CCR-covered issuer is 
matched with one, two or three firm(s) that are not rated by CCR as of the end of 2015 
respectively. The CCR-covered sample consists of issuer-pay CRAs’ rating downgrade 
announcements that CCR initiated coverage of between 2012 and the end of 2015. Rating 
changes are between 2006 and 2015. Firms are matched based on their pre-treated (one year 
prior to CCR’s coverage) firm characteristics. The characteristics include size, leverage, 
profitability, tangibility sales and growth rate. The first day of issuer-year from the non-CCR-
covered (control) group that is matched with the CCR-covered (treated) firm is applied as the 
hypothetical coverage initiation time for the firm. Hypothetical CCRfirstcover equals one if the 
downgrade is after the hypothetical coverage time, zero otherwise. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. R-squared is reported. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) 1-to-1 (3) 1-to-3 (4) 1-to-5 
(Hypothetical) CCRfirstcover  –3.862*** –0.057 –1.102 –0.927 
 (1.455) (0.650) (0.841) (0.780) 
Sales –0.247 0.432* 0.641 0.572 
 (0.709) (0.256) (0.394) (0.347) 
Leverage 0.256*** –0.059** –0.072** –0.060** 
 (0.080) (0.026) (0.034) (0.029) 
ROA 0.147 –0.052 –0.131** –0.107* 
 (0.209) (0.059) (0.065) (0.061) 
Tangibility –6.153 –4.596*** –6.700** –4.986** 
 (3.760) (1.614) (2.606) (2.196) 
Growth 0.079 1.016 -0.005 0.071 
 (0.915) (0.731) (0.283) (0.269) 
Cash equivalent 8.612*** –0.325 –0.680 –0.827 
 (2.383) (1.557) (1.971) (1.565) 
Constant –14.316** 3.412 6.103** 4.765* 
 (5.796) (2.305) (2.963) (2.540) 
R-squared  262 82 177 206 
Observations 0.150 0.247 0.090 0.077 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3.5 Analyses Conditional on Reputational Differences and Investor Protection 
Environment 
Two mechanisms through which CCR’s coverage initiation can improve information 
content and thus the rating quality of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs are investigated in 
this section. 
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3.5.1 The Effect of China Credit Rating’s Coverage Initiation Conditional on 
Reputational Differences among Issuer-Pay Credit Rating Agencies 
Similar to Section 2.4, I propose that an important mechanism through which CCR’s 
coverage improves ratings informativeness of issuer-pay CRAs in China is the 
reputation of issuer-pay CRAs. In other words, reputable incumbent CRAs are more 
likely to adjust their rating strategies following CCR’s coverage initiation, improving 
the quality of their ratings, because they fear losing their reputation. This proposal is 
consistent with the reputational mechanism mentioned in Section 2.4 (Bar-Isaac & 
Shapiro 2013; Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012; Mathis, McAndrews & Rochet 2009; 
Opp, Opp & Harris 2013; Skreta & Veldkamp 2009). Moreover, the asymmetric results 
between downgrades and upgrades imply that reputation concerns may be a mechanism. 
Therefore, I expect that incumbent CRAs with a better reputation will experience a 
greater improvement in rating quality; thus, their rating changes are associated with 
more market reactions following CCR’s coverage initiation. 
As previously discussed, only CCXI and Lianhe are recognised as reputable issuer-pay 
CRAs in China. The other issuer-pay CRAs belong to the non-reputable group. The 
study estimated the model in Table 3.2 and tested whether the coefficient of 
CCRfirstcover differed between the reputable and non-reputable groups. Column 1 of 
Table 3.5 presents the results from this analysis. The coefficient on CCRfirstcover is 
more negative in the subsample of reputable issuer-pay CRAs and the difference in 
coefficients is statistically significant. 
This finding is consistent with the expectations and suggests that investors react more to 
rating changes issued by reputable issuer-pay CRAs during the post-coverage period, 
thus indicating a greater improvement of rating information content (quality) of 
reputable issuer-pay CRAs following CCR’s coverage. This also confirms the existence 
of the reputational mechanism, through which CCR’s coverage influences the 
enhancement of rating quality. However, these results are contrary to the criticism that 
issuer-pay CRAs in China do not care about their reputation when assigning ratings 
(Bottelier 2003; Kennedy 2008; Xu & Han 2013). 
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3.5.2 The Effect of China Credit Rating’s Coverage Initiation Conditional on Issuers’ 
Investor Protection Environment 
In this section, I use the IPI and rating frequency to measure the investor protection 
environment of an issuer, similar to Section 2.4.2. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.5 summarise the results of the analysis conditional on 
issuers’ investor protection environment. Consistent with expectations, the coefficient 
of CCRfirstcover is more negative for firms with better investor protection environment 
(i.e., issuers have higher rating frequency or come from provinces with a higher IPI). 
These findings suggest that, disciplined by the coverage of CCR, incumbent issuer-pay 
CRAs are more likely to adjust their rating strategy when rating issuers who have a 
better investor protection environment. 
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Table 3.5: Information Content of Rating Changes of Issuer-Pay Rating Agencies 
for Downgrades—Classified by Reputation of Issuer-Pay CRAs 
Table 3.5 presents the 21-trading-day CARs (in percentage) for bonds surrounding the 
downgrades rating change announcements of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, classified by their 
reputation. The reputable group consists of two CRAs: CCXI and Lianhe. The non-reputable 
group consists of the other seven issuer-pay CRAs. The Diff. of. Coefficient equals the 
coefficient of CCRcover*Post for reputable group minus that for non-reputable group for 
column 1; the coefficient of CCRcover*Post for high-IPI group minus that for low-IPI group for 
column 2; the coefficient of CCRcover*Post for high-frequency group minus that for low-
frequency group for column 3, respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. R-squared is 
reported. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
3.6 Robustness Test 
3.6.1 Alternative Sample Period 
This study also considers that there may be a time delay in the influence of CCR’s entry. 
Therefore, I deleted the observations in 2012 and assumed that the market needed one 
year to react to CCR’s coverage. The result does not change qualitatively (see Appendix 
3.1). 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
 Non-
reputable 
Reputable  Low IPI High IPI  Low 
frequency 
High 
frequency 
 
CCRfirstcover –0.431** –5.912**  –0.167 –6.011***  0.085 –4.206**  
 (0.214) (2.308)  (0.232) (2.225)  (0.252) (1.983)  
Diff. of coefficient –5.481** chi2 = 5.59  –5.844*** chi2 = 6.82  –4.291** chi2 = 4.61  
Sales 0.121 –0.465  0.031 –1.035  -0.050 0.006  
 (0.116) (0.839)  (0.116) (1.052)  (0.179) (1.048)  
Leverage –0.032** 0.574***  0.016 0.642***  –0.014 0.593***  
 (0.014) (0.202)  (0.011) (0.206)  (0.014) (0.187)  
ROA –0.040* 0.223  0.062 0.847**  –0.027 –0.019  
 (0.024) (0.268)  (0.049) (0.349)  (0.031) (0.348)  
Tangibility 0.016 –9.607**  –1.046 –21.866**  –1.118 –2.291  
 (0.477) (4.541)  (0.734) (8.681)  (0.852) (3.958)  
Growth 0.708*** 0.212  –0.010 –0.497  0.655*** 0.769  
 (0.182) (0.636)  (0.447) (0.695)  (0.140) (0.680)  
Cash equivalent –0.307 15.922**  0.740* 12.185***  –0.230 30.038***  
 (0.511) (7.877)  (0.385) (4.480)  (0.307) (10.265)  
Constant 1.894** –36.588**  –1.437** –33.076***  1.375 –45.689***  
 (0.941) (14.779)  (0.707) (11.266)  (0.901) (14.350)  
Observations 135 127  132 130  114 148  
R-squared  0.135 0.273  0.128 0.331  0.117 0.349  
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
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3.6.2 Alternative Event Window and Alternative Estimation Window to Calculate 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
I changed the event window from 21 days to 11 days, a shorter reaction cycle, to 
calculate the cumulative AR during the 11-trading-day event window for bonds 
surrounding downgrades rating change announcements. The results still hold (see 
Appendix 3.2). Moreover, I changed the estimation window from 90 trading days (t – 
120, t – 30) to 60 trading days (t – 80, t – 20) to include more valid data. The results still 
hold (see Appendix 3.2). 
3.6.3 An Alternative Way to Calculate Instrumental Variables 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1, I applied another method to calculate the IV (i.e., industry 
average total asset) based on the financial data in the prior year using firms who were 
covered by CCR as of 2015. All results are unchanged qualitatively (see Appendix 3.3). 
3.6.4 Additional Proxy to Measure the Investor Protection Environment 
I used the MI in 2009 (Fan, Wang & Zhu 2011) as a proxy for the information 
environment. The high MI group consists of firms from provinces with a higher MI than 
the median level; the low MI group consists of firms from provinces with a lower MI 
than the median level. The empirical result does not change qualitatively (see Appendix 
3.4). 
3.6.5 Event Study Using a Different Rating Classification to Define Rating Changes 
As another robustness check, I rematched the events of rating change using a wider 
rating scale. I reclassified the ratings to nine scales as follows: AAA, AAA– = 9; AA+ = 
8; AA = 7; AA– = 6; A+ = 5; A = 4; A – = 3; BBB+ = 2, others = 1. The previous 
results still hold (see Appendix 3.5). 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined how the entry of CCR affected the information quality of ratings 
issued by incumbent issuer-pay CRAs in China. By comparing the information content 
of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs before and after CCR’s coverage initiation, this research 
found there was a significant improvement in the rating quality of incumbent CRAs. 
Their ratings incorporated more information content and triggered a greater market 
reaction to their rating downgrade announcements following CCR’s coverage. 
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The IV approach and PSM method were employed to remedy the possible endogeneity 
issue, establishing the causal role of CCR’s coverage initiation. This study further found 
that all ratings of incumbent CRAs were lower than CCR’s, and only the downgrades 
caused greater reactions during the post-coverage period. This asymmetric finding 
suggests that the rating strategy adjustment of incumbent CRAs are responsive to the 
reputational mechanism elevated by CCR’s entry. 
This research also found that CCR’s entry had a greater effect on more reputable issuer-
pay CRAs, and a greater influence on issuers with a better investor protection 
environment. This finding indicates that incumbent CRAs’ rating behaviour can be 
disciplined by CCR’s entry through their own reputation concerns and outside 
supervisors. 
The findings in this chapter supplement the existing literature that discusses how to 
improve the rating quality of issuer-pay CRAs. It also complements the debates on the 
reputational mechanism of CRAs. Further, it calls for more attention on the importance 
of issuer-pay CRAs’ reputations and the construction of a better investor protection 
environment.
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Chapter 4 
Certification through Reputation of a Credit Rating Agency 
 
This chapter investigates whether certification via reputable CRAs is beneficial to 
issuers in the bond market in China. After considering the issuer-reputable CRA match, 
I find that bonds rated by the most reputable CRAs are associated with a lower yield 
spread (higher bond price), revealing investors’ recognition of the rating quality of 
reputable CRAs. This result is consistent with the traditional certification hypothesis 
and underlying reputational mechanism. I further find that the investor protection 
environment and issuer’s risk are two mechanisms through which the certification effect 
works. I also find this certification effect was reinforced after the entry of CCR. Section 
4.1 provides a brief introduction and Section 4.2 analyses the related literature. Section 
4.3 focuses on sample and methodology, while 4.4 presents the baseline empirical 
results. Section 4.5 estimates the effect of CCR’s entry on the certification role of 
reputable CRAs. Section 4.6 is a robustness test. Section 4.7 concludes the chapter. 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I test the certification hypothesis from the issuer’s point of view by 
asking whether certification benefits issuers through reducing financing cost in the bond 
market. 
In the bond market, CRAs play the important role of connecting bond issuers with bond 
investors. The most important reason why CRAs are valuable is because they can 
reduce the informational cost of capital for issuers. This role arises from the typical 
information asymmetry between issuers and investors during bond issuance. Ackerloff 
(1970) claimed that such an information gap would deteriorate investors’ trust of issuers, 
or even destroy the whole market. However, CRAs, as an intermediary between insiders 
and outsiders, are in a perfect position to reduce information asymmetry and lower the 
cost of capital for bond issuers. 
Previous research has estimated the important role of CRAs in reducing information 
asymmetry between bond issuers and bond investors, and subsequently reducing the 
cost of debt. For instance, Livingston and Zhou (2009) found that bonds with split 
ratings had a higher yield because investors required more compensation for the greater 
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asymmetric information behind the rating difference. In addition, Tang (2009) analysed 
debt costs after Moody’s change on its rating granularity and found that firms with more 
refined ratings had lower debt costs than those with less refined ratings. Sufi (2009) 
highlighted the certification effect of bank loan ratings on the financing and investment 
activities of issuers, as rating solicitation can also reduce information asymmetry. The 
author further advocated that due to the greater reputation of Moody’s and S&P, firms 
with bank loan ratings from them could get access to debt financing more easily. 
Conversely, how does an issuer-pay CRA solve its own information problem vis-a-vis 
the investors, particularly as it collects most of its revenue from issuers? One solution is 
the ‘reputation capital’ at stake for CRAs. CRAs are repeat player in the markets; thus, 
their long-run business is closely related to their reputation. If they only focus on short-
term revenue by initiating favourable ratings, investors will lose confidence in them in 
the long run, causing reputation and income loss. As long as the present value of future 
income is greater than the short-term profit from fraud, CRAs will choose not to defraud 
investors. 
Therefore, reputation is a valuable asset in the credit rating industry. The intention to 
protect reputation capital will affect CRAs’ rating imitation decisions. As bad bond 
performance (e.g., default in the future) will damage the reputation of rating agencies, 
relatively reputable CRAs will rate high-quality issuers that pose little risk to their 
reputation. In turn, aware of the reputation concerns of CRAs, investors take reputable 
CRAs’ ratings as positive signals, and, ceteris paribus, the issuer will have a lower debt 
cost. This is associated with the certification hypothesis that underwriters can help to 
reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders by certifying issuer 
quality through their reputation (Booth & Smith 1986). 
Although the role of CRAs’ reputations has been discussed theoretically, the empirical 
evidence is addressed less often, particularly in the emerging market. In this chapeter, 
issuance data between 2006 and 2015 is used to empirically estimate the benefit of 
certification from reputable CRAs to issuers in the bond market in China. After 
controlling the issuer-CRA selection bias, I found that reputable CRAs obtained lower 
bond yields for their clients. In addition, the investor protection environment and 
issuer’s risk are two mechanisms through which the certification effect has influence. 
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Moreover, according to the results from Chapters 2 and 3, reputable CRAs in China 
experienced a greater improvement in rating quality after the entry of CCR. Therefore, I 
have an opportunity to further analyse whether CCR’s entry affected the certification 
role of existing reputable issuer-pay CRAs. I find that bonds rated by reputable CRAs 
obtained lower bond yields after CCR’s entry, and the certification effect to reduce debt 
cost by reputable CRAs was stronger for CCR-uncovered issuers than covered issuers. 
Overall, the findings suggest that CRAs’ rating decisions reflect reputation concerns 
and are thus informative of issue quality. Investors take reputable CRAs’ ratings as a 
positive signal and assign a lower yield for issuers. This effect is reinforced by the entry 
of an independent CRA, verifying the reputational mechanism from another perspective. 
4.2 Related Literature 
After the subprime crisis and sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the failure of CRAs has 
been widely discussed by the public and academia. The discussion was directed at their 
capital: their reputation. There are several branches of studies on the reputation of CRAs 
and financial intermediaries in general. Nevertheless, this thesis will focus on the 
relationship between intermediary reputation and security price. 
4.2.1 Theory 
Theoretically, there are still inconsistencies between the certification hypothesis and 
market power hypothesis in relation to the role of a financial intermediary’s reputation. 
In the bond market, the certification hypothesis is at first applied on underwriters. It 
suggests that with their reputation at stake, reputable underwriters can verify the quality 
of their issuers, thus reducing information asymmetry (Allen 1990; Booth & Smith 1986; 
Titman & Trueman 1986). The certification via reputable underwriters can lower issuers’ 
information cost, thus lowering bond issuance yield. This certification effect works 
because reputable underwriters apply stricter evaluation standards to avoid reputation 
cost (Chemmanur & Fulghieri 1994). There are still opposing arguments regarding the 
certification hypothesis caused by moral hazard and competition. As long as 
underwriters build up a strong reputation, they have the market power and incentive to 
milk their reputation (Chemmanur & Fulghieri 1994). Thus, it is highly possible that 
reputable underwriters are associated with incorrect evaluation. 
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In terms of the certification effect via reputation of the CRAs, some commentators 
believe that the reputational mechanism can alleviate any conflict of interest to some 
extent. When issuer-pay CRAs consider the long-term reputation cost, they tend to 
provide more informative ratings to avoid investors’ or regulators’ derecognition of 
their rating inflation (Bar-Isaac & Shapiro 2013; Bolton, Freixas & Shapiro 2012). 
Further, Goel and Thakor (2010) found that CRAs’ concern over their reputation can 
induce them to invest more, and that reputation tends to dominate any conflicts of 
interest in the industry (Covitz & Harrison 2003). Fischer’s (2015) model uses a 
dynamic setting to capture the effects of CRAs’ reputations, and the author found that 
low-quality bond issuers generally tend to match low-quality CRAs. However, the same 
debate between certification and market power also exists in the credit rating industry. 
For example, model built by Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009) suggested that 
agencies increase their ratings using their cumulative reputation. The truth-telling 
incentives are weaker when CRAs have more business from rating complex products. 
4.2.2 Hypothesis development 
Base on the discussion on previous studies, this chapter aims to answer the question of 
the relationship between the certification effect via CRA’s reputation and the bond 
issuance cost using the above models. The hypothesis are as follows: 
H1: Bonds rated by reputable CRAs are associated with significantly lower 
issuance yield. 
According to the results in Chapters 2 and 3, the entry of CCR disciplined the rating 
behaviour of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs, thus reducing the information asymmetry 
between the CRA-issuer alliance and investors. This study found that existing issuer-
pay CRAs, particularly reputable ones, reduced their rating inflation for firms covered 
by CCR and their rating changes caused a greater market reaction. Therefore, if the 
investors are aware of this rating quality change, the entry of CCR should increase the 
power of the certification effect on CRAs’ reputations. This argument can be 
investigated through Hypotheses H2 and H3. 
H2: After CCR’s entry, bonds rated by reputable CRAs are associated with an 
even lower issuance spread. 
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H3: Compared with CCR-covered firms, reputable CRAs have a greater 
certification effect on CCR-uncovered firms. 
4.2.3 Empirical Literature 
There are a number of empirical studies on the certification effect via reputation for 
investment banks (underwriters). Several researchers discussed the correlation between 
the reputation of underwriters and the IPO price (Beatty & Ritter 1986; Booth & Smith 
1986; Chemmanur & Fulghieri 1994; Hoberg 2007; Johnson & Miller 1988; Loughran 
& Ritter 2004), but the results were inconclusive. With respect to the bond market, Fang 
(2005) addressed the importance of underwriters’ reputations on the yield of bonds from 
the perspective of price (underwriting fee) and quality (bond issuance price), revealing 
that reputable banks obtained lower yields and their underwriting decisions reflected 
reputation concerns. Fang (2005) also found a positive relationship between reputation 
and the underwriting fee, consistent with the theory in the product market (Allen 1984; 
Klein & Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983). Similarly, Livingston and Miller (2000) and Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta and Patel (1997) also found a negative relation between an underwriter’s 
reputation and bond yield, but they did not consider self-selection issue. Conversely, 
Andres, Betzer and Limbach’s (2014) results supported the market power hypothesis 
rather than the certification hypothesis, whereby they found bonds underwritten by the 
most reputable investment banks were associated with a higher default risk. Employing 
a high-yield bonds sample, they further found that investors required higher bond yields 
as they were aware of this higher potential risk. 
Regarding the certification role of CRAs, there have been several studies on the 
certification effect on the stock market for the credit rating industry. For example, Li, 
Shin and Moore (2006) found that, compared to Japanese rating agencies, international 
rating agencies, such as Moody’s and S&P, have a greater influence on the stock price 
of Japanese companies. Their findings imply that GRAs have a greater reputation than 
domestic agencies in Japan, and that this higher reputation affects the stock price change. 
With respect to the bond market and the certification role of CRAs, the empirical 
studies are very rare. Allen and Dudney (2008) analysed the influence of rating 
agency’s reputations on US government bond yields, using the split ratings sample of 
Moody’s and S&P. They found that Moody’s impact on bond yields dominated S&P 
from 1986 to 1994. However, this dominant influence disappeared from 1995 to 2002 
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following Moody’s negative publicity related to an antitrust investigation in 1995. This 
finding indicated that the reputation change of CRAs was highly related to the 
investor’s willingness to invest in their rated bonds. Livingston, Wei and Zhou (2010) 
found that issuing rates on split-rated bonds with superior Moody’s ratings were about 
eight bps lower than those given superior ratings by S&P. Their study indicated that 
investors differentiated between the two ratings and assigned more weight to the ratings 
from Moody’s—the more conservative rating agency. 
Moreover, Han, Pagano and Shin (2012) compared the original issuing rate of non-
financial Japanese bonds rated by domestic rating agencies to those rated by 
international agencies from April 1998 to March 2009. They found that the bonds rated 
by global agencies benefited from 11 to 14 bps yields compared to those rated by 
domestic CRAs. However, this advantage was offset by the yield increase of 12–17 bps 
that occurred during the 2007–09 financial crisis for internationally rated bonds. Their 
results show that the reputation of CRAs plays an important role in determining the 
financial costs facing bond issuers and that the reputation of international CRAs was 
damaged during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, which is consistent with the findings of 
Li, Shin and Moore (2006). 
Further, the stronger reputation of international rating agencies can mitigate information 
asymmetry. Covitz and Harrison (2003) identified that Moody’s and S&P changed 
ratings to protect their reputation as delegated monitors for investors rather than 
maximising the revenue extracted from issuers. Shin and Moore (2008) concluded that 
even though Moody’s and S&P assigned lower credit ratings to Canadian firms than the 
Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), a Canadian CRA, the former was more 
influential in the Canadian capital market. 
Additionally, Ferri, Lacitignola and Lee (2013) compared the CARs of the bond market 
surrounding the rating change announcements issued by the GRA and NRA in Korea. 
They found that CARs following downgrades by NRAs dominated those by GRAs, 
which goes against the reputation capital theory that CRAs with a greater reputation 
capital are more reliable. 
There has been limited research on the influence of the reputation of China’s CRAs on 
bond-issuing prices. For a long time, the reputation of issuer-pay CRAs in China was 
criticised (Kennedy 2008; Lee 2006).  
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Generally speaking, the empirical studies on the relationship between bond yield and 
CRA’s certification role are still sparse and inconclusive, while the inconclusive 
evidence mainly stems from the differences in the sample and time period selection. 
China provides a unique setting in which many issuer-pay CRAs are competing; thus, I 
have sufficient criteria to split them into reputable and non-reputable groups. The entry 
of CCR gives us an exogenous shock to further test the certification hypothesis. This 
thesis complements the literature that supports the certification effect of reputable CRAs 
in the bond market. 
4.3 Sample and Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample and Variables 
4.3.1.1 Sample 
I collected data from Wind, ChinaBond and CCR. The sample consists of 11,845 new 
bond issuances for 3,344 issuers from 2006 to the end of 2015. The data sample 
excludes financial institutions bonds, treasury bonds, enterprise set bond, EBs25 and 
other non-rated or small volume bond categories. 
4.3.1.2 Variables Employed 
I estimated the treasury spread for every bond issuance, which is defined as the 
difference between the issue’s offering yield and the yield on a benchmark treasury 
security. This spread, which is also called the risk premium, ultimately measures the 
default risk of the bond (Fisher 1959) under the assumption that bond yields capture all 
publicly available information in a timely manner. It is the dependent variable in the 
regression. The benchmark treasury is chosen as a corresponding China treasury bond 
with a similar duration and maturity as the bond issuance by the firm in the sample. 
My main independent variable is reputation that is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
CRA of the issued bond belongs to the reputable group, zero otherwise. The reputable 
group consists of CCXI and Lianhe, while the non-reputable group comprises the others. 
There are three criteria to define whether a CRA belongs to the reputable group: market 
share, foreign capital and recognition from the government. I applied these criteria, 
described in Chapters 2 and 3, and recognise CCXI and Lianhe as reputable issuer-pay 
                                                          
25 The EB market is regulated by CSRC, and joint venture capital CRAs are banned from rating this 
bond category. 
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CRAs in China. Thus, reputation equals one if the issue is rated by CCXI or Lianhe, 
zero otherwise. 
I also selected several control variables that explained bond yields in terms of issue 
characteristics based on previous research (Fisher 1959; Fung & Rudd 1986; Horrigan 
1966; Kaplan & Urwitz 1979; Sorensen 1979; West 1970; Ziebart & Reiter 1992). The 
variables are maturity, which is the number of years to maturity of debt; volume, which 
is the log of the par value of debt initially issued (in RMB 100 million); rating, which is 
the rating assigned to the debt issuer, based on a notch basis as follows: AAA, AAA– = 
5; AA+, AA = 4; AA– = 3; A+ = 2; others = 1; and enhancement, which is a dummy 
variable indicating that the issue has credit enhancements. 
In addition to the issue characteristics, I also controlled the following issuer 
characteristics (Blume, Lim & Mackinlay 1998; Campbell & Taksler 2003): sales, 
which is the log of total sales in RMB 100 million; leverage, which is the ratio of total 
liability from the balance sheet to total assets; ROA, which is the return on assets that 
represents profitability; tangibility, which is the ratio of property, plant and equipment 
to total assets; growth, which is the year-to-year increase of operating income; and cash 
equivalent, which is the ratio of cash, tradable asset and receivable over current asset to 
represent liquidity. Moreover, in all regressions, I controlled economic and industry 
effects using indicator variables for the years and industries for each issue; 𝜀𝑖 represents 
the residual. 
4.3.2 Methodology 
This section analyses the association between the reputation of issuer-pay CRAs and 
bond yields to see if issuers can save money by hiring reputable CRAs, all things being 
equal. 
To verify the impact of the reputation of CRAs, we assume market investors are 
sophisticated and can get access to all public information. Thus, the reputation’s role is 
reflected by the treasury spread. 
I estimated regressions using Eq. 4.1, in which the treasury spread is the dependent 
variable and reputation as a dummy variable is the independent variable. 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖       (4.1) 
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4.3.2.1 Endogeneity Concerns 
From the descriptive statistics in Table 4.1, we observe that issuers rated by reputable 
CRAs generally have higher ratings (0.238 notches higher), larger scales and greater 
margins than those rated by non-reputable CRAs. These differences indicate that the 
matching between a bond issuer and CRA is not a random process. If high-quality firms 
prefer reputable CRAs, then the lower issuance bond yield may largely depend on the 
characteristics of issuers, rather than the reputation capital of CRAs. Conversely, if 
reputable CRAs only choose to rate high-quality firms, then the regression might also 
overestimate the role of reputation. This may cause endogeneity problems in 
econometric analysis investigations of the role of reputation by leading to a lower 
spread in the form of omitted variable bias due to sample selection. 
If the unobserved reasons behind reputable CRAs’ choices affect the bond yield spread, 
we may overestimate the certification effect of CRAs’ reputations. To correct this 
problem, we addressed the well-recognised issue of endogenous matching in the 
Heckman (1980) two-stage ‘treatment-regression model’ approach (Maddala 1986) in 
the manner of Guo and Fraser (2014), Ross (2010), Fang (2005) and Andres, Betzer and 
Limbach (2014). 
The appropriate ‘treatment effects’ model to correct selection bias is 
Regression equation: 𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝛿𝑤𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖      (4.2) 
Selection equation: 𝑤∗𝑖 =  𝛾𝑧𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖, 𝑤𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑤
∗
𝑖 > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
           (4.3) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖 = 1|𝑧𝑖) = 𝛷(𝛾𝑧𝑖) 
and 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖 = 0|𝑧𝑖) = 1 − 𝛷(𝛾𝑧𝑖) 
The above models are named ‘Heckit’ models. These models are direct applications of 
the sample selection model used to estimate ‘treatment effects’ in observational studies. 
The ‘treatment effects’ model differs from the sample selection model in two ways: 1) a 
dummy variable indicating the treatment conditions 𝑤𝑖 (i.e., 𝑤𝑖 = 1 if observation 𝑖 is 
in the treatment regime, zero otherwise) directly entered into the regression equation, 
and 2) the outcome variable is observed for both regimes (i.e., 𝑤𝑖 = 1 and 𝑤𝑖 = 0). 
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The evaluation task is to use the observed variables to estimate the regression 
coefficients 𝛽and the ‘treatment effects’ 𝛿, while controlling for selection bias induced 
by non-random treatment assignment. The model expressed by Eq. 4.2 and Eq. 4.3 is a 
switching regression. By substituting 𝑤𝑖 in Eq. 4.2 with Eq. 4.3, we obtain two different 
equations of the outcome regression: 
when 𝑤∗𝑖 > 0, 𝑤𝑖 = 1: 𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽𝑥𝑖 + 𝛿(𝛾𝑧𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖) +  𝜀𝑖     (4.4) 
and 
when 𝑤∗𝑖 ≤ 0, 𝑤𝑖 = 0: 𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽𝑥𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖       (4.5) 
This is Quandt’s (1958) form of the switching regression model that indicates two 
regimes for treatment and non-treatment groups. Eq. 4.4 is the outcome model for 
treated observations, whereas Eq. 4.5 is for non-treated participants. 
A consistent two-step approach for this model was suggested by Maddala (1986), which 
is referred to as the dummy endogenous regression model with a structural shift. In the 
first stage, predicted values for Pr(w=1|z) from a probit model is obtained, and a hazard 
variable (see Eq. 4.6) representing the unobserved variables is calculated and included 
as an additional regressor in a regression model in the second stage (Powers 2007).26 
ℎ𝑖 = {
∅(?̂?𝑧𝑖)/𝛷(𝛾𝑧𝑖)                   𝑤𝑖 = 1 
−∅(?̂?𝑧𝑖)/{1 − 𝛷(𝛾𝑧𝑖)}    𝑤𝑖 = 0 
       (4.6) 
where ∅ is the standard normal density function. 
For this study, in the first stage of the Heckman approach, it estimated selection 
equations for issues’ and firms’ characteristics leading to the rating of reputable CRAs 
using Eq. 4.7. Following the literature regarding the independent variables for CRA 
selection equations, I controlled all the issue levels and firm-level characteristics in the 
first-stage regression. Aside from the variables in the second-stage regression, at least 
some of the variables should be valid instruments in the first stage in the sense that they 
are not only meaningful predictors of the likelihood that reputation equals one but also 
independent of the bond yield and thus properly excludable from the second-stage 
regression (Prabhala & Li 2007). According to Fang (2005), total issue times (frequency) 
is used as the main instrument for CRA selection. Frequency is the number of bond 
                                                          
26 We also employed the one-step maximum likelihood estimation (ML); the results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 
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issues conducted by the firm during 2006 to 2015. As the rating business is a repeat 
behaviour, the willingness to keep repeat clients is the main drive behind why CRAs 
want to keep a good reputation. Thus, reputable CRAs like to choose repeat issuers. 
However, repeat issuers have less financial constraints as they can repeatedly issue 
bonds publicly compared to other issuers. To save issue costs (including the 
communication cost with CRAs), they also have more incentives to choose reputable 
CRAs. Column 4 of Table 4.2 presents the underlying reputable CRA-issue matching 
equation. Frequency is highly statistically significant and positively associated with the 
probability of being rated by reputable CRAs, confirming the existence of selection bias. 
The IVs should not be related to the particular issuance price for each issue, because the 
market will not lower the spreads simply because the company issues more bonds. I 
then add the hazard variable that is calculated from the predicted value of reputation 
from the first-stage regression to the second-stage regression using Eq. 4.8 to find the 
true effect of CRAs’ reputations on bond issuance yield. Year fixed effects and industry 
fixed effects are considered in both regressions, although the results are not reported. 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 =  𝛾1𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛾3𝑋𝑖 +
𝛾4𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖         (4.7) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     (4.8) 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the overall sample (Panel A) and 
comparisons between bonds rated by reputable CRAs and non-reputable CRAs (Panel 
B). Results of t-test for differences in means and medians between the two subsamples 
are reported in the last two rows. 
With respect to the main bond characteristics, it reports a mean treasury spread of 2.379% 
for the bonds in the full sample, a mean issue volume of RMB 849 million, a mean time 
to maturity of 3.345 years, and a mean issuer’s rating of 3.940 (below AA). The mean 
and median differences show that issues rated by reputable CRAs, as compared to non-
reputable CRAs, are significantly larger in terms of issuance volume (RMB 940 million 
v. RMB 749 million) and shorter in terms of maturity (3.029 years v. 3.733 years). In 
addition, on average, bonds rated by reputable CRAs have a significantly lower treasury 
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spread (2.170% v. 2.635%) and higher issuer’s rating (4.047 v. 3.809) than those rated 
by non-reputable ones. 
Turning to the issuers’ characteristics, issuers rated by reputable CRAs are significantly 
larger in terms of sales, more leveraged and profitable, and have more tangible assets 
than their counterparts rated by non-reputable CRAs. Moreover, on average, issuers 
rated by reputable CRAs issue more frequently on the bond market (10 times v. 6.52 
times during a 10-year sample period). 
The above comparison between the most important bond and issuer characteristics 
reveal significant disparities between bonds rated by reputable CRAs and those rated by 
CRAs with a lesser reputation. These differences are consistent with the differences 
reported in Allen and Dudney (2008) and Han, Pagano and Shin (2012). The well-
recognised issue of selection in the rating process is thus apparent in the data, just as 
addressed in Section 4.3.2. 
4.4.2 Baseline Empirical Results 
In this section, I attempt to answer the research question of whether certification via 
reputation of CRAs is beneficial or detrimental to bond issuers. In particular, I test the 
first hypothesis (H1) as presented in Section 4.3.2. Specifically, I run the regressions in 
the form of Eq. 4.1 to test if bonds rated by reputable CRAs have a lower issuance yield, 
or if reputable CRAs can certify the bonds’ quality. If we observe a significantly 
negative value of the coefficient on reputation, then ceteris paribus, employing more 
reputable CRAs can save issuance costs for issuers. I also control the sample selection 
bias described in Section 4.3.2. 
From the raw sample results in Table 4.2, we observe a significantly negative 
coefficient of reputation. For instance, in Model 3, bonds rated by CCXI or Lianhe have 
a 0.160% lower treasury spread than bonds rated by less reputable CRAs, all else being 
equal. In practice, issuers can save more than RMB 1.2 million per year on average by 
hiring reputable CRAs. Moreover, the signs on the other variables are in line with this 
expectation. For example, we observe that the issuer’s rating term is negative, indicating 
that higher yields are required from bonds with lower (worse) ratings, which is in line 
with intuition and basic economic theory (Fisher 1959). 
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Columns 4 to 7 present the results when controlling endogeneity and applying the 
Heckman two-stage ‘endogenous treatment-regression’ model. From the bond-reputable 
CRA matching result from Column 4, we observe similar patterns shown in the 
univariate test from Table 4.1. Generally speaking, bonds with a shorter maturity, 
higher issuer rating, larger size, higher leverage, lower tangibility and higher earning 
ability are likely to choose more reputable CRAs. Further, issuers who frequently issue 
bonds are more likely to be chosen by reputable CRAs. After controlling the sample 
selection bias, we observe similar results from Columns 5 to 7 of Table 4.2 that show 
that issuers hiring reputable CRAs to rate their bonds can save bond spread significantly. 
For example, in Column 7, the difference between bond issuance yield and treasury 
yield is 0.380% lower in bonds rated by reputable CRAs, all else being equal. Column 8 
shows us that the IV frequency chosen is independent from the dependent variable. 
The results in Table 4.2 suggest that the certification role of CRAs via reputation works 
in China’s bond market, even after controlling the sample selection bias. 
4.4.3 An Analysis Conditional on the Investor Protection Environment and Issuer’s 
Risk 
In this section, this research find the mechanisms through which reputable CRAs 
implement their certification effect on issuers. 
4.4.3.1 Certification Effect Conditional on the Investor Protection Environment 
As an information provider, reputable CRAs’ certification value is expected to have a 
greater effect for issuers with a bad investor protection environment. Investors can 
access information through more channels if the issuers are exposed to the public; thus, 
the information source is not restricted to CRAs’ ratings. However, for firms with little 
exposure to the public, CRAs’ rating reports becomes an essential way to get 
information to issuers, and investors of bond issuers who have a bad investor protection 
environment are more likely to rely on CRAs. 
Therefore, this study hypothesises that issuers with a worse investor protection 
environment can save more treasury spread when hiring reputable CRAs. To test this 
hypothesis, I performed an analysis conditional on an issuer’s investor protection 
environment. Here, I used IPI to capture the investor protection environment. 
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IPI was developed by Fan, Wang and Zhu (2011) to show the maturity of the market for 
each province in China, just as described in Chapter 2. I classified an issuer as having a 
better investor protection environment if it came from a province where the IPI is above 
the sample median. The high IPI group consists of firms who come from provinces with 
an IPI above the median level; otherwise the company belongs to the low IPI group. 
From Table 4.3, for both groups, hiring reputable CRAs is generally associated with a 
lower treasury spread. However, when I look at the coefficient differences between the 
two groups, I find the value is significantly negative. The coefficient difference is -
0.056, which means compared with firms with better investor protection environment, 
firms with worse investor protection environment on average can save 0.056% more 
when hiring reputable CRAs. These results indicate that the certification role of 
reputable CRAs are more valued by investors of bond issuers who have a bad investor 
protection environment. 
4.4.3.2 Certification Effect Conditional on Issuer’s Risk 
Another mechanism I consider is issuer’s risk: investors put more trust in ratings by 
reputable CRAs for issuers with a higher default risk. Thus, all things being equal, 
investors require less return for bonds rated by reputable CRAs, especially for high-risk 
issuers. Therefore, I used two variables to measure the risk of issuers. The first measure 
is the size of the issuers. In China, large-sized companies can more easily get access to 
funds from the market or government. Generally speaking, the larger the size, the safer 
the security. The second measure is the rating of issuers. If the issuer’s rating is below 
the sample median level, then it belongs to the high-risk group as the ratings represent 
the default risk. 
From Table 4.3, I observe that for small issuers and low-rating issuers, hiring reputable 
CRAs can reduce treasure spread. This indicates that the certification effect of reputable 
CRAs is stronger for issuers with high risk. 
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Table 4.1: Rating Sample Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for bond issues from 2006 to 2015. Panel A presents the statistics of the full sample. Treasury spread is the 
difference between the issue’s offering yield and the yield on a benchmark treasury security. The benchmark treasury is chosen as a corresponding 
China treasury bond with a similar duration and maturity as that expressed in the bond issuance by the firm in the sample. Maturity is the number of 
years to maturity of debt; volume is the log of the par value of debt initially issued (in RMB 100 million); rating is a numerical value of ratings assigned 
on the issuers, based on a notch basis as follows: AAA, AAA– = 5, AA, AA = 4, AA– = 3, A+ = 2, others = 1; enhancement is a dummy variable 
indicating the issue has credit enhancements; assets and sales are the log of total assets and sales in RMB 100 million; leverage is the ratio of total 
liability from the balance sheet to total assets; ROA is the return on assets that represents profitability; tangibility is the ratio of property, plant and 
equipment to total assets; growth is the year-to-year increase of operating income; all above variables are measured at the time t-1. Frequency is the 
number of bond issues the firm conducts during the 10-year sample period. Cash equivalent is the ratio of cash, tradable asset and receivable over 
current asset to represent liquidity. Panel B presents the statistics of reputable and non-reputable groups and the mean differences between these two 
groups. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of full sample 
  Treasury 
spread 
Maturity Volume Rating Enhancement Sales Leverage Tangibility ROA Growth Frequency Cash 
equivalent 
Whole 
sample 
Mean 2.379 3.345 2.139 3.940 0.114 4.258 0.586 0.247 5.362 0.432 8.440 0.466 
Std.dev. 1.011 2.833 0.890 0.765 0.317 1.878 0.163 0.206 11.934 7.579 8.568 1.704 
Min. –4.100 0.240 –2.303 1 0 –3.912 0.001 0 –25.678 –0.999 1 0.000 
Max. 6.666 23 5.704 5 1 10.215 0.977 0.969 861.116 541.278 62 100.018 
N 11,845 11,845 11,844 11,845 11,845 11,800 11,808 11,779 11,791 11,779 11,845 11,792 
Panel B: Summary statistics of reputable and non-reputable samples   
Bond rated 
by reputable 
CRAs 
Mean 2.170 3.029 2.241 4.047 0.081 4.653 0.605 0.265 5.768 0.410 10.009 0.461 
Std.dev. 0.934 2.727 0.928 0.776 0.272 1.831 0.154 0.207 15.645 7.267 9.210 1.539 
Min. –4.100 0.240 –2.303 1 0 –3.219 0.001 0 –13.319 –0.990 1 0.001 
Max. 6.402 20 5.704 5 1 10.215 0.977 0.969 861.116 541.278 62 100.018 
N 6519 6519 6518 6519 6519 6489 6492 6485 6476 6474 6519 6476 
Bond rated 
by non-
reputable 
CRAs 
Mean 2.635 3.733 2.014 3.809 0.154 3.776 0.563 0.225 4.867 0.459 6.520 0.472 
Std.dev. 1.042 2.913 0.825 0.729 0.361 1.821 0.170 0.203 4.163 7.944 7.263 1.887 
Min. –1.027 0.250 –1.609 1 0 –3.912 0.003 0 –25.678 –0.999 1 0.000 
Max. 6.666 23 5.298 5 1 10.078 0.926 0.946 38.546 537.077 62 88.378 
N 5326 5326 5326 5326 5326 5311 5316 5294 5315 5305 5326 5316 
Mean difference –0.465*** –0.704*** 0.227*** 0.238*** –0.073*** 0.877*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.901*** –0.049 3.489*** –0.111 
Median difference –0.492*** –2*** 0.224*** 0 0 0.946*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.805*** 0.010** 3*** 0.006 
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Table 4.2: Bond Issuance Yield and Reputation of Credit Rating Agencies 
Table 4.2 presents the relationship between bond issuance yield and the reputation of CRAs. The sample consists of 11,845 issuance observations for 
3344 issuers from 2006 to the end of 2015. Columns 1 to 3 present the results for Eq. 4.1 using the raw sample. All variables are the same as Table 4.1. 
The Heckman sample shows results when considering sample selection bias using the two-stage treatment-effect method. Column 4 presents results for 
the first-stage bond-reputable CRA matching equation, and the left-hand variable is reputation. Frequency is the number of bond issues the firm 
conducts during the 10-year sample period. Columns 5 to 7 present results for the second-stage regression. Industry fixed effects are indicator variables 
for industry of the issuer; year fixed effects are indicator variables for fiscal years. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
 Raw sample  Heckman sample 
   First stage Second stage  
 (1) (2) (3)  Reputation (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Reputation –0.175*** –0.230*** –0.160***   –1.284*** –3.160*** –0.380**  
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)   (0.119) (0.223) (0.168)  
Maturity 0.068***  0.058***  –0.042*** 0.043***  0.054*** 0.060*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.003) 
Volume –0.018*  0.031***  0.063*** 0.036**  0.036*** 0.030*** 
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.019) (0.014)  (0.012) (0.011) 
Issuer’s rating –0.705***  –0.639***  0.107*** –0.615***  –0.629*** –0.649*** 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.021) (0.018)  (0.015) (0.013) 
Enhancement –0.134***  –0.159***  –0.073* –0.191***  –0.167*** –0.151*** 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.044) (0.032)  (0.026) (0.025) 
Sales  –0.229*** –0.072***  0.055***  –0.057*** –0.064*** –0.076*** 
  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.016) (0.009) (0.007) 
Leverage  0.004*** 0.001*  0.003***  0.005*** 0.001* 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility  –0.292*** –0.215***  -0.005  –0.155* –0.209*** –0.203*** 
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  (0.047) (0.043)  (0.063)  (0.086) (0.043) (0.043) 
ROA  0.000 –0.000  0.019***  0.003*** 0.000 –0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth  0.001 0.001  0.001  0.003 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash equivalent  –0.012*** –0.008*  0.015**  0.006 -0.006 –0.009** 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
Frequency     0.015***    –0.000 
     (0.002)    (0.001) 
Constant 3.866*** 2.248*** 3.864***  –0.926*** 4.116*** 3.079*** 3.909*** 3.813*** 
 (0.067) (0.071) (0.074)  (0.088) (0.078) (0.117) (0.082) (0.074) 
Hazard      0.694*** 1.835*** 0.136  
      (0.073) (0.138) (0.104)  
Observations 11,844 11,735 11,734  11,734 11,734 11,734 11,734 11,734 
R-squared (Pseudo 
R2) 
0.468 0.355 0.475  0.056    0.469 
Prob > chi2     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Industry and year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4.3: Certification Effect Conditional on the Investor Protection Environment and Issuer’s Risk 
Table 4.3 presents the certification effect, classified by issuer’s investor protection environment and issuer’s risk. The sample consists of 11,845 
issuance observations for 3344 issuers from 2006 to the end of 2015. The left-hand variable is treasury spread. All the variables are the same as those in 
Table 4.2. The results already consider sample selection bias using the two-stage treatment-effect method. We classify an issuer as having a better 
investor protection environment if it comes from the province where the IPI is above the sample median. The high IPI group consists of firm who come 
from provinces with an IPI above the median level; otherwise the company belongs to the low IPI group. We use size and rating levels to measure the 
risk of issuers. Issuers with lower than sample median sales and issuers who have lower than median ratings belong to the high-risk group; otherwise 
they belong to the low-risk group. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 Investor protection 
environment 
 Issuer’s risk 
 Investor protection index   Size Rating level 
 Low IPI (0) High IPI (1)  Small (0) Large (1) Low (0) High (1) 
Reputable –0.189*** –0.133***  –0.188*** –0.101*** –0.164*** –0.063*** 
 (0.021) (0.021)  (0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) 
Difference (0) – (1) 
 
–0.056* Chi2 = 3.67  –0.087** Chi2 = 9.1 –0.101*** Chi2 = 14.14 
Maturity 0.059*** 0.038***  0.082*** 0.033*** –0.074*** 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.005)  (0.012) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Volume 0.083*** 0.013  0.038 –0.022 0.253*** 0.027** 
 (0.021) (0.015)  (0.027) (0.014) (0.024) (0.012) 
Issuer’s rating –0.608*** –0.616***  –0.665*** –0.613***   
 (0.029) (0.023)  (0.036) (0.021)   
Enhancement –0.176*** –0.229***  –0.248*** –0.214*** –0.511*** –0.313*** 
 (0.036) (0.044)  (0.038) (0.045) (0.034) (0.047) 
Sales –0.042*** –0.052***  –0.058*** –0.064*** 0.216*** –0.053*** 
 (0.015) (0.011)  (0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.010) 
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Leverage 0.002* 0.002**  0.000 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility –0.165*** –0.366***  –0.254*** –0.104* –0.158** 0.004 
 (0.058) (0.060)  (0.060) (0.059) (0.063) (0.047) 
ROA 0.007** 0.000  0.009* –0.000 0.070*** 0.000** 
 (0.004) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Growth 0.002*** 0.002  0.001** –0.007 0.005*** –0.003 
 (0.000) (0.009)  (0.000) (0.015) (0.001) (0.006) 
Cash equivalent –0.003 –0.050  –0.007 0.004 0.045*** 0.027** 
 (0.004) (0.047)  (0.005) (0.038) (0.005) (0.012) 
Hazard 0.538** 0.202  0.237 –0.040 5.459*** 0.917*** 
 (0.241) (0.137)  (0.333) (0.132) (0.204) (0.107) 
Constant 2.776*** 3.905***  3.423*** 3.966*** -4.594*** 0.504*** 
 (0.349) (0.204)  (0.471) (0.195) (0.264) (0.142) 
Observations 5967 5767  5847 5887 6927 4807 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.427 0.510  0.450 0.434 0.347 0.303 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 94 
 
4.5 Empirical Results Conditional on the Entry of China Credit Rating 
4.5.1 Certification Comparison Before and After China Credit Rating’s Entry 
To test H2, I needed to define a new variable post, which is a dummy equal to one if the 
bond issuance date is after 2012 when CCR officially started its rating business, 
otherwise zero. Panel A of Table 4.4 shows the univariate test results for the 
certification effect change before and after CCR’s entry. From Panel A, we observe that 
during the pre-period, the treasury spread of bonds rated by reputable CRAs is 0.328% 
lower than bonds rated by non-reputable CRAs on average, and this difference is even 
larger during the post-period at 0.461%. 
I then added other control variables and estimated the certification change using Eq. 4.9. 
If a significantly negative value for 𝛽1 is observed, this means that after the entry of 
CCR, bonds rated by reputable CRAs enjoy an even lower issuing spread than bonds 
rated by non-reputable CRAs. In turn, the certification effect of reputable CRAs is more 
valued by investors after CCR’s entry because CCR’s intervention increases the rating 
quality of existing CRAs, particularly for reputable ones. 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 +
𝛽4𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   (4.9) 
From Panel B of Table 4.4, after I control year fixed effects, industry fixed effects and 
other issue and issuer-related control variables respectively, we observe a significantly 
negative value of the coefficient of the interaction term. For example, in Column 3, the 
value of 𝛽1 is –0.095; this means employing reputable CRAs can save 0.095% more on 
the treasury spread during the post-period compared with the pre-period. Moreover, the 
economic value is significant and, on average, the cost saving per year by reputable 
CRAs is around RMB 0.8 million larger during the post-period than the pre-period. 
I also applied the Heckman method described in Section 4.3.2. The results are presented 
in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.4, and show that the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
Thus, this research found that issuers hiring reputable CRAs can save more treasury 
spread after CCR’s entry. 
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4.5.2 Certification Effect Comparison between China Credit Rating-Covered and 
Uncovered Issuers 
I use Eq. 4.10 to investigate H3, in which CCRcover is a new variable that equals one if 
the bond issuer is covered by CCR between 2012 and 2015, otherwise zero. The 
estimation period is from 2012 to 2015, which is the period after CCR’s entry. There are 
8,261 observations for 3,019 issuers during this period, among which 814 issuers are 
coved by CCR. In Eq. 4.10, 𝛽1 represents the spread saving difference caused by the 
certification effect between CCR-covered and CCR-uncovered issuers. As CCR’s entry 
disciplines rating behaviour and increases the informativeness of existing issuer-pay 
CRAs, particularly reputable CRAs, the certification effect on reducing treasury spread 
by reputable CRAs is expected to be greater for uncovered issuers. Therefore, we 
should observe a significantly positive value for 𝛽1  that indicates that the treasury 
spread saved by hiring reputable CRAs is greater for CCR-uncovered issuers. 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 =  𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖×𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +
𝛽3𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖                 (4.10) 
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Table 4.4: Certification Effect Change Before and After China Credit Rating’s 
Entry 
Table 4.4 presents the certification effect change before and after CCR’s entry. The sample 
consists of 11,845 issuance observations for 3344 issuers from 2006 to the end of 2015. Panel A 
shows the univariate test results. Panel B presents the multivariate test results. Columns 1 to 3 
present the results for Eq. 9 using the raw sample. The left-hand variable is the treasury spread. 
All the variables are the same as those in Table 4.2 except post, which equals one if the bond 
issuance date is after 2012, zero otherwise. The Heckman sample shows results when 
considering sample selection bias using the two-stage treatment-effect method. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A: Univariate test 
  (1) (2)  
  Pre Post Difference (2) – (1) 
(3) Reputable = 0 Obs = 1331 Obs = 4037  
  2.304*** 
(0.029) 
2.734*** 
(0.015) 
0.431*** 
(0.033) 
(4) Reputable = 1 Obs = 2307 Obs = 4234  
  1.976*** 
(0.019) 
2.273*** 
(0.014) 
0.297*** 
(0.024) 
 Difference (4) – (3) –0.328*** 
(0.033) 
–0.461*** 
(0.021) 
 
Panel B: Multivariate test 
 Raw sample  Heckman sample 
  First stage Second stage 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) Reputation (5) 
Reputation*Post –0.079** –0.129*** –0.095***   –0.127*** 
 (0.039) (0.031) (0.033)   (0.031) 
Reputation –0.320*** –0.068*** –0.112***   –0.252 
 (0.033) (0.026) (0.028)   (0.170) 
Post 0.334***  0.443***    
 (0.031)  (0.027)    
Maturity  0.058*** 0.060***  –0.042*** 0.055*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.004) 
Volume  0.032*** 0.011  0.063*** 0.036*** 
  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.019) (0.012) 
Issuer’s rating  –0.639*** –0.597***  0.107*** –0.631*** 
  (0.013) (0.014)  (0.021) (0.015) 
Enhancement  –0.157*** –0.195***  –0.073* –0.164*** 
  (0.025) (0.027)  (0.044) (0.026) 
Sales  –0.073*** –0.071***  0.055*** –0.066*** 
  (0.006) (0.007)  (0.011) (0.009) 
Leverage  0.001* 0.000  0.003*** 0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility  –0.213*** –0.364***  –0.005 –0.208*** 
  (0.043) (0.046)  (0.063) (0.043) 
ROA  –0.000 0.000  0.019*** 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.001) 
Growth  0.001 0.002**  0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Cash equivalent  –0.008* –0.008*  0.015** –0.007 
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  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.004) 
Frequency     0.015***  
     (0.002)  
Constant 2.050*** 3.799*** 4.543***  –0.926*** 3.837*** 
 (0.038) (0.076) (0.063)  (0.088) (0.083) 
Hazard      0.113 
      (0.104) 
       
Observations 11,845 11,734 11,734  11,734 11,734 
R-squared (pseudo R2) 0.129 0.476 0.374  0.056  
Prob > chi2     0.000 0.000 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  No Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes No  No Yes 
Table 4.5 presents the results for comparison between these two groups. Panel A shows 
the univariate result that for uncovered issuers, hiring reputable CRAs can have a 0.454% 
lower treasury spread, while for covered issuers, the spread saving is only 0.215%, 
0.239% less than uncovered issuers. This means that, on average, the certification effect 
of reputable CRAs on saving issuing costs is stronger for uncovered firms. Panel B 
presents the multivariate result. For the four models of the raw sample and Heckman 
sample, we observe a significantly positive value for 𝛽1. In Model 4, for example, the 
spread saving by hiring reputable CRAs for CCR-uncovered issuers is 0.181% greater 
than covered issuers, which means, on average, keep other things unchanged, if hiring 
reputable CRAs, CCR-uncovered issuers can save approximately RMB 1.8 million 
more per year than CCR-covered issuers. 
This may be because the certification effect of reputable CRAs is reinforced by CCR’s 
entry. Specifically, as long as there is no third-party intervention (no CCR’s coverage), 
investors are more likely to believe in reputable CRAs, as their rating quality has been 
indirectly raised by CCR’s entry. This is also consistent with the findings in Chapters 2 
and 3. This result also reveals that the reputational mechanism works in China and 
supplements previous studies. 
Therefore, through estimations of H2 and H3, this study found that the certification 
effect of reputable CRAs was enhanced by the entry of CCR. 
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Table 4.5: Certification Effect Comparison between China Credit Rating-Covered 
and China Credit Rating-Uncovered Issuers 
Table 4.5 presents the certification effect change before and after CCR’s entry. The sample 
consists of 8261 issuance observations for 3019 issuers from 2012 to the end of 2015. There are 
814 firms covered by CCR. Panel A shows the univariate test results. Panel B presents the 
multivariate test results. Columns 1 to 4 present the results for Eq. 10 using the raw sample. The 
left-hand variable is the treasury spread. All the variables are the same as those in Table 4.2 
except CCRcover that equals one if the bond issuer is covered by CCR, zero otherwise. The 
Heckman sample shows results when considering sample selection bias using the two-stage 
treatment-effect method. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
Panel A: Univariate test 
  (1) (2)  
  CCRcover = 0 CCRcover = 1 Difference (2) – 
(1) 
(3) Reputable = 0 Obs = 2480 Obs = 1554  
  3.010*** 
(0.020) 
2.294*** 
(0.022) 
–0.716*** 
(0.031) 
(4) Reputable = 1 Obs = 1720 Obs = 2507  
  2.556*** 
(0.025) 
2.079*** 
(0.016) 
–0.477*** 
(0.028) 
 Difference (4) – (3) –0.454*** 
(0.032) 
–0.215*** 
(0.027) 
 
Panel B: Multivariate test 
 Raw sample  Heckman sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  First stage (5) Second stage (6) 
Reputation*CCRcover 0.245*** 0.188*** 0.212*** 0.181***   0.181*** 
 (0.039) (0.033) (0.038) (0.033)   (0.033) 
Reputation –0.418*** –0.250*** –0.342*** –0.243***   –0.230 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023)   (0.214) 
CCRcover –0.716*** –0.208*** –0.426*** –0.176***   –0.176*** 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.027)   (0.027) 
Maturity  0.087***  0.084***  –0.057*** 0.084*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006) 
Volume  0.016  0.043***  0.024 0.043*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.024) (0.013) 
Issuer’s rating  –0.879***  –0.849***  0.260*** –0.850*** 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.030) (0.027) 
Enhancement  –0.206***  –0.206***  –0.168*** –0.205*** 
  (0.030)  (0.031)  (0.056) (0.034) 
Sales   –0.197*** –0.047***  0.029** –0.047*** 
   (0.007) (0.008)  (0.013) (0.010) 
Leverage   0.005*** 0.002***  0.003*** 0.002*** 
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility   –0.242*** –0.124**  –0.176** –0.124** 
   (0.059) (0.051)  (0.078) (0.052) 
ROA   0.000 –0.000  0.018*** –0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.004) (0.001) 
Growth   –0.001 –0.002  0.002 –0.002 
   (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.004) 
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Cash equivalent   –0.012** –0.006  0.008 –0.006 
   (0.006) (0.005)  (0.008) (0.005) 
Frequency      0.016***  
      (0.003)  
Constant 3.086*** 5.894*** 3.408*** 5.790***  –1.336*** 5.790*** 
 (0.042) (0.065) (0.053) (0.074)  (0.118) (0.074) 
Hazard       –0.008 
       (0.131) 
        
Observations 8261 8261 8209 8209  8209 8209 
R-squared (pseudo R2) 0.246 0.474 0.314 0.477  0.063  
Prob > chi2      0.000 0.000 
Industry and year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
4.6 Robustness Test 
4.6.1 Additional Rating Scale and Additional Test for Bonds in Each Year 
I estimated the relationship between the bond issuance yield and reputation of CRAs for 
each rating scale from 1 to 5. Except for the scale of AAA and the very low ratings 
(scale 1), the results are qualitatively unchanged for all other rating scales. In regard to 
AAA issuers, who have the highest rating, investors do not strongly take into 
consideration who rated them (see Appendix 4.1). 
Furthermore, this thesis estimated the relationship between the bond issuance yield and 
reputation of CRAs for each particular issuance year from 2006 to 2015 respectively. 
The results are qualitatively unchanged (see Appendix 4.2). 
4.6.2 Additional Test on the Maturity and Categories of Bonds 
I divided all bonds into three categories according to their maturity length. Category 1 is 
short-term bonds whose maturity is less than three years; category 2 is medium-term 
bonds with maturity between three and five years; category 3 is long-term bonds whose 
maturity length is over five years. I then tested the relationship between the bond 
issuance yield and reputation of CRAs for each category. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged (see Appendix 4.3). 
Moreover, according to the bond category, I further estimated the relationship between 
the bond issuance yield and reputation of CRAs for each type of bond: CPs, MTNs and 
CBs. The results are qualitatively unchanged for all types of bonds (see Appendix 4.4). 
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4.6.3 Propensity Score Matching Sample to Control Selection Bias of China Credit 
Rating’s Coverage 
To control the potential problem of sample selection bias of CCR’s coverage, I applied 
the PSM method to match out the most similar firms from the uncovered group each 
year from 2012 to 2015. Using the PSM sample, I compared the certification effect of 
reputable CRAs between CCR-covered firms and uncovered firms. The results are 
qualitatively unchanged (see Appendix 4.5). 
4.6.4 Propensity Score Matching Method to Remedy Endogeneity of Reputable China 
Credit Rating’s Coverage 
Along with the Heckman two-stage model, I also applied the PSM method to match out 
the most similar bonds from the non-reputable CRA-rated group each year from 2006 to 
2015. I still found that compared with bonds rated by reputable CRAs, those bonds that 
were rated by non-reputable CRAs but have the most similar firm characteristics needed 
to pay more default spread, keeping all other control variables the same. This reflects 
the certification effect of reputable CRAs  as well (see Appendix 4.6). 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides evidence of the role and value of certification by reputable CRAs 
in China. On average, issuers employing reputable CRAs have a lower treasury spread 
when issuing new bonds. Even after controlling the sample selection bias and other 
control variables, I still find the same results. This is in line with Han, Pagano and Shin 
(2012) and Li, Shin and Moore (2006) in that investors require risk premium on bonds 
rated by non-reputable CRAs. In addition, the investor protection environment and 
issuer’s risk are found to be two mechanisms through which the certification effect can 
benefit issuers. 
Further, I find that this certification effect is enhanced by CCR’s entry, which reduced 
rating inflation and increased the rating informativeness of existing issuer-pay CRAs in 
China, particularly for reputable CRAs. After CCR’s entry, hiring reputable CRAs can 
save more treasury spread, which shows that the certification role of reputable CRAs is 
more valued by investors as their rating behaviour is disciplined by CCR. Moreover, for 
CCR-uncovered issuers, using reputable CRAs is associated with a greater spread 
saving. This demonstrates that after CCR’s entry, investors want to trust reputable 
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CRAs when there is no rating by CCR; in turn, this verifies the important role of CCR. 
These findings supplement the existing literature on the certification effect of CRAs, 
particularly in emerging markets. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Contributions 
With increased criticism of CRAs’ rating quality, academics and governments have 
proposed several alternative models to replace the issuer-pay business model of 
incumbent CRAs. China provides us with a unique opportunity to analyse how the entry 
of CCR, a new independent CRA that utilises a combination of public utility and 
investor-pay models, affects the behaviour of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs in China. 
5.1 Summary 
5.1.1 Results from Difference-in-Differences Analysis on Credit Ratings 
In Chapter 2, I used the rating data from 2006 to 2015 in China to analyse the rating 
change. Through a DID study, I found a decline in rating inflation (ratings from issuer-
pay CRAs) for firms covered by CCR, compared with those not covered by CCR. This 
result indicates the rating strategy change of incumbent CRAs,  The Heckman two-stage 
method and PSM method were employed to control the endogeneity problem and the 
results were qualitatively unchanged. 
Thus, CCR acts in a certification role to discipline incumbent issuer-pay CRAs and 
creates a benchmark for them. In particular, this discipline effect is more significant in 
more reputable issuer-pay CRAs and firms with a better investor protection 
environment. I further found that reputational mechanism and public supervision were 
two mechanisms through which CCR’s entry influenced incumbent issuer-pay CRAs’ 
rating behaviour. 
5.1.2 Results from Analysis on Event Study 
In Chapter 3, I examined how the entry of CCR affected the information content of 
rating changes by incumbent issuer-pay CRAs in China. By comparing the market 
reaction following rating changes before and after CCR’s coverage initiation, I found 
there was a significant improvement in the rating quality of incumbent CRAs. Their 
ratings incorporated greater information content that triggered a greater market reaction 
to their rating downgrade announcements following CCR’s coverage. Subsequently, I 
employed the IV approach and PSM method to remedy the possible endogeneity issue, 
establishing the causal role of CCR’s coverage initiation. I further found that all ratings 
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of incumbent CRAs were lower than CCR’s, and only the downgrades caused greater 
reactions during the post-coverage period. This unbalanced market reaction between 
downgrades and upgrades suggests a rating strategy adjustment by incumbent CRAs in 
response to the reputational mechanism elevated by CCR’s entry. Next, this research 
found that CCR’s entry had a greater effect on more reputable issuer-pay CRAs, and a 
greater influence on issuers with a better investor protection environment. This finding 
indicates that incumbent CRAs’ rating behaviour can be disciplined by CCR’s entry 
through their own reputation concerns and outside monitors. 
5.1.3 Results from Analysis on Certification through Reputation 
In Chapter 4, this research investigates the value of certification provided by relatively 
more reputable credit rating agencies. This thesis provides evidence of the role and 
value of certification by reputable CRAs. On average, issuers employing reputable 
CRAs have a lower treasury spread when issuing new bonds. In addition, the investor 
protection environment and issuer’s risk are two mechanisms through which the 
certification effect can benefit issuers. Specifically, the certification role of reputable 
CRAs are stronger for firms with worse investor protection environment and higher risk. 
Further, this thesis found that the certification effect was enhanced by the entry of CCR, 
which increased the rating information quality of existing issuer-pay CRAs in China, 
particularly for reputable CRAs. After CCR’s entry, hiring reputable CRAs could save 
more treasury spread, which showed that the certification role of reputable CRAs was 
more valued by investors as their rating behaviour was disciplined by CCR. Moreover, 
for CCR-uncovered issuers, using reputable CRAs was associated with a greater spread 
saving. After CCR’s entry, investors wanted to trust reputable CRAs when there was no 
rating by CCR, which verified the important role of CCR. 
5.2 Contribution 
 These findings complement the existing literature that documents a negative link 
between the entry of a new issuer-pay CRA and incumbent issuer-pay CRAs’ 
rating inflation. 
 These findings shed light on the debate concerning whether CRAs with 
alternative business models can alleviate the rating inflation problem. 
 These findings supplement the existing literature that discusses how to improve 
the rating quality of issuer-pay CRAs. 
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 These findings supplement the existing literature on the certification effect of 
CRAs, particularly in the emerging market. 
 These findings complement the debates on the reputational mechanism of CRAs. 
 These findings generate policy implications regarding the distinct effects of 
different types of CRA on existing providers’ rating strategies, and also 
emphasise the importance of investor protection environment construction. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1: Market Share of Different Issuer-Pay Credit Rating Agencies 
This table presents the market share of issuer-pay CRAs among different bond markets from 
2006 to 2015. SCP is super commercial paper; CP is commercial paper; MTN is mid-term note; 
CB is corporate bond (supervised by NDRC); EB is enterprise bond (issued by listed firms and 
supervised by CSRC). Panel A reports the market share based on the bond issue number. Panel 
B reports the market share based on the bond issue volume. 
Panel A: Market share based on issue number 
 SCP CP MTN CB EB Total 
CCXI 43.98% 34.86% 35.17% 18.52% 0.00% 31.69% 
Lianhe 24.95% 24.56% 26.46% 15.89% 0.00% 22.36% 
Dagong 21.67% 22.75% 21.48% 20.34% 12.20% 21.35% 
SBRC 8.70% 17.03% 16.46% 10.45% 9.16% 14.23% 
Pengyuan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 30.79% 18.94% 6.10% 
CCXR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 32.14% 1.67% 
UR 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.23% 25.40% 1.35% 
Golden 0.64% 0.36% 0.43% 3.55% 2.16% 1.04% 
SFE 0.00% 0.45% 0.00% 0.15% 0.00% 0.20% 
       
Panel B: Market share based on issue volume 
 SCP CP MTN CB EB Total 
CCXI 44.51% 38.92% 36.07% 20.38% 0.00% 34.32% 
Lianhe 27.14% 28.69% 36.84% 17.65% 0.00% 27.25% 
Dagong 23.30% 21.29% 17.93% 26.72% 15.89% 21.36% 
SBRC 4.53% 10.59% 8.91% 9.37% 8.00% 8.50% 
Pengyuan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 22.78% 8.64% 4.02% 
CCXR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 39.94% 2.22% 
UR 0.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.24% 26.58% 1.58% 
Golden 0.19% 0.17% 0.26% 2.64% 0.95% 0.63% 
SFE 0.00% 0.33% 0.00% 0.14% 0.00% 0.12% 
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Appendix 2.2: Rating Classification 
The ratings distribution in China is very different from developed markets. Although the 
ratings have 19 scales, ranging from C to AAA, most observations are concentrated in 
the ratings above A+. If we take ratings as a dependent variable and define each scale as 
a numerical number, we may mistakenly assume that the difference between each 
nearby rating is the same, and this may cause misleading results. Therefore, I use both 
practical and statistical rationales to reclassify the ratings. 
Practical Background 
To classify the ratings, I collected all ratings assigned by issuer-pay CRAs of all firms 
with a bond-issuing history between 2006 and 2015. From Appendix 2.2 Table 1, I can 
observe that 98.87% of 26,069 observations received ratings above A+. 
Table 2.2.1: Rating Distribution of All Ratings from 2006 to 2015 
Rating N Percentage (%) 
AAA 4679 17.95 
AAA– 5 0.02 
AA+ 5146 19.74 
AA 10,658 40.88 
AA– 4345 16.67 
A+ 941 3.61 
A 163 0.63 
A– 42 0.16 
BBB+ 15 0.06 
BBB 12 0.05 
BBB– 5 0.02 
BB+ 5 0.02 
BB 14 0.05 
BB– 3 0.01 
B+ 1 0 
B 5 0.02 
B– 2 0.01 
CCC 6 0.02 
CC 15 0.06 
C 7 0.03 
Total 26,069 100 
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Subsequently, I checked the ratings for firms who were rated in both the pre- and post-
period (the regression sample). From Table 2.2.2, 98.81% of 17,516 observations are 
above A+. 
Table 2.2.2: Rating Distribution for Firms in the Sample from 2006 to 2015 
Rating N Percentage (%) 
AAA 4153 23.71 
AAA– 5 0.03 
AA+ 3857 22.02 
AA 6211 35.46 
AA– 2480 14.16 
A+ 601 3.43 
A 119 0.68 
A– 33 0.19 
BBB+ 7 0.04 
BBB 5 0.03 
BBB– 5 0.03 
BB+ 1 0.01 
BB 11 0.06 
BB– 2 0.01 
B+ 1 0.01 
B 2 0.01 
CCC 4 0.02 
CC 14 0.08 
C 5 0.03 
Total 17,516 100 
There are practical reasons behind this unbalanced distribution. First, some bond 
investors are restricted to buying bonds with certain ratings by industrial regulations. 
For example, according to the regulation issued by CSRC, money fund management 
companies can only invest in issuers with AAA ratings. 27  Further, based on the 
regulation by CIRC, insurance companies can only invest in issuers whose ratings are 
above A.28 Second, to increase their leverage, bond investors refinance on the interbank 
and exchange markets through bond pledge repurchases; the bond conversion ratios are 
                                                          
27 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/jj/jjyz/201012/t20101231_189675.html 
28 http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgf/jj/jjyz/201012/t20101231_189675.html 
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mainly set by China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (CSDC).29 
According to the official documents issued by CSDC, the lowest required pledge rating 
is AA. Third, issuers with certain ratings are encouraged and supported by government 
regulation. According to the NDRC, the bond issue procedure can be simplified to some 
extent for issuers whose ratings are above AA. 30  Last, underwriters have strong 
incentives to underwrite high-rating issuers in order to sell their bonds more easily. 
However, they also want to avoid the default risk in future, thus imposing internal 
restrictions on the issuers’ ratings. For instance, some investment banks only underwrite 
issuers above AA,31 and some specify that issuers for CPs must be above A+ and issuers 
for MTNs must be above AA–. Therefore, although there is no specific rating 
requirement from official supervisors, in practice, thresholds of ratings do exist in China. 
Thus, bonds issued in China have their own special distributed ratings. Table 2.2.3 
presents the issuers’ rating for new issued bonds from 2006 to 2015. Among the total of 
12,719 new bonds issued, only 76 issuers were below A+. 
Table 2.2.3: Rating Distribution of New Bond Issuers from 2006 to 2015 
Rating 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
AAA 42 60 112 180 221 306 351 340 468 561 2641 
AAA– 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
AA+ 29 50 54 133 179 255 385 337 521 667 2610 
AA 43 63 77 161 266 417 779 760 1117 1178 4861 
AA– 50 76 84 146 159 254 425 331 304 216 2045 
A+ 36 69 47 39 24 58 95 67 31 16 482 
A 13 23 7 4 8 5 1 1 0 0 62 
A– 2 3 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 10 
BBB+ 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
BB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 215 346 388 663 859 1295 2037 1836 2442 2638 12,719 
In practice, I find there are several thresholds for issuers’ ratings in China. The first is 
A+: issuers with A+ have a higher likelihood of issuing short-term CPs. The second is 
AA–: issuers can issue MTNs if their ratings are above AA–. The third cut-off point is 
                                                          
29 There are still some bond pledge conversion ratios negotiated between financial institutions; 
however, in practice, bonds with ratings below AA are very hard to pledge. 
http://www.chinaclear.cn/zdjs/editor_file/20160708155313347.pdf. 
30 http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbtz/201305/t20130522_542124.html 
31 https://wallstreetcn.com/articles/236341 
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AA because several regulatory documents use it to define high-quality issuers. The 
fourth is AAA (including AAA–). 
Theoretical Background 
CART analysis was used in the investigations. The goal of this method is to explore the 
best way to classify ratings into different categories in order to achieve the most 
accurate predictability. CART is a statistical method that explains the variation of a 
response variable using a set of explanatory variables or so-called predictors. The 
method is based on a recursive binary splitting of the data into mutually exclusive 
subgroups containing objects with similar properties. An important advantage of CART 
is that no assumption about the underlying distribution of the predictor variables is 
required, which is suitable for the ratings in China. The rationale for using CART is 
fourfold. First, the CART approach exhibits the capability of modelling complex 
relationship between variables without strong model assumptions. Second, CART can 
identify ‘important’ independent variables through the built tree and basic functions 
when many potential variables are considered. Third, CART does not need a long 
training process when the dataset is huge. Finally, one strong advantage of CART is that 
the resulting classification model can be easily interpreted. It not only points out which 
variables are important in classifying objects and observations, but also indicates that an 
observation belongs to a specific class when the built rules are satisfied. Given these 
advantages, CART has been proven to be an effective tool in handling forecasting and 
classification problems (Chai et al. 1996; Flagg, Giroux & Wiggins 1991; Griffin et al. 
1997; Kuhnert, Do & Mcclure 2000; Lee et al. 2006; Ohmann et al. 1996). 
Theory 
CART was introduced by Breiman et al. (1984), using a parametric approach to pattern 
recognition. The methodology outlined in Breiman et al. (1984) can be summarised into 
three stages. The first stage involves growing the tree using a recursive partitioning 
technique to select variables and split points using a splitting criterion. Several criteria 
are available for determining the splits, including Gini, towing and ordered towing (for 
a more detailed description of the criteria, see Breiman et al. (1984)). After a large tree 
is identified, the second stage of the CART methodology uses a pruning procedure that 
incorporates a minimal cost complexity measure. The result of the pruning procedure is 
a nested subset of trees starting from the largest tree grown and continuing until only 
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one node of the tree remains. Cross-validation or a testing sample is used to provide 
estimates of future classification errors for each subtree. Cross-validation is used when 
only small numbers of data points are available in building the CART models. The last 
stage of the methodology is to select the optimal tree that corresponds to a tree yielding 
the lowest cross-validated or testing set error rate. Trees in this stage have been 
identified as unstable. To avoid this instability, trees with smaller sizes, but comparable 
in accuracy (i.e., within one standard error), will be chosen as an alternative. This 
process is referred to as the one standard error rule and can be tuned to obtain trees of 
varying sizes and complexity. A measure of variable importance can be achieved by 
observing the drop in the error rate when another variable is used instead of the primary 
split. Basically, the more frequent a variable appears as a primary or surrogate split, the 
higher the importance score assigned (for more details regarding the model building 
process of CART, see Breiman et al. (1984) and Steinburg and Colla (1997)). 
To verify the results, I further employed the method of random forests. Random forests 
or random decision forests (Ho 1995, 1998) are an ensemble learning method for 
classification, regression and other tasks that operate by constructing a multitude of 
decision trees at training time and outputting the class that is the mode of the classes 
(classification) or mean prediction (regression) of the individual trees. Random decision 
forests correct the decision trees’ habit of overfitting their training set (Friedman, Hastie 
& Tibshirani 2001). Subsequently, I randomly divided the training and testing data 
1,000 times to check the average predictability. 
Empirical Results 
There are 17,516 ratings in the dataset, which is the same as the sample I used in the 
DID analysis. All firms in the sample have been assigned ratings in both pre- and post-
period. The ratings are given by existing issuer-pay CRAs in China, including initial 
ratings assigned when firms issued a new bond and the following ratings. Of the 
observations, 70% were randomly selected as the training sample (estimating the 
parameters of the corresponding built classification tree); the remaining 30% were used 
to test the model (comparing the predictability among different ways of classifying 
ratings). The dependent variable is the credit ratings of issuers—there are eight ways to 
classify different categories of ratings. The independent variables include tangibility; 
asset; ROA; leverage; sales growth; financial expense over income; current asset; cash 
equivalent; earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) / 
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Interest; net operating cash; gross profit; short-term debt; industry dummy; and listing 
dummy. I tried two methods to investigate the tree. One method was to build a random 
tree, and the other method was to build a random forest through 1000 random splits to 
analyse the average classification accuracy. 
From the results in Table 2.2.4, I compare the average correct classification rate (using 
training data) and the average correct prediction rate (using testing data). I find that the 
fifth and eighth ways have the highest correct classification and prediction rates. 
Consistent with the practical background, A+, AA–, AA and AAA are important 
thresholds in China’s bond market. The detailed forecast accuracy for each rating 
category is also calculated. 
Table 2.2.4: Prediction Accuracy of Different Classification Methods from the 
Classification and Regression Tree 
 
One random tree Random forest 1000 times 
  Classification method 
Classification 
accuracy 
Prediction 
accuracy 
Classification 
accuracy 
Prediction 
accuracy 
1 AAA = 19, CC = 1 77.64% 67.76% 96.02% 80.76% 
2 
 AAA, AAA– = 9, AA+ = 
8, AA = 7, AA– = 6, A+ = 
5, A = 4, A– = 3, BBB+ = 
2, others = 1 
77.58% 67.73% 96.07% 80.84% 
3 
AAA, AAA– = 6, AA+ = 5, 
AA = 4, AA– = 3, A+ = 2, 
others = 1 
79.60% 67.97% 96.15% 81.09% 
4 
AAA, AAA– = 5, AA+ = 4, 
AA = 3, AA– = 2, others = 
1 
79.38% 68.14% 96.21% 81.33% 
5 
AAA, AAA– = 5, AA+, AA 
= 4, AA– = 3, A+ = 2, 
others = 1 
85.69% 78.33% 97.48% 86.19% 
6 
AAA, AAA– = 4, AA+ = 3, 
AA = 2, others = 1  
81.62% 71.59% 96.47% 83.27% 
7 
AAA, AAA–, AA+ = 4, AA 
= 3, AA– = 2, others = 1 
83.90% 73.40% 96.98% 83.50% 
8 
AAA, AAA– = 4, AA+, AA 
= 3, AA– = 2, others = 1 
85.34% 78.74% 97.52% 86.58% 
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Therefore, from both a practical and theoretical perspective, it is necessary to reclassify 
the ratings in China in the following way: AAA, AAA– = 5; AA+, AA = 4; AA– = 3; 
A+ = 2; others = 1. This classification is consistent with the reality and has the highest 
prediction accuracy. I also present the prediction accuracy for each rating category in 
Table 2.2.5. 
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Table 2.2.5: Prediction Accuracy of the Classification and Regression Tree Using Testing Data 
Panel A 
Prediction CC CCC B– B B+ BB– BB BB+ BBB– BBB BBB+ A– A A+ AA– AA AA+ AAA– AAA Predicted 
accuracy CC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
B– 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
B+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
BB– 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
BB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
BB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
BBB– 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
BBB 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
BBB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
A– 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
A 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 2 1 0 0 0 36.36% 
A+ 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 8 52 16 14 3 0 0 53.06% 
AA– 2 1 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 16 82 322 173 37 0 1 50.39% 
AA 0 3 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 4 7 52 382 1408 321 1 47 63.14% 
AA+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 28 194 716 0 101 68.65% 
AAA– 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 
AAA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 46 124 0 1059 85.82% 
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Panel B 
Prediction Others 
BBB
+ 
A
– 
A 
A
+ 
AA– AA AA+ 
AAA, 
AAA– 
Predicted 
accuracy 
Others 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
BBB+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
A– 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Nil 
A 1 0 2 4 1 2 1 0 0 36.36% 
A+ 3 0 2 8 52 16 14 3 0 53.06% 
AA– 6 0 2 16 82 322 173 37 1 50.39% 
AA 8 0 4 7 52 382 1408 321 48 63.14% 
AA+ 0 0 0 0 4 28 192 714 101 68.72% 
AAA, AAA- 0 0 0 0 0 5 48 126 1059 85.54% 
           
Panel C 
Prediction Others A+ AA– AA AA+ 
AAA, 
AAA– 
Predicted 
accuracy 
Others 19 3 19 6 0 0 40.43% 
A+ 10 54 23 12 3 0 52.94% 
AA– 17 78 305 181 38 1 49.19% 
AA 17 53 374 1393 305 46 63.67% 
AA+ 0 3 29 197 745 106 68.98% 
AAA, AAA- 0 0 5 47 110 1056 86.70% 
        
Panel D 
Prediction Others AA– AA AA+ AAA, AAA– 
Predicted 
accuracy 
Others 106 52 27 6 0 55.50% 
AA– 75 303 167 35 4 51.88% 
AA 69 352 1403 329 43 63.89% 
AA+ 4 43 192 714 107 67.36% 
AAA, AAA- 0 5 47 117 1055 86.19% 
       
Panel E 
Prediction Others A+ AA– AA+, AA AAA, AAA– Predicted 
accuracy 
Others 19 3 12 4 0 50.00% 
A+ 10 59 40 23 0 44.70% 
AA– 19 58 298 191 2 52.46% 
AA+, AA 15 71 404 2708 175 80.28% 
AAA, AAA- 0 0 1 111 1032 90.21% 
       
Panel F 
Prediction Others AA AA+ AAA, AAA– Predicted accuracy 
Others 626 210 32 3 71.87% 
AA 346 1361 332 45 65.31% 
AA+ 33 211 721 107 67.26% 
AAA, 
AAA– 
4 54 116 1054 85.83% 
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Panel G 
Prediction Other
s 
AA– AA AAA, AAA–, 
AA+ 
Predicted accuracy 
Others 110 48 25 5 58.51% 
AA– 80 336 177 35 53.50% 
AA 60 332 1342 301 65.95% 
AAA, AAA–, 
AA+ 
4 39 292 2069 86.06% 
      
Panel H 
Prediction Other
s 
AA– AA+, AA AAA, AAA– Predicted accuracy 
Others 111 48 23 0 60.99% 
AA– 73 293 181 2 53.37% 
AA+, AA 70 411 2700 173 80.50% 
AAA, AAA– 0 3 133 1034 88.38% 
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Appendix 2.3: Marginal Effects for the Ordinal Regression Model and the Ordinal 
Regression Model for Other Classifications 
Panel A: Marginal effect for ORM      
AAA, AAA–    n = 4158 (3) Post = 0 N (4) Post = 1 (4) – (3) N DID 
(1) CCRcover = 0 0.137 197 0.216 0.079*** 468  
(2) CCRcover = 1 0.219 1210 0.288 0.069*** 2283  
(2) – (1) 0.082***  0.072***   –0.009 
AA+, AA    n = 10,068       
(1) CCRcover = 0 0.585 1190 0.605 0.020*** 3460  
(2) CCRcover = 1 0.605 1744 0.587 –0.018*** 3674  
(2–1) 0.020***  –0.018***   –0.039*** 
AA–      n = 2480       
(1) CCRcover = 0 0.198 764 0.134 –0.064*** 858  
(2) CCRcover = 1 0.132 508 0.096 –0.036*** 350  
(2–1) –0.066***  –0.038***   0.028*** 
A+      n = 601       
(1) CCRcover = 0 0.057 243 0.033 –0.024*** 183  
(2) CCRcover = 1 0.032 128 0.021 –0.011*** 47  
(2–1) –0.025***  –0.012***   0.014*** 
Others      n = 209       
(1) CCRcover = 0 0.023 83 0.012 –0.011*** 76  
(2) CCRcover = 1 0.012 30 0.008 –0.004*** 20  
(2–1) –0.011***  –0.004***   0.006*** 
       
Panel B: ORM for other rating classifications     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAA, AAA– = 9, AA+ = 8, 
AA = 7, AA– = 6, A+ = 5, 
A = 4, A– = 3, BBB+ = 2, 
others = 1 
AAA, AAA– = 6, 
AA+ = 5, AA = 4, 
AA– = 3, A+ = 2, 
others = 1 
AAA, AAA– = 5, AA + 
=4, AA = 3, AA– = 2, 
others = 1 
AAA, AAA–= 4, 
AA+, AA = 3, 
AA– = 2, others 
= 1 
CCRcover*Post –0.178*** –0.180*** –0.183*** –0.232*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.068) 
CCRcover 0.767*** 0.768*** 0.767*** 0.747*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.059) 
Post 0.594*** 0.596*** 0.598*** 0.722*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) 
Sales  0.858*** 0.858*** 0.859*** 0.871*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Leverage –0.035*** –0.035*** –0.034*** –0.038*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA –0.297*** –0.299*** –0.305*** –0.309*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040) 
Tangibility 0.758*** 0.759*** 0.763*** 0.646*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.084) 
Growth 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash equivalent  0.241*** 0.242*** 0.244*** 0.194*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) 
Observations 17,388 17,388 17,388 17,388 
Pseudo R-squared 0.174 0.176 0.179 0.210 
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Appendix 2.4: Ordinary Least Squares Results of Different Classifications Using 
an Unmatched Full Sample 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAA, AAA– = 
9, AA+ = 8, AA 
= 7, AA– = 6, 
A+ = 5, A = 4, 
A– = 3, BBB+ 
= 2, others = 1 
AAA, AAA– 
= 6, AA+ = 
5, AA = 4, 
AA– = 3, A+ 
= 2, others = 
1 
AAA, AAA– 
= 5, AA+ = 4, 
AA = 3, AA– 
= 2, others = 1 
AAA, AAA– 
= 4, AA+, 
AA = 3, AA– 
= 2, others = 
1 
CCRcover*Post –0.051* –0.060** –0.051** –0.088*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) 
CCRcover 0.380*** 0.376*** 0.359*** 0.242*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.015) 
Sales  0.430*** 0.419*** 0.411*** 0.256*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Leverage –0.015*** –0.014*** –0.013*** –0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.013** 0.004 0.001 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Tangibility 0.030 0.057 0.066* 0.021 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.027) 
Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash equivalent  0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Constant 5.765*** 2.713*** 1.796*** 1.883*** 
 (0.092) (0.087) (0.085) (0.059) 
Observations 17,388 17,388 17,388 17,388 
R-squared 0.500 0.517 0.521 0.462 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 2.5: Difference-In-Differences Analysis of Ratings for a Particular Time Period 
Columns 1 to 4 present the DID analysis results excluding samples in 2012 using the PSM sample. Column 5 presents the results of the PSM sample if 
the post-period is changed to 2011. 
 (1) Baseline results  (2) Reputation  (3) Investor protection  (4) Rating frequency (5) 
Post = year after 
2011 
 PSM  Non-reputable Reputable  Low IPI High IPI  Low frequency High frequency PSM sample 
CCRcover*Post –0.056**  0.032 –0.128***  0.013 –0.120***  0.025 –0.092** –0.035 
 (0.024)  (0.039) (0.036)  (0.036) (0.037)  (0.033) (0.046) (0.021) 
Diff. of coefficient 
 
  –0.160 *** Chi2 = 9.24  –0.133** (chi = 6.63)  –0.117** (chi = 4.24)  
CCRcover 0.194***  0.123*** 0.240***  0.152*** 0.237***  0.093*** 0.111*** 0.174*** 
 (0.018)  (0.034) (0.028)  (0.030) (0.032)  (0.028) (0.036) (0.015) 
Sales  0.283***  0.269*** 0.292***  0.286*** 0.268***  0.318*** 0.233*** 0.283*** 
 (0.004)  (0.007) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) 
Leverage –0.010***  –0.011*** –0.010***  –0.014*** –0.007***  –0.014*** –0.007*** –0.010*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
ROA 0.003  –0.104*** 0.007***  0.000 0.003*  0.005** –0.015 0.002 
 (0.004)  (0.030) (0.001)  (0.027) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.036) (0.004) 
Tangibility 0.040  0.120** 0.007  0.041 0.150***  0.054 –0.088* 0.051* 
 (0.032)  (0.053) (0.043)  (0.044) (0.052)  (0.046) (0.048) (0.029) 
Growth 0.006  0.000 0.027***  0.001 0.050***  0.005 0.004 0.003 
 (0.004)  (0.004) (0.008)  (0.003) (0.014)  (0.005) (0.011) (0.003) 
Cash equivalent  0.062***  0.040*** 0.123***  0.051*** 0.134***  0.051*** 0.137*** 0.068*** 
 (0.008)  (0.012) (0.026)  (0.016) (0.052)  (0.013) (0.025) (0.008) 
Constant 2.794***  2.490*** 2.835***  2.703*** 2.792***  2.620*** 3.094*** 2.797*** 
 (0.065)  (0.229) (0.106)  (0.158) (0.132)  (0.163) (0.131) (0.063) 
Observations 11,433  4676 6757  5807 5626  6077 5356 13,511 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.471  0.436 0.495  0.434 0.489  0.453 0.438 0.471 
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 2.6: Difference-In-Differences Analysis of Rating Categorised by the 
Reputation of Issuer-Pay Credit Rating Agencies and Investor protection 
environment for the Propensity Score Matching Sample 
  
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
 Non-
reputable 
Reputable  Low IPI High IPI  Low frequency High frequency  
CCRcover*Post 0.032 –0.135***  0.002 –0.118***  0.019 –0.113**  
 (0.038) (0.034)  (0.034) (0.036)  (0.032) (0.044)  
 
Diff. of coefficient 
 
 
–0.143*** 
 
chi2 = 
10.65 
  
–0.111** 
 
chi2 = 5.84 
  
–0.127** 
 
chi2 = 5.84 
 
CCRcover 0.124*** 0.242***  0.152*** 0.239***  0.091*** 0.116***  
 (0.034) (0.028)  (0.030) (0.031)  (0.028) (0.036)  
Sales  0.270*** 0.291***  0.288*** 0.268***  0.320*** 0.229***  
 (0.006) (0.005)  (0.007) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.005)  
Leverage –0.011*** –0.010***  –0.014*** –0.006***  –0.014*** –0.007***  
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  
ROA –0.084*** 0.006***  –0.012 0.003  0.004 –0.014  
 (0.028) (0.001)  (0.024) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.032)  
Tangibility 0.147*** 0.007  0.058 0.155***  0.045 –0.059  
 (0.048) (0.040)  (0.040) (0.048)  (0.042) (0.043)  
Growth –0.000 0.028***  0.000 0.052***  0.003 0.002  
 (0.002) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.014)  (0.002) (0.010)  
Cash equivalent  0.043*** 0.132***  0.055*** 0.144***  0.059*** 0.127***  
 (0.014) (0.023)  (0.018) (0.047)  (0.016) (0.024)  
Constant 2.460*** 2.813***  2.691*** 2.782***  2.627*** 3.057***  
 (0.228) (0.104)  (0.157) (0.130)  (0.164) (0.127)  
Observations 5658 7853  6887 6624  7271 6240  
R-squared (adjusted) 0.496 0.496  0.424 0.494  0.444 0.441  
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
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Appendix 2.7: Difference-In-Differences Analysis of Ratings Categorised by the 
Reputation of Issuer-Pay Credit Rating Agencies and Investor protection 
environment for the Heckman Sample 
  
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
 Non-
reputable 
Reputable  Low IPI High IPI  Low 
frequency 
High 
frequency 
 
CCRcover*Post –0.008 –0.170***  –0.055* –0.150***  –0.017 –0.124***  
 (0.031) (0.030)  (0.029) (0.030)  (0.031) (0.033)  
 
Diff. of coefficient 
 
 
–0.162*** 
 
chi2 = 
14.23 
  
–0.095** 
 
chi2 = 5.17 
  
–0.107** 
 
chi2 = 
5.47 
 
CCRcover 0.187*** 0.309***  0.250*** 0.265***  0.153*** 0.151***  
 (0.029) (0.026)  (0.026) (0.028)  (0.029) (0.029)  
Sales  0.224*** 0.236***  0.384*** 0.170***  0.253*** 0.221***  
 (0.016) (0.013)  (0.021) (0.012)  (0.021) (0.013)  
Leverage –0.009*** –0.011***  –0.007*** –0.010***  –0.014*** –0.006***  
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  
ROA –0.007 –0.000  0.134*** –0.006  –0.016 0.004***  
 (0.028) (0.003)  (0.028) (0.005)  (0.026) (0.001)  
Tangibility 0.036 –0.187***  0.465*** –0.231***  –0.131 0.021  
 (0.071) (0.059)  (0.075) (0.061)  (0.081) (0.062)  
Growth 0.002 0.011***  –0.017*** 0.011*  0.006** –0.019*  
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.010)  
Cash equivalent  0.049*** 0.026*  0.027** 0.107***  0.026** 0.158***  
 (0.016) (0.015)  (0.011) (0.031)  (0.013) (0.022)  
Inverse Mill ratio –0.091 –0.247***  0.704*** –0.548***  –0.143 –0.050  
 (0.090) (0.081)  (0.108) (0.075)  (0.108) (0.091)  
Constant 2.445*** 3.399***  1.171*** 3.820***  3.080*** 2.872***  
 (0.270) (0.175)  (0.262) (0.183)  (0.284) (0.199)  
Observations 8263 9118  8622 8759  9298 8083  
R-squared 
(adjusted) 
0.398 0.496  0.386 0.498  0.359 0.459  
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
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Appendix 2.8: Rating Inflation Change and Additional Check on Conditional 
Regression 
 Rating (full sample) 
 Investor protection index  Rating frequency 
 Non-
reputable 
Reputable  Non-
reputable 
Reputable 
CCRcover*Post –0.014 –0.241***  0.059 –0.245*** 
 (0.045) (0.044)  (0.049) (0.043) 
Diff. of coefficient 
(Reputable – Non-
reputable) 
 
–0.227*** (chi = 13.20)  –0.304*** (chi = 21.58) 
CCRcover 0.141*** 0.397***  -0.048 0.288*** 
 (0.043) (0.037)  (0.045) (0.035) 
Sales  0.266*** 0.260***  0.203*** 0.243*** 
 (0.008) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.006) 
Leverage –0.009*** –0.006***  –0.002** –0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.040 0.002  –0.092*** 0.007*** 
 (0.033) (0.002)  (0.031) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.021 0.079  0.326*** –0.076 
 (0.072) (0.060)  (0.060) (0.049) 
Growth 0.000 0.001***  –0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash equivalent  0.086* 0.157***  0.131*** 0.171*** 
 (0.048) (0.029)  (0.036) (0.025) 
Constant 2.221*** 2.826***  2.272*** 2.892*** 
 (0.365) (0.110)  (0.291) (0.115) 
Observations 4025 4737  3014 5072 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.446 0.519  0.455 0.481 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Appendix 2.9: An Alternative Measurement for the Investor protection 
environment—Marketization Index 
 
 Raw Sample (1)  Heckman Sample (2)  PSM Sample (3) 
 Low MI High MI  Low MI High MI  Low MI High MI 
CCRcover*Post –0.024 –0.162***  –0.059** –0.160***  –0.010 –0.096*** 
 (0.029) (0.030)  (0.030) (0.031)  (0.035) (0.035) 
Diff. of coefficient 
(High – Low MI) 
 
–0.138*** 
 
chi2 = 10.85 
  
–0.266** 
 
chi2 = 5.52 
  
–0.333* 
 
chi2 = 2.94 
         
CCRcover 0.216*** 0.305***  0.240*** 0.291***  0.161*** 0.210*** 
 (0.026) (0.028)  (0.028) (0.028)  (0.030) (0.031) 
Leverage 0.241*** 0.263***  0.398*** 0.293***  0.284*** 0.268*** 
 (0.007) (0.005)  (0.075) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.005) 
ROA –0.010*** –0.008***  –0.008*** –0.008***  –0.013*** –0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.014 0.004*  0.100* 0.004**  –0.004 0.003 
 (0.023) (0.002)  (0.053) (0.002)  (0.024) (0.002) 
Sales (log) 0.057 0.062  0.206*** 0.152***  0.070* 0.159*** 
 (0.038) (0.047)  (0.071) (0.047)  (0.040) (0.047) 
Growth 0.001* 0.001***  –0.016 –0.007  –0.001 0.046*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.001) (0.010) 
Cash equivalent 0.023** 0.136***  0.025** 0.190***  0.049*** 0.159*** 
 (0.011) (0.036)  (0.011) (0.024)  (0.014) (0.048) 
Inverse Mill ratio    0.673* 0.025    
    (0.359) (0.035)    
Constant 2.580*** 2.808***  1.618*** 2.704***  2.660*** 2.736*** 
 (0.149) (0.124)  (0.523) (0.127)  (0.163) (0.130) 
Observations 8793 8595  8314 8055  6599 6912 
R-squared  0.380 0.493  0.409 0.512  0.425 0.498 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Appendix 3.1: Information Content of Rating Changes of Issuer-Pay Rating Agencies for Downgrades for a Particular Time Period 
This table presents the 21-trading-day CARs (in percentage) for bonds surrounding the downgrades rating change announcements of incumbent issuer-pay CRAs. 
The sample consists of issuer-pay CRAs’ rating downgrades announcements for firms that CCR initiated coverage of between 2012 and the end of 2015. Rating 
changes are from 2006 to 2011 and 2013 to 2015. Column 1 shows the results for the baseline model, applying the normal sample and IV sample respectively. 
Column 2 presents the regression results conditional on CRAs’ reputations. Columns 3 and 4 present regression results conditional on the investor protection 
environment of issuers, measured by IPI and rating frequency respectively. All variables are the same as Table 3.2. Industry fixed effects are indicator variables for 
firms’ industry. Standard errors are in parentheses. R-squared is reported. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) Baseline results   (2) Reputation  (3) Investor protection  (4) Rating frequency 
 Base model IV  Non-
reputable 
Reputable  Low IPI High IPI  Low 
frequency 
High 
frequency 
CCRfirstcover  –4.505**   –0.424* –8.385***  0.018 –7.436***  –0.028 –4.876** 
 (1.755)   (0.225) (3.107)  (0.252) (2.868)  (0.242) (2.215) 
CCRfirstcover 
(instrumented) 
 –3.364**          
  (1.584)          
Diff. of coefficient 
 
   –7.961** Chi2 = 6.53  –7.454*** Chi2 = 6.70  –4.848** Chi2 = 4.73 
Sales  –0.272 –0.704  0.156 –0.062  0.001 –1.205  0.003 –0.457 
 (0.814) (0.801)  (0.130) (1.018)  (0.103) (1.197)  (0.182) (1.189) 
Leverage 0.283*** 0.292***  –0.037** 0.683***  0.016 0.668***  –0.020 0.682*** 
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 (0.092) (0.093)  (0.015) (0.236)  (0.013) (0.210)  (0.014) (0.211) 
ROA 0.121 0.175  –0.046* 0.109  0.003 0.419  –0.030 0.101 
 (0.240) (0.239)  (0.025) (0.350)  (0.033) (0.280)  (0.034) (0.398) 
Tangibility –6.847 –8.302*  0.209 –7.475  –0.744 –25.505**  –0.628 –3.645 
 (4.281) (4.316)  (0.471) (5.084)  (0.745) (10.230)  (0.800) (4.418) 
Growth –0.180 0.386  0.730*** -0.594  0.380 –1.493**  0.758*** 0.505 
 (1.002) (0.981)  (0.188) (0.930)  (0.262) (0.750)  (0.163) (0.770) 
Cash equivalent  8.656*** 8.792***  –0.190 16.491**  0.953** 9.634***  –0.130 32.499*** 
 (2.620) (2.641)  (0.554) (7.787)  (0.400) (3.269)  (0.315) (11.490) 
Constant –15.368** –15.540**  2.005** –45.699**  –1.573** –28.898***  1.419 –50.827*** 
 (6.529) (6.567)  (0.970) (18.250)  (0.789) (10.060)  (0.941) (15.940) 
Observations 227 227  122 105  240 117  94 133 
R-squared  0.164 0.156  0.141 0.313  0.149 0.359  0.373 0.373 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Appendix 3.2: Information Content of Rating Changes of Issuer-Pay Rating 
Agencies for Downgrades—11-Day Event Window, 60-Trading-Day Estimation 
Window 
 (1) 11-day event 
window 
  (2) 60-trading-day 
estimation window 
 
CCRfirstcover  –2.591**   –3.582***  
 (1.237)   (1.317)  
Sales  0.131   –0.320  
 (0.605)   (0.626)  
Leverage 0.084   0.219***  
 (0.068)   (0.072)  
ROA 0.099   0.156  
 (0.177)   (0.188)  
Tangibility –2.317   –5.120  
 (3.242)   (3.413)  
Growth 0.246   0.143  
 (0.772)   (0.865)  
Cash equivalent  4.766**   7.427***  
 (2.021)   (2.173)  
Constant –5.595   –12.000**  
 (4.932)   (5.289)  
Observations 255   293  
R-squared  0.078   0.133  
Industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
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Appendix 3.3: Alternative Instrumental Variable Regression for Downgrades 
This table presents the results of the IV regressions, applied another way to calculate the IV. 
The sample consists of issuer-pay CRAs’ rating downgrade announcements for firms that CCR 
initiated coverage of between 2012 and the end of 2015. Rating changes are between 2006 and 
2015. The first stage is the logit regression of CCRfirstcover dummy on Ind–Mean–Asset. 
CCRfirstcover is a dummy variable equal to one if the event date of rating change is during the 
post-coverage date, zero otherwise. Ind–Mean–Asset is the industry average total asset 
(measured as the logarithm of total asset) of each firm’s industry in the prior year, calculated 
using only CCR-covered firms as of 2015. Also included in the first-stage regression in Column 
1 are the same control variables as those in the corresponding second stage and for the exclusion 
restriction test. Industries are classified by codes defined by CSRC. The first day of issuer-year 
with the highest predicted probability of CCR’s coverage initiation for each issuer is assigned as 
the instrumented date for CCR’s coverage initiation. The instrumented CCRfirstcover equals 
one if the event date of rating changes is after the instrumented date for CCR’s coverage 
initiation, zero otherwise. Column 2 shows the results for the second-stage regression. All 
variables are the same as Table 3.2. Industry fixed effects are indicator variables for firms’ 
industry. Standard errors are in parentheses. R-squared is reported. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) First stage  (2) Second stage 
CCRfirstcover (instrumented)   –3.143** -3.156** 
   (1.353) (1.358) 
Ind–Mean–Asset 8.599***    
 (1.352)    
Sales  0.293  –0.793 –0.620 
 (0.203)  (0.620) (0.701) 
Leverage 0.029  0.238*** 0.270*** 
 (0.022)  (0.078) (0.080) 
ROA –0.000  0.186 0.204 
 (0.057)  (0.202) (0.208) 
Tangibility 1.591  –5.380* –7.676** 
 (1.048)  (3.242) (3.790) 
Growth –0.516  0.733 0.494 
 (0.555)  (0.885) (0.901) 
Cash equivalent  0.938  7.468*** 8.631*** 
 (0.654)  (2.314) (2.393) 
Constant –61.912***  –13.478** –14.854** 
 (9.823)  (5.408) (5.800) 
Observations 257  262 262 
LR Chi-squared 125.60    
Prob (Chi-squared) 0.000    
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.369  0.087 0.144 
Industry fixed effects Yes  No Ye 
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Appendix 3.4: An Alternative Measurement for the Investor protection 
environment 
This table presents the results of 21-trading-day CARs surrounding rating downgrades, 
conditional on MI. The left-hand-side variable is the 21-day CARs surrounding rating change 
announcements. CCRfirstcover is a dummy variable equal to one if the event date of rating 
change is during the post-coverage date, otherwise zero. The high MI group consists of issuers 
who come from the provinces with an MI above the sample median; otherwise the issuer 
belongs to the low MI group. All variables are the same as Table 3.2. Industry fixed effects are 
indicator variables for firms’ industry. Standard errors are in parentheses. R-squared is reported. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Devp. Var = CARs 
 Low MI High MI 
CCRfirstcover -0.167 –6.011*** 
 (0.232) (2.225) 
   
Diff. of coefficient 
(High – Low MI) 
–5.844*** (chi = 6.82) 
Sales  0.031 –1.035 
 (0.116) (1.052) 
Leverage 0.016 0.642*** 
 (0.011) (0.206) 
ROA 0.062 0.847** 
 (0.049) (0.349) 
Tangibility –1.046 –21.866** 
 (0.734) (8.681) 
Growth –0.010 –0.497 
 (0.447) (0.695) 
Cash equivalent  0.740* 12.185*** 
 (0.385) (4.480) 
Constant –1.437** –33.076*** 
 (0.707) (11.266) 
Observations 132 130 
R-squared (adjusted) 0.128 0.331 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No 
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Appendix 3.5: Event Study Using the Classification as Follows—AAA, AAA– = 9; 
AA+ = 8; AA = 7; AA– = 6; A+ = 5; A = 4; A– = 3; BBB+ = 2; others = 1 
This table presents the results of 21-trading-day CARs surrounding rating downgrades; the 
rating change events are defined using a new rating classification. The left-hand-side variable is 
the 21-day CARs surrounding rating change announcements. CCRfirstcover is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the event date of rating change is during the post-coverage date, 
otherwise zero. All variables are the same as Table 3.2. Industry fixed effects are indicator 
variables for firms’ industry. Standard errors are in parentheses. R-squared is reported. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) Baseline results  
 Base model IV 
CCRfirstcover  –3.426***  
 (0.855)  
CCRfirstcover (instrumented)  –2.615*** 
  (0.822) 
Sales  –0.947* –1.237** 
 (0.511) (0.513) 
Leverage 0.265*** 0.261*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) 
ROA 0.277** 0.304** 
 (0.121) (0.122) 
Tangibility –1.287 –0.980 
 (2.298) (2.307) 
Growth –0.488 –0.046 
 (0.718) (0.711) 
Cash equivalent  8.472*** 8.037*** 
 (1.512) (1.517) 
Constant –14.333*** –13.876*** 
 (3.400) (3.464) 
Observations 548 548 
R-squared  0.152 0.143 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
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Appendix 4.1: Bond Issuance Yield and Reputation of Credit Rating Agencies 
Using Different Rating Scales Respectively 
This table presents the relationship between the bond issuance yield and reputation of CRAs for 
each rating scale from 1 to 5. The left-hand variable is treasury spread, which is the difference 
between the issue’s offering yield and the yield on a benchmark treasury security. All the 
variables are the same as those in Table 4.2. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 A A+ AA– AA, AA+ AAA–, 
AAA 
Reputation 0.292 –0.267*** –0.135*** –0.158*** –0.005 
 (0.240) (0.081) (0.040) (0.018) (0.022) 
Maturity –0.035 0.044 0.126*** 0.090*** 0.012*** 
 (0.056) (0.034) (0.015) (0.004) (0.003) 
Volume –0.099 0.062 0.178*** 0.016 –0.001 
 (0.188) (0.079) (0.041) (0.015) (0.014) 
Enhancement –0.696** –1.023*** –0.620*** –0.196*** –0.270*** 
 (0.276) (0.171) (0.081) (0.031) (0.063) 
Sales 0.015 –0.095* –0.034 –0.066*** –0.067*** 
 (0.148) (0.052) (0.022) (0.009) (0.008) 
Leverage –0.008 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.009*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility –0.900 –0.256 –0.349*** –0.170*** 0.077 
 (0.563) (0.276) (0.127) (0.055) (0.059) 
ROA 0.018 –0.004 0.006 0.001 –0.000 
 (0.021) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.000) 
Growth 0.061 0.009 0.002 0.001 –0.014 
 (0.115) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.011) 
Cash equivalent –0.592 0.019 0.000 –0.009** 0.027 
 (0.649) (0.116) (0.013) (0.004) (0.027) 
Constant 2.722*** 2.221*** 1.468*** 1.349*** 1.098*** 
 (0.756) (0.375) (0.189) (0.108) (0.104) 
Observations 72 469 1,959 6837 2397 
R-squared  0.777 0.610 0.447 0.310 0.307 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 4.2: Bond Issuance Yield and Reputation of Credit Rating Agencies for Each Issuance Year 
This table presents the relationship between the bond issuance yield and reputation of CRAs for each year between 2006 and 2015. The left-hand 
variable is the treasury spread, which is the difference between the issue’s offering yield and the yield on a benchmark treasury security. All the 
variables are the same as those in Table 4.2. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Reputation –0.026 0.014 –0.120* –0.126*** –0.060* –0.141** –0.088*** –0.084*** –0.194*** –0.121*** 
 (0.039) (0.057) (0.063) (0.047) (0.032) (0.055) (0.030) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033) 
Maturity –0.030*** –0.010 –0.011 0.074*** 0.057*** 0.038*** 0.115*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 
 (0.009) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Volume –0.150*** –0.172*** –0.027 0.060 0.038 –0.042 0.106*** 0.052** 0.037 –0.001 
 (0.035) (0.049) (0.049) (0.038) (0.026) (0.043) (0.026) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) 
Issuer’s rating –0.110*** –0.274*** –0.555*** –0.530*** –0.214*** –0.506*** –0.811*** –0.626*** –1.008*** –1.135*** 
 (0.022) (0.032) (0.041) (0.040) (0.029) (0.050) (0.029) (0.028) (0.038) (0.040) 
Enhancement –0.363*** –0.536*** 0.046 0.209** 0.049 –0.401*** –0.236*** –0.126** –0.281*** –0.305*** 
 (0.119) (0.171) (0.124) (0.083) (0.049) (0.098) (0.049) (0.050) (0.060) (0.071) 
Sales 0.015 0.048** –0.018 –0.098*** –0.113*** –0.107*** –0.146*** –0.080*** –0.004 0.016 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.012) (0.025) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) 
Leverage –0.000 –0.001 0.005* –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility 0.154 –0.434*** –0.053 –0.148 –0.243*** –0.114 –0.191** –0.204** –0.262** –0.136 
 (0.115) (0.155) (0.163) (0.141) (0.091) (0.161) (0.094) (0.082) (0.104) (0.104) 
ROA 0.009* 0.003 –0.001 0.003 –0.005 –0.009 –0.003 0.008** 0.000 0.015*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) 
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Growth 0.068 –0.032 0.008 0.012 0.002*** 0.001 0.024 0.000 –0.006 –0.037*** 
 (0.070) (0.037) (0.049) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.015) (0.003) (0.010) (0.014) 
Cash equivalent –0.018 0.022 0.210** 0.025 –0.018*** 0.109** –0.031** –0.012 –0.003 0.006 
 (0.072) (0.051) (0.084) (0.042) (0.004) (0.047) (0.012) (0.009) (0.006) (0.031) 
Constant 2.211*** 3.106*** 4.286*** 4.004*** 2.603*** 5.254*** 5.852*** 4.627*** 6.388*** 6.084*** 
 (0.148) (0.184) (0.220) (0.202) (0.129) (0.228) (0.124) (0.121) (0.155) (0.171) 
Observations 205 335 363 601 824 1197 1848 1728 2344 2289 
R-squared  0.729 0.579 0.688 0.666 0.557 0.327 0.643 0.526 0.441 0.436 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 4.3: Bond Issuance Yield and Reputation of Credit Rating Agencies for 
Different Maturity Categories 
This table presents the relationship between the bond issuance yield and reputation of CRAs for 
different maturity ranges. The left-hand variable is the treasury spread, which is the difference 
between the issue’s offering yield and the yield on a benchmark treasury security. All the 
variables are the same as those in Table 4.2. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Maturity < 3 
years 
3 years <= Maturity <= 5 
years 
Maturity > 5 
years 
Reputation –0.147*** –0.104*** –0.348*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.035) 
Volume –0.181*** –0.038** –0.039 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.034) 
Issuer’s rating –0.500*** –0.771*** –0.655*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.038) 
Enhancement –0.438*** –0.540*** –0.374*** 
 (0.082) (0.052) (0.038) 
Sales 0.025** –0.057*** –0.073*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) 
Leverage 0.004*** 0.006*** –0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility –0.438*** 0.074 –0.724*** 
 (0.067) (0.076) (0.110) 
ROA 0.008*** 0.000 –0.005 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) 
Growth –0.003 0.009 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.008) (0.001) 
Cash equivalent 0.019 0.007 –0.009** 
 (0.033) (0.023) (0.004) 
Constant 4.257*** 5.521*** 6.045*** 
 (0.096) (0.126) (0.172) 
Observations 5884 3356 2494 
R-squared  0.334 0.376 0.425 
Industry and year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 4.4: Bond Issuance Yield and Reputation of Credit Rating Agencies for 
Different Categories of Bonds 
This table presents the relationship between the bond issuance yield and the reputation of CRAs 
for each type of bond. The left-hand variable is the treasury spread, which is the difference 
between the issue’s offering yield and the yield on a benchmark treasury security. All the 
variables are the same as those in Table 4.2. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 CP MTN CB 
Reputation –0.115*** –0.091*** –0.160*** 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) 
Maturity 0.144 –0.001 –0.035*** 
 (0.124) (0.007) (0.009) 
Volume –0.060*** –0.012 –0.078** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.033) 
Issuer’s rating –0.653*** –0.781*** –0.522*** 
 (0.018) (0.028) (0.034) 
Enhancement –0.568*** –0.553*** –0.116*** 
 (0.073) (0.056) (0.034) 
Sales 0.026** –0.054*** –0.086*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
Leverage 0.002** 0.006*** –0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility –0.173*** 0.103 –0.155 
 (0.060) (0.068) (0.108) 
ROA 0.006** –0.000 –0.004 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) 
Growth –0.027 –0.000 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.001) 
Cash equivalent 0.011 –0.011 –0.006* 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.004) 
Constant 3.683*** 5.647*** 4.310*** 
 (0.154) (0.158) (0.233) 
Observations 5851 3515 2368 
R-squared  0.476 0.456 0.578 
Industry and year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
  
 147 
 
Appendix 4.5: Certification Effect Comparison between China Credit Rating-
Covered and China Credit Rating-Uncovered Issuers Using Propensity Score 
Matching Sample 
This table presents the certification effect change before and after CCR’s entry. The sample 
consists of 7817 issuance observations for 1327 issuers from 2012 to the end of 2015. There are 
814 firms covered by CCR and 513 firms are 1-to-1 matched from the CCR-uncovered group. 
Columns 1 to 4 present the results for Eq. 4.10 using the PSM sample. The left-hand variable is 
the treasury spread. All the variables are the same as those in Table 4.5. The Heckman sample 
shows results when considering the sample selection bias of choosing reputable CRAs. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 PSM sample  Heckman PSM sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  First stage (5) Second stage (6) 
Reputation*CCRcover 0.215*** 0.097** 0.209*** 0.102**   0.104** 
 (0.059) (0.049) (0.055) (0.049)   (0.049) 
Reputation –0.389*** –0.159*** –0.340*** –0.167***   0.105 
 (0.053) (0.044) (0.049) (0.044)   (0.239) 
CCRcover –0.474*** –0.121*** –0.369*** –0.125***   –0.132*** 
 (0.043) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036)   (0.037) 
Maturity  0.063***  0.064***  –0.037*** 0.068*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008) (0.005) 
Volume  –0.004  0.023  0.064** 0.016 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.029) (0.017) 
Issuer’s rating  –0.838***  –0.787***  0.298*** –0.816*** 
  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.039) (0.034) 
Enhancement  –0.093*  –0.087  –0.183* –0.063 
  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.104) (0.060) 
Sales   –0.221*** –0.057***  –0.021 –0.060*** 
   (0.008) (0.010)  (0.018) (0.010) 
Leverage   0.009*** 0.005***  0.002 0.005*** 
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Tangibility   –0.340*** –0.138**  –0.513*** –0.095 
   (0.067) (0.060)  (0.095) (0.071) 
ROA   –0.000 –0.000  0.020*** –0.000 
   (0.001) (0.001)  (0.005) (0.001) 
Growth   –0.006 –0.022  –0.040 –0.019 
   (0.022) (0.019)  (0.035) (0.020) 
Cash equivalent   –0.244*** –0.111***  0.056 –0.117*** 
   (0.041) (0.036)  (0.068) (0.037) 
Frequency      0.015***  
      (0.003)  
Constant 2.766*** 5.704*** 3.286*** 5.471***  –1.199*** 5.442*** 
 (0.057) (0.083) (0.085) (0.100)  (0.176) (0.104) 
Hazard       –0.170 
       (0.146) 
        
Observations 5065 5065 5061 5061  5061 5061 
R-squared (Pseudo R2) 0.144 0.413 0.260 0.421  0.037  
Prob > chi2      0.000 0.000 
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  No Yes 
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Appendix 4.6: Bond Issuance Yield and Reputation of Credit Rating Agencies: 
Propensity Score Matching Sample 
This table presents the relationship between the bond issuance yield and reputation of CRAs, 
using the PSM sample. The sample consists of 11,577 issuance observations from 2006 to the 
end of 2015. There are 6519 bonds rated by reputable CRAs and 5059 bonds are 1-to-1 matched 
from the non-reputable group. Columns 1 to 3 present the results for Eq. 4.1 using the PSM 
sample. The left-hand variable is the treasury spread. All the variables are the same as those in 
Table 2. The Heckman sample shows results when considering the sample selection bias of 
choosing reputable CRAs. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively. 
 Raw sample  Heckman sample 
   First stage Second stage 
 (1) (2) (3)  Reputation (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Reputation –0.170*** –0.218*** –0.156***   –1.335*** –3.499*** –0.420** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)   (0.127) (0.271) (0.175) 
Maturity 0.069***  0.059***  -0.040*** 0.044***  0.055*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) 
Volume –0.021**  0.028**  0.061*** 0.035**  0.035*** 
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.019) (0.014)  (0.012) 
Issuer’s rating –0.698***  –0.632***  0.100*** –0.608***  –0.621*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.021) (0.018)  (0.015) 
Enhancement –0.145***  –0.169***  0.023 –0.160***  –0.168*** 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.045) (0.033)  (0.027) 
Sales  –0.227*** –0.072***  0.055***  –0.044** –0.063*** 
  (0.005) (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.019) (0.009) 
Leverage  0.004*** 0.001  0.003***  0.005*** 0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Tangibility  –0.286*** –0.212***  –0.029  –0.172* –0.207*** 
  (0.048) (0.043)  (0.063)  (0.094) (0.043) 
ROA  0.000 –0.000  0.017***  0.003** 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Growth  0.002 0.001  0.001  0.003 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) 
Cash equivalent  –0.011*** –0.008*  0.013*  0.005 –0.006 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.010) (0.004) 
Frequency     0.015***    
     (0.002)    
Constant 3.848*** 2.224*** 3.842***  –0.841*** 4.122*** 3.280*** 3.903*** 
 (0.067) (0.072) (0.074)  (0.089) (0.080) (0.139) (0.085) 
Hazard      0.729*** 2.052*** 0.163 
      (0.079) (0.167) (0.108) 
Observations 11,577 11,515 11,514  11,514 11,514 11,514 11,514 
R-squared (Pseudo 
R2) 
0.462 0.351 0.470  0.047    
Prob > chi2     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Industry and year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
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Appendix 4.7: Variable description 
Variable 
name 
Description Period Sources 
CRAs 21-trading-day CARs (in percentage) for bonds 
surrounding the rating change announcements of 
incumbent issuer-pay CRAs 
 
2012-
2015 
calculation 
CCRfirstcover is a dummy variable equal to one if the event date of 
rating change is during the post-coverage date, otherwise 
zero 
2012-
2015 
CCR 
CCRcover a dummy variable that equals one if a firm was rated by 
CCR at any time, and zero otherwise 
2006-
2015 
CCR 
Post is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm–year–CRA 
observation is from the period after 2012, and zero 
otherwise 
2006-
2015 
Wind 
Treasury 
Spread 
the difference between the issue’s offering yield and the 
yield on a benchmark treasury security 
2006-
2015 
Wind 
Reputable a dummy variable equals 1 if the bond or firm is rated by 
joint-venture CRAs, eg., CCXI or Lianhe, zero otherwise 
2006-
2015 
Wind 
Maturity the number of years to maturity of debt 2006-
2015 
Wind 
Volume (log) the log of the par value of debt initially issued in 100 
million of RMB 
2006-
2015 
Wind 
Enhancement a dummy variable indicating the issue has credit 
enhancements 
2006-
2015 
Wind 
Rating the credit rating assigned to the debt issuer, based on a 
notch basis as follows: AAA=6, AA+=5, AA=4, AA-=3, 
A+=2, others=1 
2006-
2015 
Wind 
Leverage the ratio of total liability from the balance sheet to total 
assets (%) 
2005-
2014 
Wind 
Tangibility the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets 2005-
2014 
Wind 
Sales (log) the log of total sales in 100 Million of RMB 2005-
2014 
Wind 
ROA the return on assets that represents the profitability (%) 2005-
2014 
Wind 
Growth the year to year increase of operating income 2005-
2014 
Wind 
Cash 
equivalent 
the ratio of cash, tradable asset and receivable over 
current asset to represent the liquidity 
2005-
2014 
Wind 
Ownership a dummy variable equals to 1 if the issuer is state-owned 
company, otherwise zero 
2005-
2014 
Wind 
Listed a dummy variable equals to 1 if the issuer is a public 
company, otherwise zero 
2005-
2014 
Wind 
Frequency the number of total bond issues conducted by the firm 
during 2006 to 2015 
2006-
2015 
Wind 
IPI the investor protection index for issuer’s registered 
province 
2009 Fan (2011) 
MI the marketization index for issuer’s registered province 2009 Fan (2011) 
Ind–Mean–
Asset 
the industry average total asset (measured as the 
logarithm of total asset) of each firm’s industry in the 
prior year, calculated using only issuer-pay CRA-rated 
firms not covered by CCR as of 2015 
2006-
2015 
Wind 
 
